

**Politics, Commerce, and Colonization in Angola at the Turn of the
Eighteenth Century**

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As Políticas, O Comércio, e a Colonização em Angola na Viragem do Século XVIII

John Whitney Harvey

Resumo

A presente dissertação analisa a colonização, as políticas, e o comércio na viragem do século XVIII. Estes tópicos serão apresentados através de três capítulos que assumem dimensões espaciais distintas: o sertão Angolano, o litoral, e a perspectiva Atlântica. Separar o trabalho em limites geográficos e conceptuais facilita a percepção das ligações entre eles, e permite compreender Angola como um agregado das três áreas espaciais e conceitos coloniais, interdependentes entre si. Construindo estas ligações cruciais, cria os meios pelos quais a forma como estes processos coloniais se transformaram pode ser identificada.

O primeiro capítulo centra-se nas políticas e na colonização do sertão Angolano. Esta parte discute os métodos de colonização e introduz actores políticos e comerciais que serão relevantes aos próximos capítulos. O segundo capítulo explica a estrutura comercial Angolana no litoral, e a sua inerente vinculação ao sertão e as políticas do território. Os primeiros dois capítulos formam a fundação que permite a disquisição chegar à dimensão Atlântica pela introdução dos principais temas e personagens no capítulo final. Assim, o comércio dos escravos servirá para evidenciar a maneira como eventos que ocorreram em Angola e no Brasil se influenciaram mutuamente, e como acabaram por afetar o sertão, bem como os comerciantes do litoral de Angola. Um discurso envolvendo as ideologias da escravatura e a *Atlantic History* permite um conhecimento mais profundo do enquadramento do estudo do comércio de escravos, e como Angola foi afectada por eventos isolados que produziram processos de mudança. A tese que esta dissertação pretende provar é que as políticas, o comércio, e a colonização em Angola eram fortemente conectados por motivos económicos que instigaram um período de transformação na viragem do século XVIII.

Palavras-Chave: Angola, Políticas, Comércio, Viragem do Século XVIII, Economia

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Abstract

This dissertation explores Commerce, politics, and colonization in Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century. The work will discuss these topics through three main chapters that are spatially divided into the Angolan hinterland, the coastal region, and the Atlantic through the Angolan perspective. Separating the work into distinct geographical and conceptual boundaries makes it possible to discern the interconnectivity as well as the interdependency of Angola as an aggregate of the three geographical areas and Portuguese colonial forces. Making these important connections provides the means through which the way that these colonial processes transformed can be identified.

The first chapter focuses on politics and colonization in the Angolan hinterland. It discusses methods of colonization and introduces political and commercial actors that are relevant in following chapters. The second chapter discusses the Angolan commercial structure on the coast, and its inherent connection to the hinterland and politics in the territory. The first two chapters set the stage through introducing major themes and characters that permit the disquisition to reach the Atlantic sphere in the final chapter. Here, the Angolan slave trade will serve to evince the manner in which events that occurred in Angola and in Brazil mutually impacted each other, and as a result, the hinterland and coastal merchants. This will be done through discussing the ideologies of slavery and Atlantic History that allow a deeper understanding of the parameters through which the slave trade can be studied as well as how Angola was deeply affected by isolated events that produced processes of change. The overarching thesis that this dissertation intends to prove is that politics, commerce, and colonization in Angola were intrinsically connected through economic motives that incited a period of transformation at the turn of the eighteenth century.

Key Words: Angola, Politics, Commerce, Colonization, Turn of the Eighteenth Century, Economy

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Introduction

This thesis seeks to explore politics, commerce, and colonization at the turn of the eighteenth century in Angola. The method of analysis used to best understand the period in Angola is to divide the work into three chapters with distinct spatial and conceptual dimensions. The following discussion uses the Angolan hinterland, the coast, and the Atlantic as the three spatial reference points through which the methods of colonization, politics, and commerce can be explicated. The Angolan hinterland is to be understood as the districts along the Kwanza River, and in Benguela and the southern interior area. The Coast is comprised from South to North as Benguela, up through Luanda, the Kongo, and the Loango Coast. The Atlantic will be considered through the Angolan perspective. These dimensions are chosen because it is what contemporaries viewed as falling under Portuguese jurisdiction, as seen in documents consulted. The reason that the chapters are organized in this way is to show the interconnected nature of the themes examined. Once the interdependency is established, important trends that impacted the colonial, political, and commercial state of the Angolan territory are exposed.

The history of Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century is comparatively understudied to other locations throughout the Portuguese empire, as well as to other periods of Angolan history. However, seminal works exist that provide crucial insight into the Portuguese political and commercial structures as well as into the African communities. These books are thematically important to the entirety of the thesis in order to strengthen the framework that comprises the present disquisition. Joseph Miller's indispensable work *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade (1730-1830)* is undoubtedly the most essential and voluminous project to date on this subject matter. Although its temporal scope follows that of this thesis, it references the turn of the eighteenth century with brilliantly clear analysis that allows for better comprehending the colonial situation that precedes 1730. Miller also wrote a series of articles that prove vital for reference. Similarly, John Thornton's *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic world, 1400-1800* accompanied by many of his articles that specifically relate to the kingdom of Kongo provides information on Portuguese institutions while providing exhaustive research relating to the African dimension of Portuguese Angola. *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil During the Era of the Slave Trade* by Roquinaldo Ferreira was published in the latter part of the production of this thesis, but its readership greatly enhanced the general understanding of Angola at this time and making connections towards the close of the writing process. Additional recent works such as *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674* By Filipa Ribeiro da Silva were also formative readings that enriched

the information gathered for this dissertation. These authors and important books were formative sources for the entirety of the thesis, but other works were instrumental to particular chapters.

Books that did not prove important to the entirety of the thesis but were crucial to understanding each part covered a narrower thematic scope. For the first chapter on the Angolan hinterland, *Os Capitães-Mores no Século XVIII* by Carlos Couto was important to understanding the Military involvement of the Angolan officials in the hinterland. Important to the second chapter were *Trade and Conflict in Angola* by David Birmingham and *The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576-1870* by Phillis Martin. Phillis Martin is one of the foremost scholars on trade at the Loango Coast, however her Portuguese bibliographical and archival references are scant compared to those of other European powers. Regardless, the work serves as a superlative reference through which the study of the Portuguese perspective was made possible. The final chapter depends primarily on thematic articles as well as the books mentioned in the previous paragraph. Additional books important to the subject matter that served as supplementary readings were for example *The Atlantic Slave Trade* by Herbert S. Klein. These were not the only books that enhanced the discussion, but were certainly some of the most notable.

The entirety of the archival research cited throughout the dissertation was collected at the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino. The Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino was chosen because although other important archives exist in Lisbon, it has the most comprehensive repository of documents and manuscripts relating to administrative, financial, military, and political issues. Choosing this archive provides a focus through which immense amounts of information can be examined from issues relating to the overseas territories. The documentation consulted was from the Angolan faction of the archive, consisting of correspondence between Angola and centralized bodies such as the Overseas Council. The archival content is composed of letters and reports written by officials on the colonial situation in Angola. It also has inventories of colonial structures and petitions for offices, as well as quantitative data regarding population, imports and exports, and the slave trade. The archive is an excellent source of boundless information, however there are two identifiable problem areas evident in the documents.

The first problem area is that the manuscripts available at the archive are almost in their entirety sent from Luanda to Lisbon because of Luanda's political importance. This downplays other areas within Angola such as Benguela that were either excluded from the subject matter or characterized as more peripheral than may have been accurate. The documents therefore assume an association with Luanda, or Luanda at the very least is a reference point from which unrelated material is gauged. The second problem is detecting possible motives, or political or personal interests that conditioned the manner in which the document is written. Many of the writers of the

manuscripts were clearly cognizant of the recipients, and the content and writing style of the letters show that they were written with their audience in mind. Asking for more resources, or showing personal accomplishments within the documents was accompanied by rhetoric that was pleasing to the central authorities so that their objectives were met. An extension of this is that in many cases, the primary reason that officials that wrote to the Overseas Council for reasons other than the current state of the colony were to complain about individuals, events or resources, or to incentivize promotions. While it is important to respect the originality of the documents, the secondary sources mentioned among others as well as awareness of the motives associated with the manuscripts help to create the most accurate representation of the period.

The boxes consulted intensively at the archive were numbers 12-24, while other documents were considered for supplementary purposes such as codices 544 and 545. Consulting the dozen boxes was sufficient for studying Angola at the turn of the century encompassing the half-century between 1675 and 1725. Encapsulating the turn of the century into a quarter century on either side of the year 1700 permitted the detection of important trends, commercial and political figures, and an intimate understanding of the period in its entirety. In examining the material, it became clear that the most effective way of characterizing this period was to choose the dates 1684 to 1725. Within this framework the dates 1695 and 1720 serve as dates that produced fundamental changes, however in order to prove the importance of the dates they must be viewed as processes of change rather than just a single event.

The first chapter is a discussion of colonization and politics in the Angolan hinterland. This chapter's functionality is to set the stage for the following chapters by analyzing the ideological changes that occurred in the interior that changed the course of colonization methods. It follows by exposing the intention to militarize the interior using methods that appealed the central authorities, and increased Portuguese presence in the most important interior areas of the period using inventories and correspondences as of 1684. This includes introducing political figures that were most involved in colonizing the African populous in the interior and trading within the commercial networks.

Government officials such as the captain-majors and governors are examined within this period because they were the most important military and political figures in the Angolan hinterland. Although the governors were not physically involved in the interior, their heavy involvement in commerce drove their trade collusions with the captain-majors to impact methods of colonization and military force that shaped colonial relations with Africans. The governors also chose the captain-majors, who were the highest Portuguese authorities in the hinterland. Who the

governors elected as captain-majors gives light to why the captain-majors acted as they did, as well as how commercial prowess was the salient trait among those chosen for the position.

The major trends discussed in regard to the hinterland officials concern commerce as well. The violence and warring committed by the captain-majors was largely due to methods of enslavement and commerce, and local authorities attempted to hamper their ability to continue such practices. In 1720, a law prohibited high ranking colonial officials from commerce, which allowed other commercial actors to trade in the hinterland without the hold that the collusion between the two military officials enjoyed. This law affected not only the government officials, but trade itself within the interior zones. How this affected the interior will be examined, which transitions into commercial relations on the coast of Angola.

The second chapter deals with commercial relationships on the coast of Angola. This shows the connections that the hinterland held with the coast through commercial agents. The chapter contains an in-depth analysis of both African and European traders that were mutually vital to sustaining the entirety of the commercial system. Through discussing the commercial relationships within the Angolan economic system, the means through which they traded such as items of monetary value and credit will be discussed. Trade networks and monetary value systems within Angola enable deliberation over the impact of monopoly contracts that taxed the export of human cargo before being sent overseas. The contracts and their holders were both politically and economically vital to the territory of Angola, and serve as a perfect transition into the Loango Coast. From 1684 until the early 1720's, Portuguese and British merchants conflicted over jurisdiction over trade along the coast that culminated in Portuguese military force. This further supports the political and commercial interdependence that will be exposed in the first chapter, as well as Loango as an important contributor to the Angolan economy, especially as the slave trade expanded throughout this period and Portuguese contractors depended on Loango to meet the quotas for goods sent abroad.

The third and final chapter concerning the Angolan slave trade serves to show the Atlantic dimension of Angolan politics, commerce, and colonization. The slave trade was undoubtedly the most important contributor to the Angolan economy. The slave trade was also an insidious force that was an implicit motive for colonization. The ideological dynamic of the slave trade from both the European and African perspective will be analyzed, as well as Atlantic History. Atlantic History is a field of study that helps define the slave trade through its parameters and problem areas. Including a discussion of the state of the art of academic scholarship on the slave trade and Atlantic History provides perspective through which the Angolan slave trade can be brought into the Atlantic scope.

Comprehending the current state of study on the slave trade and Atlantic History permits discourse to reach the agents of change within the slave trade that influenced the subjects discussed in the previous two chapters. A law from 1684 restricted the amount of human cargo that could be transported from Angola to the rest of the Atlantic, which limited transportation resources and changed many aspects of trade in Angola. The discovery of gold in Brazil in 1695 was an impetus to colossal changes in the slave trade that enormously affected commerce in Angola. The political and commercial implications of gold in Brazil will be shown, leading into ramifications suffered in Angola resulting from favoring gold extraction as opposed to agricultural resources. The 1684 law continued to impact trade from this point forward, and proved to be increasingly important when the governors were excluded from trade in 1720. The law impacted the availability of slave vessels for export that the governors formerly financed. This influenced future mandates that supported increased commercial freedom in Angola as well as regularization of the slave trade in an attempt to resolve the issues created by commercial interests that reverberated throughout the entirety of the Angolan society.

Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century experienced great change in colonization, politics, and commerce with economic gain as the common denominator. These three concepts were intimately connected through economic interests that were mutually affected through formative changes in any one element. Whether in the Angolan hinterland, on the coast, or throughout the Atlantic, compositional changes and tendencies severely impacted the entirety of the territory. These fundamental connections intended for isolated purposes deeply influenced other spheres within the colony as a result of economic interests, and that is precisely what this thesis intends to prove.

I

Politics and Commerce in the Angolan Hinterland

The Angolan hinterland at the turn of the eighteenth century was a crucial frontier of colonization and commerce. This chapter seeks to discuss political, colonial, and economic trends that occurred in the Angolan interior from both the viewpoints of hinterland and coastal actors. Portuguese colonial success was essentially confined to the coast, holding largely nominal control of the Angolan interior. However, a series of jurisdictions were established along waterways such as the Kwanza River among African populations that became important commercial centers. The districts were areas that were considered essential to local trade between the Portuguese and Africans, whose local transactions influenced commercial relations on a broader scale through the use of contracted porters and financial collusions. Although the various hinterland centers were commercially significant, they served many functions, such as military frontiers. Each of the jurisdictions were occupied by infantry lead by a captain-major.¹ Some of these jurisdictions had military structures called *presídios* that held military cantonments, and were a beacon of control and commerce.

The districts in the interior became increasingly important over time as commercial routes integrated. The African communities participated in the European commerce and valued their commodities, placing importance on the locations of the Portuguese districts rather than their kingdoms. Although many of the *presídios* were located in preexisting commercial areas, it made those places more important, and especially effected kingdoms whose political centrality was not in the same place. As the Angolan slaving frontier moved eastward, the Portuguese used military force in order to capture slaves. The lucrative nature of this method of slaving incentivized commercial relationships between intermediaries in the hinterland and financiers on the coast. The most salient of these relationships was between the governors of Angola and the captain-majors.

The governor-general was the highest authority in the Angolan territory. The governor's premier position was the result of the military nature of the Portuguese overseas colonies in the period. Aside from coastal protection, development of the interior was crucial to showing the crown successful military efforts. Consequentially, frequent correspondence showed the governors rationalizing expenditures and exaggerating the state of the colony in order to be sent more

¹ Words such as military offices that have clear translations that do not detract from the original meaning are translated into English, such as in this case, from *capitães-mores* to captain-majors. This is notable, however, because of contemporary discord between the translation of terms such as this, as authors such as Joseph Miller and Mariana Cândido translate it as captain-major, whereas Filipa Ribeiro da Silva chose captain-general. For the purposes of this dissertation, I have chosen to maintain the use of modern Portuguese orthography for words that either cannot be translated into English, or that lose the essence of the word through doing so. Words of African origin such as people, institutions, place names, etc. will be presented in Anglicized spelling where possible. Although this is the case, it must be understood that quotations from contemporary texts will maintain the spelling used in each individual case.

manpower and resources. This position held a wide range of powers, and also entered commercial relationships in order to supplement their income.

The governors and captain-majors were largely involved in trade relationships, with the captain-major serving as the hinterland commercial agent that gave the governors' goods precedence over others. The captain-majors committed violent acts and war techniques in order to accrue slaves for sale in their jurisdictions, which caused incredible damage towards relationships with the African communities. Who the candidates were for these two positions may indicate why the jurisdictions as a mechanism of colonization were not as successful as they could have been as a result of economic motives. In fact, the case of the captain-major may be attributed to a strong trend of africanization that led them to identify less with Portuguese colonial interests, and more with their role as inhabitants in African communities and as merchants. At the turn of the eighteenth century, several attempts were made to hinder the violence and commercial preferences, which culminated in a law in 1720 disallowing commerce for any government official in the overseas territories. In addition to curbing the commerce conducted by the governors, it changed the captain-majors enslaving and commercial strategies in the hinterland.

The primary points of analysis will be viewed through the lens of the military government and its relationship with the interior African states. Colonization conceptually and through commercial outposts in the interior will be discussed, as well as the Africanization of the governmental roles through isolation. The militaristic rhetoric employed by governors attempting to show success in the colony to continue financing interior expeditions is fundamental in exposing the importance of the hinterland, even though their presence was largely unsuccessful as a purely dominant force. The way that militarism was presented also changed throughout this period. The governors' collusion with the captain-majors was a retrogressive act in relation to the colonization of the hinterland. Additionally detrimental were the captain-majors' conduct in their jurisdictions. The captain-majors were widely accused of being the source of many of the problems associated with Portuguese colonization, however the root of their issues were largely a result of the demographics they were drawn from and the circumstances of their surroundings. The commonality between the candidates for captain-major is that the position was viewed as a means for financial gain. Attempts were made to curb the trade relationships between governors and captain-majors that had greater impacts than just the end of their financial relationship, and this became clear by the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

Colonization Methods and The Angolan Peoples

Colonization in Angola began through exploratory expeditions extending down the coast of the African continent. Diogo Cão first explored the Portuguese territory, situated on the Southwest coast of Africa from 1482 to 1485, sent by King João II of Portugal. The continued Portuguese colonization effort began immediately by sending missionary delegates into the African kingdoms and Cão renaming the Zaire River the “Rio de São Jorge”. Almost a full century later, in 1575, Paulo Dias de Novais anchored on the Ilha das Cabras, and subsequently founded the colony’s capital city of Luanda on the mainland in 1576, officially recognized in 1605, where he became the first governor and captain-major of Angola. The position of governor-general was created almost two decades later in 1592,² of what was then the captaincy of Angola. The early focus on Luanda in the colony secured the city as the Portuguese cultural, political, and economic center of the West African littoral.

The capital city of Luanda was of essential importance to the Angolan territory. Although other port cities established such as Benguela that was 700³ kilometers South of the capital, and Loango located roughly 372 kilometers North of it were notable and gained importance throughout this period, Luanda was preeminent. This chapter focuses on the Angolan hinterland, but the fundamental place of convergence and political consolidation stemmed from this city inward. Luanda since its inception was regarded as a place that amalgamated myriad cultures, peoples, languages, and commercial styles and products. It was an extremely “africanized” community that began as a fort-city, rapidly becoming a site of major commercial activity.⁴ Contemporaries considered the city so culturally and linguistically diverse, that some referred to it as “Babylon”.⁵ Luanda, situated on a large hill on the bay, grew in commercial importance over time, and increasingly traded raw materials and human cargo throughout the Portuguese empire.

After the Dutch occupancy of Luanda from 1641 to 1648, the relationship between Angola and Brazil became clear, as military supplies and commerce were sent with overwhelming volume between the two colonies before and afterwards. The connection between the two colonies progressed with the slave trade. The slave trade was a fundamental part of the Angolan export economy, and equally crucial to Brazilian agricultural produce and mining. In fact, the institution of human export from Angola was implied in the majority of interpersonal relationships, and the lucrative aspect of it drove many individuals in powerful positions to involve themselves for personal rather than collective gain.

² Delgado, Ralph, *História de Angola: Primeiro Período e parte do segundo, de 1482 a 1607*, Luanda: Livraria Magalhães, 1961, p. 55.

³ Mariana P. Candido, “Merchants and the Business of the Slave Trade in Benguela, 1750-1850,” *African Economic History*, No. 35 (2007). pp. 1-35, p. 1.

⁴ Isabel Castro Henriques, *Percursos da Modernidade em Angola: Dinâmicas Comerciais e Transformações Sociais no Século XIX*, Lisbon: Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa, 1997, p. 110.

⁵ “babilônia”, May 23, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

It is important to understand Luanda as wielding these characteristics that inevitably drove its characterization as a colonial entrepôt. As a result, Luanda drew people who arrived voluntarily from Lisbon who sought fortune. Consequently, leading up to the eighteenth century it became an almost prerequisite qualification to hold noble status in order to be considered for a high-ranking political position, some of which were even from the royal family. Angola had an abnormally high percentage of nobility in its government positions, and the value attributed towards military positions among the Portuguese elite is perhaps evident in that seven of nine governors named in Angola after 1666 were such.⁶ Luanda, however, could not have held the commercial importance that it did without the hinterland communities.

Throughout this period, methods of colonization in the hinterland shifted from evangelization to warring and violence. The religious orders were fundamental in colonizing the native population since the very beginning of Portuguese efforts in Angola, but by the end of the seventeenth century there was a clear ecclesiastical decadence.⁷ The first expeditions were made with religious leaders and conversion was understood as a way of designating a Europeanized or subjugated individual. Religious conversion was also a way of social and political standardization, and was less overtly intrusive than other tactics. Religious schools were set up, and baptisms were commonplace throughout the colony. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, it was clear that militarism was more effective than evangelization as a means of colonization.

Four monastic orders were most predominant in Angola. The Franciscan order was dominant earlier in the colony's history, but its offshoot, the predominantly Italian Capuchin Order gained considerable ground. The Capuchin and Jesuit missions were well documented in Angola, and the Jesuits in particular owned immense amounts of land and resources. The fourth order was the Carmelites, of primarily Spanish origin, but the most influential missionaries were the Capuchins and the Jesuits. However, this period in Angolan religious history was marked more by conflicts between the orders rather than by colonization.

The religious orders in Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century did not have a harmonious relationship. Disputes over land and jurisdiction in the interior were contentious issues. Also, although many missionaries came to Angola to evangelize the African population, some of the religious figures were dependent on state administered stipends, and were responsible for the "spiritual welfare of settlers, soldiers, and administrators."⁸ Hence, evangelization was not their sole function in the territory, and the majority of religious figures were not Portuguese persons.

⁶ Bicalho, Maria Fernanda, and Ferlini, Vera Lúcia Amaral, Orgs., *Modos de Governar: Idéias e Práticas Políticas no Império Português, Séculos XVI-XIX*, São Paulo, 2005, pp. 79.

⁷ Ralph Delgado, *História de Angola: Terceiro Período 1684-1836*, Luanda: Livraria Magalhães, 1961, p. 274.

⁸ David Birmingham, *Portugal and Africa*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 71.

Although the salient purpose of the missionaries was conversion, the fact that many of the religious figures were foreign, and that the supreme authority for priestly conduct and purpose was the Vatican rather than Portugal questions their direct or purposeful involvement in Portuguese colonization initiatives. Whether the missionaries' evangelization process was consistent with Portuguese political and military aspirations or not, it is doubtful that missionaries were consciously working in stride with the Portuguese imperial pretensions.⁹ On a similar token, Portugal was unable to fulfill its responsibilities designated through the *padroado* giving the empire the task of organizing and financing religious activities in its dominion.¹⁰ Although the church was an important part of Angolan society, the political and economic means of colonization will be the focus of the discussion.

The Portuguese colonization of the Angolan peoples according to Beatrix Heintze can be considered in two categories. The first category is through voluntary vassalage and the other is through military conquest. The Portuguese did not have a particular efficient "technique" that lead to colonizing the African peoples, but maintaining the idea of Africans as underdeveloped aided in asserting dominance.¹¹ Before discussing the ways in which the local kingdoms were "colonized", the word 'colonization' must be discussed. If colonization is agreed upon to denote political control of a collective of settlers from a common external origin over those native to a particular place, then the means (voluntary or forced) to the end of political control is the central issue. However, the root of the word 'colonization' is the same as that of 'culture'. The Latin root word, *colere* means 'cultivate', originally understood for agricultural signification.¹² This word, when reapplied to indigenous societies' subjugation to Portuguese political dominance in Angola, implies that the indigenous societies adopted the colonial political infrastructure, and cultural norms in a subservient manner, coming under the European cultural norms. With this assertion designated as the motive of colonization, the way in which it was realized can also be defined.

Catarina Madeira Santos highlights three different styles of colonization. The first designation is colonization as translation or transcription. What this type infers is that a system of imperial language is used that transmits ideologies or institutions of colonialism. For example, political language that identifies a colonial system, or hierarchies of vassalage of one group to another creates the perception of subjugation of one demographic over another. The next type is defined as tangential colonialism, or 'entrepôt' Colonialism. This refers to elements such as the *presídios* that were spread throughout the territory in different areas conducive to sustained contact

⁹ Birmingham, *Portugal and Africa*, p. 72.

¹⁰ Adrian Hastings, *The Church in Africa: 1450-1950*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 72.

¹¹ Henriques, p. 40.

¹² Carlos Alberto Medeiros, *A Colonização das Terras Altas de Huíla (Angola)*, Lisboa: Universidade de Lisboa Instituto da Alta Cultura, 1976, p. 4

with the native populous and it is understood as intermittent or minimal colonialism. The last type is colonialism as invasion. This clearly implies a set of beliefs or principles of domination, and the direct intention of subordinating a particular sector of humanity.¹³

The three aforementioned types of colonialism appear not only to be almost never mutually exclusive in Angola's case, but in fact in many cases all three simultaneously held true. Colonialism as translation and colonialism as invasion both stem from an ideological standpoint, whereas the *entrepôt* is a physical architectural presence. Although the *presídios* were of an intrinsically military nature creating an image of dominance and military force, the difference between the functionality of the structure and the actions performed by its inhabitants were often very different. The placement of the structures made them prime areas for markets, and agriculture as well. The military structures were considered to be manifestations of colonial dominance, but their commercial component was the most important. However, their isolated state also produced mutual cultural acquisitions. Because the *presídios* were placed in the hinterlands of Angola and served several different functions, many of the inhabitants experienced stark manifestations of cultural mixing resulting from long stints in the isolated centers. The Military men often intermarried, spoke the local language, and adopted local customs. A disconnect between the positions purpose and its execution differed greatly as a result, and will be discussed at length later in the chapter.

The most pertinent form of colonialism in this context, and which may serve best as an extension of *entrepôt* colonialism, is colonialism through economic means. As a result of Portuguese presence in the Angolan territory, displacing African peoples that preceded them, greater integration occurred. The slave trade was the driving force between many wars, dislocation efforts, and commercial transactions that provided for a broader reach of interpersonal interactions and restructuration of societies. This also led to many people changing what was societally valued in terms of food, raw materials, and clothes, creating far more dependence on trade and monetary systems for survival. The natural progression of such trend included the standardization of commercial ideologies and methods, as the cultures internalized certain trends or goods as indicative of status or livelihood. Although the Portuguese presence in Angola was largely nominal, almost in its entirety east of the Atlantic coast, the physical and cultural proximity between the Portuguese and Africans created complex commercial, social, and political relationships that inevitably proved to be the most effective form of colonization. In fact, the "impossibility" of forced colonization in the Angolan interior obliged the Portuguese to rely on the "colonizing effects" of commerce and market places, making the African communities rely both indirectly and

¹³ Catarina Madeira Santos, *Um Governo Polido Para Angola: Reconfigurar Dispositivos do Dominio: (1750-c.1800)* PhD Diss, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales Paris and Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2005, p. 14.

directly on Portuguese commercial and political structures.¹⁴ The primary sources available today that construct the colonial reality of Angola use language that indicates a colonial political and military structure, but the motives of the officials are often tainted with intent to justify their actions and presence in Angola to the central powers. Because of the lack of sources from a plurality of perspectives, using economic means as the terms for colonialism in Angola allows for it to be discussed not just through the identification of colonial language, but by identifying a ‘process of subjugation’.¹⁵

The Angolan territory that the Portuguese either considered under their jurisdiction or were involved with through commercial and political networks was extremely geographically diverse, with many topographical and faunal differences. To the North of the colony splicing the equator was a rainforest that extended from the coast inward, surrounding much of the interior of the Congo River. Tapering off from the rainforest was the Savannah Mosaic, comprised of a dryer, grassier, and less dense forest that extended south to the bottom of the tributaries of the Congo River. From the area just above Luanda, down to the Kunene River, along side the sliver of land between it and the coast that makes up part of the Namib Desert is a woodland area. Directly below Luanda, however, was the Kwanza River that served as the most accessible route inland and its banks housed the greatest population of Portuguese personnel off the coast, as well as the greatest interior colonial presence. To the other side of the woodland area is the Kalahari Desert that has intermittent patches of forest, and a swamp reservoir in the North. Southern central Angola is also home to mountainous regions up to the central Angolan Huíla Plateau, about 225 kilometers inland.

Because of the harsh climatic conditions, the different kingdoms or peoples of eighteenth century Angola are most effectively placed using topographical borders such as rivers because the highest population densities were located close to fresh water sources. There were several African communities that were crucial to this period of Portuguese colonization in Angola. The Vili Kingdom covered as much as 460 miles along the Western coast, extending from Cape Lopez down to the Congo River. This expanse encompassed major ports of export, including Loango Bay and Cabinda.¹⁶ The Kingdom of Kongo that lay on either side of the Congo River negotiated with Portuguese missionaries, traders, and other personnel since the inception of their attempts at a permanent stronghold in Angola. Above the Malebo Pool (formerly Stanley Pool),¹⁷ a rather densely populated area, were the Tyo (or Teke) peoples. All of these northern kingdoms may

¹⁴ Henriques, pgs. 40, 105.

¹⁵ Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara, Ruth H. Lindeborg, *Black British Cultural Studies*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p. 88.

¹⁶ Martin, Phillis, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 158.

¹⁷ Alberto Vasconcellos da Costa e Silva, *A Enxada e a Lança: A África Antes dos Portugueses*, São Paulo: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1992, p. 52.

actually have originated from directly above the Malebo Pool. In fact, linguistic and cultural constants indicate that the Teke, Vili, and Kongo Kingdoms were likely previously connected.¹⁸ Along the right boarder of the Kwango river, resided the Yaka, directly above the Shinje peoples, with the Chokwe at the bottom of the river. To the right of these Kwango River inhabitants were the Lunda that migrated substantially throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century becoming deeply involved in the slave trade. The same can be said for the Jaga who referred to themselves as the Imbangala, a group of disputed origin that covered a large expanse of the central plateau east of Luanda, by the Kwanza River.¹⁹ The Jaga were accused of committing both infanticide and anthropophagy, many times acquiring new members not just by birth, but by the acquisition of Africans fleeing slavery or persecution from their original kingdoms. Some of the confusion that arose over their origin and composition may be attributed to coastal African contemporaries generalizations, labeling unknown Africans coming from the interior of the colony as Jaga.²⁰ However, the Kimbundu speaking peoples of the Luanda Plateau such as the Ndongo that was an aggregate of the Kimbundu societies suffered the greatest Portuguese influence. This area was originally meant to designate Angola, whose namesake was the Ndongo leader called the “Ngola”.²¹ Where Portuguese dominance was essentially nominal elsewhere, the Ndongo were enormously subjected to the earliest period of the slave trade in Angola, depleting their population and destroying their sovereignty. Where slavers drew from the periphery of other kingdoms through war, the Ndongo were exposed to central attacks. The Ovimbundo covered a large expanse below the kwanza toward Benguela, where although the city was established in 1617, they met the colonizers with a great deal of resistance. By the eighteenth century however, they were “inexorably drawn into the Portuguese economic system.”²² To the South of the Ovimbundo were the Ovambu peoples above the Cunene River.²³

Although these were the Major kingdoms or ethnic groups of the time, other states were important to this era of Angolan history. These other groups were either lesser in population, further into the Angolan hinterland, or were considered vassal states to other powers. The division of native chiefdoms into vassals and non-vassals was “a determining element of Portuguese rule in Angola.”²⁴ Some of the vassal duties were free commerce with the exclusion of foreign

¹⁸ Martin, p. 4.

¹⁹ Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, (1730-1830)*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p. 28.

²⁰ Martin, 18.

²¹ David Birmingham, ‘Chapter 5: Central Africa from Cameroun to the Zambezi’ in J. D. Fage and Roland Oliver, ed. *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 4. 1600-1790, 1975, p. 351.

²² Birmingham, *Central Africa*, p. 350.

²³ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 24.

²⁴ Beatrix Heintze, “Luso-African Feudalism in Angola?: the Vassal Treaties of the 16th to the 18th Century” Coimbra: Instituto de História Económica e Social, 1980, p. 111.

competitors, porters for officials, and the extradition of slaves. The most important obligation was military service, and “without this, the Portuguese could not have maintained themselves in Angola, let alone conquered other regions.”²⁵ What would previously have been considered rather endogamous communities underwent a period of transformation, both in relation to the way that the kingdoms interacted, and how they viewed commercial relationships. Whether implicated by the changing economic value set, or overtly through commercial exchange, the slave trade as an economic incentive was the driving force to these changes.

Portuguese military expeditions were engulfed in a state of almost constant war, and other European powers such as the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French became involved in the colony’s commercial relationship. This was an extremely violent period in Angolan history, with an appalling death rate. Communities were severely depopulated because of war, raids, slavery, or climatic conditions, creating communities of castaways or the integration of fleeing Africans into neighboring kingdoms.²⁶ The last quarter of the seventeenth century showed the fall of many of the African monarchs into vassalage. One example would be the establishment of a fort at Pungo a Ndongo in 1671, marking the complete subversion of the Ndongo.²⁷ What increased interaction may have achieved however, is a fundamental change in the African political and economic infrastructure. The social structure of many of the African kingdoms was linked to the number of dependents. The African ideology of slavery was viewed in terms of what a person was able to give. The poorest in the communities could only offer their services, and thus served those of higher status in the community. This economic philosophy was based in the African ‘use-based’ economy that valued the immediate return of an object, whether human or otherwise. It appears inconceivable that the Africans would offer slaves from their own communities to the Europeans, but this seems to have originated from the “misplaced projections of a modern liberal civilization’s individualistic ethic” into a situation in which people sensitive to the omnipresence of death “apparently calculated value in forms more enduring than fragile individual human lives.”²⁸ Further analysis of African ideologies of slavery follows in the third chapter.

The African political economy highlighted the importance of possessing scarce material goods that were symbolic of power, and as exotic material goods became more common in Angola, the acquisition of dependents as slaves became increasingly essential. Consequently, the slave trade

²⁵ Although Beatrix Heintze believes the institution of vassalage to be an important element this time period, she contends that it is perhaps insufficient to label this as feudalism, because of the inherent codependency of the relationship. Beatrix Heintze, “Luso-African Feudalism in Angola, p. 122.

²⁶ Miller provides the example of increased war against the Ovimbundo, that gave rise to the Kioko, or Chokwe “those who fled,” East of the Kwango river, Joseph Miller, 38; Joseph C. Miller, “Cokwe Expansion, 1850- 1900;” occasional paper, no. I, 2d ed. rev., Madison: African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, 1974.

²⁷ David Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and their Neighbours under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p.126; Henriques, p. 114.

²⁸ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 40.

was an agent of ideological change that further incentivized militarism and warfare in hopes of capturing slaves as spoils of war as the evolution from slaves as dependents or as power, to slaves as commodities became essential and war was the most secure way of obtaining them. The transition to a slave economy of export and credit systems inevitably changed the composition of many African kingdoms. An increased importance placed on commercial exchange became a centralizing force for the African kingdoms, creating trade markets and merging the centralized power.²⁹ The trade markets as a centralizing power was contingent upon a previous decentralization before reforming societies to incorporate the markets circulating goods. Decentralization as a first step was crucial in that it eroded African social institutions, and rebuilt them to value European institutions and commodities.³⁰

The Kongo is an example of an African Kingdom that the Portuguese were heavily involved in that experienced a great transformation at the turn of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period the kingdom experienced immense sociopolitical strife and constant war. The capital, Mbanza Kongo, renamed São Salvador by the Portuguese was the center of political power and commerce. However, a series of factors greatly disrupted the internal dynamics of the kingdom that caused immense decentralization and a shift to the coastal city of Mbanza Nsoyo. John Thornton contends that there were a number of agents of change rather than merely Portuguese war efforts. Instead of major events such as the Portuguese victory at the Battle of Mbvila in 1665, beginning a half-century period of change in the composition of the Kingdom of Kongo, he states that it is necessary to examine cultural, political, or geographical aspects using a methodology akin to the ‘Annales School’ rather than relying solely on events.³¹ Although there may have been other circumstances, David Birmingham contends that the salient factor for the decomposition throughout this time in the Kongo was pressures that emerged as a result of the slave trade, putting Mbanza Nsoyo at the forefront.³²

Mbanza Nsoyo became far more important to the Kongo, especially after defeating the Portuguese in 1670 with Dutch aid.³³ Although the capital São Salvador was in poor condition after sustained war up until this point, the Kongo was extremely important for trade routes in search of raw materials and as of 1700, salt on the coast. The decentralization as a result of wars at the end of the seventeenth century inevitably restructured the kingdom, resulting in greater importance of trade relationships. Because Mbanza Nsoyo was situated on the coast, its inhabitants accrued a great deal

²⁹ Miller, Joseph, p. 136.

³⁰ Ferreira, Roquinaldo, *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil During the Era of the Slave Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 14.

³¹ John Thornton, *The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641-1718*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983, p. xix.

³² Birmingham, *History of Africa*, p. 329.

³³ Anne Hilton, *The Kingdom of Kongo*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 202.

of wealth through trade, which contributed to São Salvador's decline as well. In fact, Mpinda, the port at Mbanza Nsoyo became the "main port of exit for slaves shipped out of the Kongo for the trans-Atlantic slave trade."³⁴ This shift that occurred throughout the period of civil war in the Kongo, decentralizing the state, shifted much of its power to the coast and markets became a driving force for population density rather than political power or agriculture as centralization was restored to the kingdom under Pedro IV in 1715.³⁵ The central markets and importance of coastal export proved more important than other factors in the re-composition of the kingdom. As previously shown for the African coastal communities from Benguela to the Kongo Kingdom, the Vili Kingdom on the Loango coast succumbed to the same fate. The economic relationships furnished between the Africans and the Portuguese created interlinked economies, and by the eighteenth century, the Vili experienced socio-political changes that correlated to the expanding slave trade on their coast as well. New products, interactions, and opportunities for ambitious individuals inevitably lead to an increasingly integrated economic system that consumed many of the African societies.³⁶

Militarization of the Angolan Hinterland

As economic incentives proved vital to the natives' connection to the Portuguese, the same is true to the intra-imperial conflicts in the Portuguese government. The Portuguese central political structure held an inherently militaristic nature at the turn of the eighteenth century. There existed several nuclei of power, but military dignitaries that enjoyed a wide range of political freedom held the preeminent positions. The highest political authority in the territory was the Governor-General, who served for all intensive purposes as the commander in chief. The royal authorities chose the governor, who presided for triennia.³⁷ The selection process for the governor throughout the seventeenth century was mediated through a 'competition' of candidates to the Overseas Council,³⁸ who were royal advisors on colonial policymaking. The Overseas Council was given a particular amount of time in which it would present the written candidacies, and open them to a vote.³⁹ The selection of the governors was based on the royal policy of awarding mercês, or rewards of honorific positions for "loyal service to the crown,"⁴⁰ although the allocation of these titles was

³⁴ Thornton, *Kingdom of Kongo*, pp. 53-54.

³⁵ Thornton, *Kingdom of Kongo*, p. 113.

³⁶ Martin, p. 159.

³⁷ Ralph Delgado, *História de Angola*, s.l., Edição do Banco de Angola, s.d., Volume I, p. 356-57

³⁸ Nuno Gonçalo, Monteiro, "Governadores e Capitães-Mores do Império Atlântico Português" in Bicalho, Maria Fernanda, and Ferlini, Vera Lúcia Amaral, Orgs., *Modos de Governar: Idéias e Práticas Políticas no Império Português, Séculos XVI-XIX*, São Paulo, 2005, p. 100.

³⁹ Monteiro, p.100.

⁴⁰ Ross Little Bardwell, *The Governors of Portugal's South Atlantic Empire in the Seventeenth Century: Social Background, Qualifications, Selection, and Reward*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, p. 51.

given in an increasingly indirect manner from the throne throughout the Ancien Regime.⁴¹ When there was not a clear favorite, or when the decision concerned a particularly important governor, the decision would be sent up to the Council of State. This post was understood as direct representation of the crown, and the metropole preferred governors coming from Lisbon, and some arrived at Luanda from a previous military post in Brazil.

The Overseas Council preferred candidates that followed instructions and showed deep loyalty to the throne. To ensure allegiance to the patria when sent to the overseas such as Angola, the crown “turned to the strongest defender of the throne,” the military nobility.⁴² Because of corruption, disobedience, a bad economy, and external military threats, the Overseas Council was pressured to choose competent governors. The governors selected almost always had experience overseas, as well as in “active combat,”⁴³ and belonged to prestigious military orders such as the Order of Christ, which were inextricably linked to the throne.⁴⁴ In order to keep the governors’ behavior in check, they were subjected to devassas,⁴⁵ as well as a review upon completion of their term. Regardless, the distance from the metropole and the power obtained gave way to mistreatment of the position and corruption.

The governor’s primary functions extended beyond the military sphere into the judicial and civil as well, as stated in the *Regimento*⁴⁶ to Aires de Saldanha de Meneses on February 12, 1676.⁴⁷ The first *regimento* was given to D. Manuel Pereira Forjaz in 1607,⁴⁸ and became a standard for governors at the beginning of their terms. The *regimentos* indicated not only what the Crown expected of gubernatorial conduct, but also goals for the continued colonization of Angola. One example is the *regimento* from 1624 to Fernão de Souza that set the stage for many facets of the period of the Ancien Regime. Some of the plans in place were to more intensively inventory resources such as military artillery, propagate the faith for greater integration, better define judiciary and financial issues and jurisdiction, improve the contentious relationship with the African population, and regulate the influx of ships as well as trade with foreigners.⁴⁹ The broad natured

⁴¹ Maria Fernanda de Olival, *Honra, Mercê, e Venalidade: as Ordens Militares e o Estado Moderno em Portugal (1641-1789)*, Tese Doc., Évora, 1999, p. 116.

⁴² Bardwell, p. vii.

⁴³ “guerra viva”

⁴⁴ Bardwell, p. 148.

⁴⁵ A judicial investigation.

⁴⁶ *regimentos* were royal ordinances of what the crown expected of the governors duties. A *Regimento* was in essence a standard of conduct for the governors.

⁴⁷ “while you serve the said government, you will have civil and judicial jurisdiction over all inhabitants and those present in this kingdom and in all else that it will be” “Hey por bem que em quanto servirdes o dito governo tendão jurisdição no civil e no crime em toda a gente moradora e estante nese reyno e em toda a mais que a elle for” February 12, 1676, AHU, Angola, Códice 544.

⁴⁸ Delgado, *vol. II*, p. 11.

⁴⁹ See Beatrix Heintze, *Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII*, Stuttgart, Verlag Wiesbaden: GMBH, 1985. p. 140-154.

power bestowed upon the governors evidenced in documents such as in this case not only showed the importance of the military in the colony, but it created myriad conflicts of interest, and set the stage for the governor to engage in illicit acts for personal gain. This power, although, did not go unnoticed by other authorities such as the Municipal Council,⁵⁰ the Ouvidor-Geral⁵¹, and the Provedor da Fazenda.⁵² These three power structures covered the civil, judicial, and financial matters respectively. They created an extreme amount of internal conflict, sending numerous complaints to the Overseas Council about disagreements amongst themselves, most often dealing with the governor and another party.

Although there was a wide range of military ranks in Angola, the ambiguity of the spectrum of duties allocated to the governor and captain-major allowed for misuse of their power for personal gain. Regardless of this, the great majority of contemporary correspondence between the governor and the imperial authorities constructed an image of a militarizing state. The very structure of the colony was intended as such, and it is clear that the crown intended to maintain the status quo. This is manifested in the penchant that the crown displayed towards those faithful to the throne, and certain actions that the crown took, such as reinstating the Mestre de Campo on June 12, 1703 that served as superior to the Municipal Council, and governed the province in the absence of the Governor. Eight years later, in 1711, the Municipal Council attempted to regain control, but were rejected again on December 9, 1712,⁵³ and then once again after another attempt in 1714, maintaining the Mestre de Campo as the governor's replacement. It appears that the preferential treatment that the crown gave the army officials was to their own detriment. The military officials were meant for the defense and expansion of the colony but through the predilection towards military officials, the crown did not consider the potential difficulty that these very people would have in governing the colony. The lack of experience or aptitude in governance that people such as the Mestre de Campo were proclaimed by the Council to have exhibited further exposes the crown's intent as to maintain the military nature regardless of personal performance. The crown eschewed the appointment of those born in the overseas to maintain the interests of the kingdom as the primary objective, but as a result, often their level of competence in terms of governance was dissatisfactory. Appointees from the metropole were removed from their former colonial realities, and were either not prepared to govern within the Angolan colonial context, or proved indulgent or opportunistic upon ascendance to their positions.

⁵⁰ The Municipal Council (Senado da Camara) was the civil governing body of Luanda, consisting of hierarchical posts, including an elected group of council officials.

⁵¹ The Ouvidor, was the Crown Magistrate, and among various functions was the president of the Municipal Council after 1706, but was replaced in 1722 by the Juiz de Fora, creating further conflict.

⁵² Fiscal inspector; Official appointed with jurisdiction to control the colony's officials in relation to fiscal and economic issues, as well as control over the colony's finances.

⁵³ The response states that the crown has more faith in someone whose profession is 'the defense of the colony', than a person involved in a political or civil life, December 9, 1712, AHU, Códice 545.

The military nature of the colony is evidenced in the selection of military officials as preeminent leaders at the turn of the eighteenth century, and the militaristic rhetoric within the documents sent to the central authorities supports this. The military officials frequently discuss subjects with a militaristic nature such as war, the need for more resources, or personnel. The fidalgo ethos of the governors is evident through appeasement to the Crown, especially since it is clear to them that the king was primarily interested in expanding colonial influence. The servile ethos, or displays of zealousness in upholding the crown's interests were often coupled with actions of authoritarianism and violence in their powerful positions.⁵⁴ This indicates that they could have used the military language in order to satisfy the central authorities, for reasons that were favorable to themselves.

On May 22, 1683, for example, a communiqué written on behalf of the future Governor Luís Lobo da Silva that assumed the position a year later outlined three of his intentions for the arrival. The first is that the territory needs “a great deal of help that consists of four hundred soldiers”⁵⁵ in order to “save” the colony. The existing soldiers were less numerous, and very costly to the royal endowment, prompting the need for “quantity and quality of the soldiers”.⁵⁶ The second was that he planned to “increase the amount of cavalry” while contracting them from “Brazil without outlay from the royal treasury.” The third element was the transportation of “ammunition, arms, and artillery that was necessary.”⁵⁷ These three elements are clear examples of the militaristic rhetoric. Because governor Lobo da Silva’s arrival was still pending at the time that this document was written and his promises were conditioned by correspondence with Angola rather than experience, it is highly implausible that he could have known exactly what would benefit the colony. Even though the governor’s rank was military, and it is natural that the document would be substantively military related, he emphasizes a notable increase in resources, even though it also states “it could be necessary to continue warring.”⁵⁸ Without urgent need of resources or a perceived immediate threat at the time, the desire to emphasize such need to the Crown and to arrive to the territory with such a large number of reserves shows itself as an intentional display of militarism.

Governor Luis Lobo da Silva was not the only example of the governor’s ethos of servitude to the throne. Several other examples exist of other governors attempting to validate their military role in the colony, showing great importance to their post. João de Silva e Sousa brought with him sixty soldiers upon arrival to Angola in 1684, as well as others such as João Saldanha da Gama who

⁵⁴ Laura de Mello e Souza, *O Sol e a Sombra: Política e Administração na América Portuguesa no Século XVIII*, São Paulo: Editora Schwartz LTDA., 2006, p. 366.

⁵⁵ “hum grande socorro que constasse de quatrocentos soldados” May 22, 1683, AHU, cx. 12.

⁵⁶ “quantidade, e qualidade dos soldados” May 22, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁵⁷ “acrescentar o numero de cavalaria”, “Brasil sem dispendio da Fazenda Real”, “municoens, armas, e artilheria de que necessitava”, May 22, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁵⁸ “podia ser necessario continuar a Guerra” May 22, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

promised two hundred new military men in 1721 when he passed through Angola.⁵⁹ Once in Angola, the governors also sent notices showing the necessity to fortify, proposing to build a new fort, as well as stock the existing structures throughout the colony with ammunition, military garrisons, and other resources essential to the colony's protection.⁶⁰ A high percentage of these soldiers would have been destined for the hinterland *presídios* that were in perpetual need of personnel.

An additional way in which the militarism was shown was through the general conception of Angola as a militarizing force through descriptions of the different forts and *presídios*. A document from the same era, November 20, 1684, indicates that the 400 soldiers that arrived in the transition in governorship between João da Silva e Sousa and Luís Lobo da Silva had come into fruition, making the nine present military campaigns equal seven hundred total personnel.⁶¹ This is perceived as a triumphant feat in increasing the numbers of soldiers that could be dispersed throughout the area, feeding the interior with military aid. The document gives an inventory of all of the people and assets that each *presídio* contained, focusing mostly on the *presídios* in Cassandama, Muxima, Massangano, Cambambe, and Pedras, as well as a description of the state of the jurisdiction of Dande, discussing the need for such personnel.

The *presídios* were where the military personnel resided. These were made from pug, placed by water, and at commercial centers.⁶² The *presídios* placed in commercial centers in the interior along the Kwanza River were Massangano (1582), Cambambe (1582), Ambaca (1617), Pedras (1671), and Muxima (1595). South of the Kwanza in the Benguela region were Benguela (1617), and Caconda (1680).⁶³ Although Benguela is situated near the coast, it is included among the *presídios* for the purposes of this paper because it shared all of the traits that the other *presídios* held, and was certainly peripheral to the Luanda officials. Each *presídio*, except for Muxima and Massangano had a military cantonment, and were staffed, along with the captain-major, with sergeants, lieutenants, and ajudantes, among others including a few dozen soldiers.⁶⁴ As these *presídios* were spread throughout the hinterland world, they were in constant contact with the African populous, and the lowly or undesirable Europeans. Closed off in their limited surroundings, the captain-majors were confined to their *presídios*, often times that were in a state of decadence

⁵⁹ March 4, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

⁶⁰ March 4, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

⁶¹ November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx 12.

⁶² Eunice R.J. P.L. Jorge da Silva, "A administração de Angola: Século XVII" (Unpublished MA Diss., Universidade de Lisboa, 1996), 2 vols., p. 198.

⁶³ These appear to be the earliest dates, whereas in some cases dates differ in terms of occupation, inauguration, etc.; Childs, Gladwyn Murray, "The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960), pp. 271-279, p. 279.

⁶⁴ Nd, August, 1713, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

and disrepair. This was the reality of the military official, surrounded by endless thick vegetation, whose only explicitly official function was the safety of the area.

The *presídios* guarded by the captain-majors in the hinterland that additionally aided coastal conflict when necessary presumably experienced difficulties in their maintenance and effectiveness at the turn of the eighteenth century. Understanding that there were several contributing factors to the *presídios*' decline, there may have been ulterior motives to characterizing the structures in this way. There are several accounts of the condition of the *presídios* throughout the period, but three main accounts create an image of degeneration. The first two sources are inventories of the resources within the structures including personnel with lists of numbers and ranks as well as various products. As mentioned above, taking inventories was important to showing the current state of affairs. The third source is a letter from the governor of Angola to Lisbon. The three documents, from 1684, 1713, and 1729 respectively maintain evidence symptomatic of the downfall of the structures, but the way in which the material is presented speaks more to possible motives for having made these distinctions, than substantiating legitimate ruin.

By 1684, the *Presídio* of Muxima held several military ranks, such as a captain-major, a tambor, lieutenant, sergeant, a corporal, an ajudante, a clerk, as well as forty-five soldiers. It housed an immense amount of guns, gunpowder and ammunition, citing "200 firearms,"⁶⁵ as well as levers, axes, and other goods such as food and agricultural equipment. The *presidio* was described as containing everything it needed, and aside from fear of neighboring vassals and general poverty of the surrounding inhabitants, was in good condition.

The *Presídio* of Massangano was in a similar state, with the same military officers occupying the *presídio*, yet this one held sixty soldiers, fifteen more than Muxima. The *presídio* was in the third most populous area in Portuguese Angola, and placed in the "heart of the hinterland."⁶⁶ It was in constant danger of attack, and was adequately equipped with much more ammunition and resources than those of the other *presídios*, including military and agricultural aid from the African vassals in the vicinity that proved "valuable" to the defense and upkeep of the *presídio*.⁶⁷ The *presídio* of Cambambe had fewer residents and less quantity yet similar supplies, listing only fifty-five firearms. Ambaca was in similarly adequate condition, although in a state of constant war with neighboring peoples, especially the 'reiy Jinga', and it housed a Jaga by the name Calandulas, as well as one named Quinhengo Quialaza, that had separated from the quilombo by Cassange, becoming 'vassals' of the conquest.⁶⁸ Many of the surrounding populations were "obliged" to do

⁶⁵ "armas de fogo-200" November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁶⁶ "coração do certao" November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx 12.

⁶⁷ "valoroços" November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁶⁸ November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

agricultural work, as well as serve in the wars when necessary. The Presídio das Pedras was in a constant state of war as well, because of rebellious vassals that had already begun to cause damage towards the presídio.⁶⁹

In the territory of Benguela, the presídio was “of great importance and very lucrative,” as a function of the slave trade.⁷⁰ It was equipped with substantially more resources, including several military officials, and one hundred and two soldiers. Benguela had such a surplus of firearms, that not only were all of the soldiers equipped, but “some at the trading house.”⁷¹ The data presented indicates the relatively positive state that the presídios were in. Granted there was opposition from vassal states, and there existed other climatic or interpersonal difficulties, the presídios appeared to be adequately equipped. The major issues presented were a constant need of potable water, and that commerce was maintained in the hands of the few. Each *presídio* was presented with how many ‘vassals’ were expendable for military purposes, and that they (in explicit reference to the African population) “<were> extremely poor and without commerce nor other earnings.”⁷² It is notable that these military documents reinforced the idea that the structures had sufficient resources, but that the commercial and vassal relationships had been strained.

By 1703, as an interlude between 1684 and 1713, contemporaries complained that the presídios had experienced a great deal of destruction. These establishments had been “very damaged” due to negligence, and much of their stock was essentially unusable due to rust.⁷³ Nearly thirty years after the initial inventory was taken, in 1713 an update was provided that appears to be an attempt to show that the presídios were in an acceptable state. This inventory follows the French intervention discussed below and strained relationships with the Africans at the locations of the majority of the *presídios*. Until this period, in preparing for further unrest they had rebuilt and restocked the losses that resulted from the intrusions. In virtually every case, there were more military officials guarding each presídio by this time. The Presído in Ambaca, for example, grew from forty soldiers to one hundred and three.⁷⁴ Although the number of soldiers more than doubled, the resources within the presídio worsened substantially. Even though the presídio appears to have been restocked throughout the period between the two inventories (the number of firearms rose from 60 to 158)⁷⁵, of the one hundred and fifty-eight firearms present, eighty-three of them were deemed unusable. The variety of goods was also drastically reduced.⁷⁶ Muxima may have

⁶⁹ November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁷⁰ “de grande importancia e de muito lucro” November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁷¹ “alguns da caça da feitoria” November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁷² “sam pobríssimos sem comersio nem outras ganancias” November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁷³ “muito damnificadas” March 22, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

⁷⁴ AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42., 1713.

⁷⁵ November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12; 1713, AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42.

⁷⁶ AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42., 1713.

experienced the most drastic decrease, because as of 1713, there were only twenty two more soldiers than had previously protected the *presídio*, although the number of fire arms reduced from 200, to seventy eight, “all poorly prepared.”⁷⁷ The *presídio* das Pedras more than doubled in the number of military personnel, and although the number of items such as guns increased from fifty to one hundred and thirty nine, ninety of them were classified as too old, leaving only forty nine as adequate pieces of machinery. The *presídio* at Cambambe appears to have been the only one that visibly increased in personnel, and in equipment throughout the thirty years, more than doubling in military residents and employable utilities. Benguela by 1713 only held forty-six soldiers, and fifteen military officials, which is only one half of what it had in 1684. The stock had depleted immensely, and the goods such as firearms were numbered at one hundred and thirty nine, although only twenty-five were operational. The incentive to show that the hinterland military structures were increasing in number of personnel and resources signifies improvement of the inland colonization. The *presídio* at Caconda even lists a collection of French guns, suggesting the element of victory over the European aggressors. However, categorizing the guns into usable and old may indicate that even though the material resources contained in the interior were growing in number, they needed an influx of new resources to replace the old in order to continue the militarizing hinterland project.

The apparent trend of the decadence of the state of the *presídios* continued throughout this period to such a degree, that by the end of Governor Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque’s first triennia in 1729, he communicated the neglect and misuse at the hinterland structures through a missive to Lisbon. Because the governor’s tenure began in 1726, the document discusses the state of the colony until that year, and what he did to improve the situation. By this time, the territory was in “such a miserable state for its defense, as well as in equal ruin in the administration of justice, towards its total perdition, because the insults, robberies, and disorder lead to its ultimate decadence.”⁷⁸ The image constructed of the *presídios* was that they were not only in decline, but many were in atrociously poor condition. The *presídio* in the Benguela territory was in such poor condition, that the number of soldiers was reduced to thirty, there was no medical help available, and the walls of the fort were “ruined.” The gate had been unhinged and destroyed, and all the artillery was dismounted. African militants in turn killed the captain-major of Benguela, Francisco de Souza da Fonseca, as well as five other military officials.⁷⁹ This insinuated that the captain-

⁷⁷ “todas mal preparadas” AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42., 1713.

⁷⁸ “tao miseravel estado para a sua defença, como em igoal ruina na administração da justiça para a sua total perdicao porque os insultos, roubos, e dozordens caminhavao para a sua ultima decadencia.” May 21, 1729, AHU, Angola, cx. 24.

⁷⁹ May 21, 1729, AHU, Angola, cx. 24.

majors injustices towards the natives continued to the degree that they revolted against him, especially at the convenience of less troops stationed there.

The governor listed a series of things that he attempted to do in order to maintain order and upkeep in the *presídios*, but the rampant misuse was far too prevalent for this to happen. This included apprehending a great deal of the military persons. Soldiers at the various *presídios* were robbing in the streets, stealing the equipment from the *presídios*, and creating havoc amongst the people, forcing people out of their houses and stealing their belongings.⁸⁰ The captain-majors though, were the most disobedient as “each of them did whatever they felt like, without fear nor respect in the <*presídios*>.”⁸¹ An embellishment of the likely behavior of the officials, it further substantiates their continued tendency to misemploy their positions to the detriment of the relationships between the African ‘vassals’ and the Portuguese government.

The commonality between the *presídios* in Massangano, Muxima and Ambaca was that all of their walls had literally crumbled to the ground, their soldiers were absent, or were not wearing their military clothing, and they had limited artillery and gunpowder. The distressful tone of these statements makes it clear that there was a lack of financial resources, but may also speak to the africanization of the troops, becoming more integrated in the hinterland societies, and performing in ways that were self-serving rather than in the interests of the colony. These forts needed urgent repair, and African ‘vassals’ were enlisted as aid, especially because the other European powers trading in Loango posed a threat as well. Storage units that did have utilities such as gunpowder were exposed to the elements, and were destroyed by rainfall because of the miserable condition of the *presídios*’ roofs. Cassandama was neglected to such a degree, that three of the remaining five horses for cavalymen were too malnourished to ride, and even they did not possess arms or boots, “and it was a great mockery when that so-called company arrived.”⁸²

Knowledge that territorial ‘control’ of Angola was largely confined to the coast, combined with the overwhelming usage of vassal language to describe Portuguese relations with the interior brings the validity of the documentary content into question. Another aspect is that in order to fuel the colonial machine in Angola, constant conflict, mortality, and corruption meant the continual need for more financial resources. The document from 1684 coupled an inventory of the different *presídios* with a great deal of vassal language. Military successes were highlighted such as African troops and vassals, as well as equipment, yet although this was during a recession in the Portuguese empire, they needed commercial stimulus. The second document shows an increase in most cases in manpower, but it makes a striking distinction. The document from 1713 categorized the utilities

⁸⁰ May 21, 1729, AHU, Angola, cx. 24.

⁸¹ “cada hum delles fazia nellez o que lhe parecia sem temor, sem respeito” May 21, 1729, AHU, Angola, cx. 24.

⁸² “e era uma grande galhofa quando aparecia aquella chamada companhia” May 21, 1729, AHU, Angola, cx. 24.

within the *presídios* into two groups: usable and old. While this differentiation invites one to believe that there was an absolute necessity for new resources as a large portion of them was old, it reveals the presence of the larger trend of militarization.

Firearms were used as examples within the inventories because they were highly valued weapons in the colony. They were also consistent with trends among the other objects, and many of the other supplies were directly related to guns such as gunpowder and ammunition. By the late seventeenth century, guns were a contentious issue in Portuguese Angola. The guns, especially new ones such as muskets were considered superior technology to the apparatuses used by the Africans.⁸³ It was also important for the inland structures to have a large supply of guns because of other European powers giving them to the Africans who could thus defend themselves against Portuguese retaliation. Old or fewer guns were less intimidating, which was a stark concern for the Portuguese.

Classifying resources as old creates the need for new goods, but it does not mean that the items did not function. This in turn incentivized the metropole to send reinforcements to the colony that was undergoing the militarizing process. Regardless of the urgency for aid, this would not transmit the element of failure but rather that in order to continue the colonial project in Angola, intent to continue the endeavor and extend military force was essential. 1713 was directly after a period of intense conflict in the interior, and after costly repairs, showing the need for new material was important to continued colonization. The most blatant example of the militarizing trend is exemplified in the third document. Governor Albuquerque concurrently demonstrates the destruction of the *presídios* and glorifies his own actions taken in order to improve the colonization process in Angola. In the governor's characterization of the deplorable conditions of the *presídios*, he discusses personal triumphs performed in order to save them. In reference to Benguela, he stated that he traveled there almost immediately in order to help reconstruct the edifice, and even fed the soldiers from his own supply.⁸⁴ The governor helped restock the *presídio* with artillery that he brought on his seaward voyage, and enlisted carpenters from his ship to rebuild the razed portions of the structure as well as mount the new artillery.⁸⁵ The governor continued by asserting that he delegated others to the task of reconstructing the *presídios* along the Kwanza River, that took four months to complete. In addition, he had a bridge constructed at Ambaca that facilitated travel and trade to and from the area.⁸⁶ The governor clothed many of the soldiers, and repaired other forts along the coast. These improvements that Albuquerque contracted were extremely costly, and the

⁸³ J. D. Fage, "Slaves and Society in Western Africa, c. 1440-c. 1770," *Journal of African History*, 21, 1980, pp. 289-310, p. 107.

⁸⁴ AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42, 1713.

⁸⁵ AHU, Angola, cx. 19 fl. 42, 1713.

⁸⁶ AHU, Angola, cx. 19 fl. 42, 1713.

apprehension of criminal acts committed by soldiers diminished the supply. Outlining the expenses and increasing need for troops, he implores the authorities to replenish the colony's assets. Governor Albuquerque's choice of words in his statements of his altruistic actions and attempts to help the colony is both desperate and extreme, making it appear as though the colony was in shambles, and that if he had the capital, he could fix the problems.

The manner in which Governor Albuquerque relays the state of the colony detracts from the validity of his statements about the *presídios*' conditions. These structures and surrounding communities maintained vital importance to the colony's interior for several decades after his letter, which indicates that although he had them repaired they could not have been in such grave disorder. However, implicit in this letter is the intent to increase military presence and expenditure. Explicit manifestations of decadence in the state of the colony, exclusively referring to military structures, while intrinsically rationalizing his militaristic position as governor conveys Albuquerque's intention to incentivize financial support from the central authorities. However, the latent exhibition of commercial incentives through building the bridge meant to sustain commercial relationships and expediency signifies the important connection between the colony's colonization efforts and commerce. This shows a change in the rhetoric from a primarily militaristic standpoint to a more commerce based one. Commerce was mentioned in the previous documents, but the correspondence from Governor Albuquerque is more focused on militarism as well as trade. The building of a bridge was intended to create more commercial connectivity between the hinterland *presídios*. Mentioning the problems with the soldiers obedience as well as their lack of military clothing indicates that they were likely integrating more with the African communities as well as focusing on commercial relationships, or taking advantage of their power to indulge in coercive trade. Because the coast was largely under Portuguese dominion, the hinterland was in constant need of resources. Rather than substantiating a continued decadence in the territorial expansion, especially considering the fact that the *presídios* often required maintenance but were not entirely razed, entails the urgency of Crown support in order to further a military agenda. The military agenda as a colonial project in the territory enjoying little more than nominal control motivated economic sustenance driven towards augmenting the number and size of intimidating structures and troops, perhaps even to give more credence to the inaccurate representations of the vassal relationships presented to the central authorities. Militarism should also be understood as an economic trend in the hinterland that needed constant financial sustenance. In the context of the Angolan *presídios*, militarization had clear economic as well as political and colonial implications.

In some cases, the militaristic rhetoric was supported by legitimate concern. Other European powers as well as African inhabitants aggressed towards the Portuguese in Angola, whose

weakened state required essential defense resources. Primarily the Dutch, French, and British empires brought on military intervention. The Dutch sack of Luanda was the first and most successful military seizure of Portuguese territory and resources. The strongest hold that the Dutch forces had on the Angolan territory preceded the turn of the eighteenth century when they occupied Luanda from 1641 until 1648, attempting to forge a direct trade route between Salvador, Brazil and Luanda. After the Dutch lost control of the port city, they continued to trade on the northern coast of the colony with the Congo, and in Loango.⁸⁷ The three major European empires mentioned participated in minatory trade relationships and military impositions on territory that the Portuguese considered under their jurisdiction, but the most pertinent to the discussion at hand was the French invasion of Benguela. The other major European presence on the Angolan littoral took place on the Loango Coast, and will be discussed in the following chapter.

The motive for the French attack on Benguela is attributed to international politics in Portugal in November of 1700 with the death of Philip II king of Spain. The French proposed the Duke of Anjou as the heir to the throne, but this would have greatly altered the European balance of power, and placed Spain under French rule. Other European powers such as the Dutch, English, the Low Countries, and Portugal supported Archduke Charles of Austria, which brought about the War of Spanish Succession in 1701. In 1703 Portugal signed two treatises, one with the English and the Low Countries, and one with a more offensive character with the English, Dutch, and Leopold I. As these other countries were offensively opposed to France, ipso facto, France became Portugal's adversary rather than ally.⁸⁸ In a retaliatory effort on June 10, 1705, a French naval fleet attacked Benguela with "four high board ships" and within two days, by June 12, the French had an army 500 strong, and within the week counting 1300,⁸⁹ sacked the city. Most structures in Benguela were completely razed to an unrecognizable degree, and the *presídio* headed by captain-major José Lourenço that was in fair condition yet poorly stocked and with few soldiers, was destroyed with all its contents burnt away. To make matters worse, the "Mandombes that lived next to the *presídio* betrayed <the Portuguese> on this occasion."⁹⁰ In fact, many of them celebrated the destruction of the *presídio*. By the 30th of the same month after continued theft and pillage, the French left the bay.

Following the *razzia* committed by the French in Benguela, urgent notice was sent to other parts of the Angolan territory, first to the Count of Sonoy⁹¹ to warn of possibly pending attack, and

⁸⁷ John Thornton, "Precolonial African Industry and the Atlantic Trade, 1500-1800," *African Economic History*, No. 19 (1990 - 1991), p. 19.

⁸⁸ Ralph Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 242.

⁸⁹ June 12, 1705, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

⁹⁰ "quatro naus...de alto bordo" "Mandombes que viviam junto ao do prezidio nos foram traidores nesta ocaziao" June 26, 1705, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

⁹¹ Delgado, *vol III*, p. 248.

to employ Dutch and English vessels to help in solidarity against their common enemy.⁹² Many more troops were necessary for replacing the troops that passed because of the invasion, because the “seven *presídios* and six forts” could not provide the necessary back up, as they were needed to maintain order in the hinterland.⁹³ The fifty soldiers in Massangano were also sent down to aid against the French invaders. Caconda, however, could not respond due to conflict between the captain-major and the soldiers, as well as issues raised from violence against the African inhabitants.⁹⁴ After this initial attack, the forts and *presídios* were repaired or reconstructed. Subsequently, the *presídios* in Ambaca and Pedras needed to be refurbished and restocked as a result of resources spent in a conflict against Reinha Jinga, D. Veronica de Guterres, after she attacked the vassal state of soba Cahenda “without plausible reasons.”⁹⁵ Massangano and Muxima also suffered problems that emerged from mistreatment of the Africans by authorities in the *presídios*. Throughout this period, the weakened state of the military forces in Angola was coupled with revolts and unrest between the Portuguese and the African states. Difficulties posed by several conflicting forces such as the African states and the initial French attack weakened the Portuguese military substantially in the political epicenters, and as a result in the periphery. The French army was intent on creating a link between Angola and Brazil, and focused more intensively on the other side of the Atlantic afterwards. Fear of a French return to Benguela or an attack on Luanda sparked the reconstruction and stocking of the *presídios*, yet there was no further major military threat in Angola, aside from commercial proceedings, especially along the Loango Coast. On November 7, 1712, the French, Spanish, and Portuguese armies signed an accord to cease war for a period of four months. On April 11, 1713, a series of negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Utrecht ended the war in Europe, and the French hostilities momentarily ceased.⁹⁶ The hostilities caused by the French, and subsequently by the African natives were very costly to the military forces in the interior for up to a decade afterwards.⁹⁷ Although there were other military altercations between the Portuguese and European powers, the French Attack on Benguela was the most damaging to the Portuguese peripheral military forces.

Aside from these demonstrations of militarization, the language of dominance and subjugation is almost always present. This language is manifested in demonstrating the dominant nature of the relationship with militaristically charged words. There is no doubt that this period was in a constant state of war and fear of invasion throughout the colony, but even in times of peace the

⁹² “Tambem escrevemos aos capitaes dos navios Inglezes, e olandezes, que se achassem nos portos do Loango, e lhe pedimos serviço de V. Magestade viessem pella costa encontrarse com estes Inimigos” July 25, 1705, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

⁹³ “sete prezidios e seis fortalezas” July 25, 1705, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

⁹⁴ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 249.

⁹⁵ “sem razões plausíveis,” Delgado, 268.

⁹⁶ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 319.

⁹⁷ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 319.

language was clear. Interestingly, many of the African natives that were considered vassals served as soldiers when necessary, including some cases in which there were “quilambas that serve<d> with their people in the wars.”⁹⁸ Although the military employed a great deal of natives used in the conquest of other kingdoms or for protection, in some cases such as above, they retaliated when opportunity arose. The native soldiers many times outnumbered the Portuguese, and realistically, military feats were often accomplished under their terms.

The information and requests presented by the governors after further analysis should be considered not only as appeasing the crown, but also as cloaking personal motives that contributed to the precariousness of the political situation in Angola following such entreaties. Constant construction or reconstruction of forts was extremely expensive for the economic resources available in Angola, and more capital was constantly required, as Angola suffered a series of financial hardships. Many of the troops requested by governors originated in places such as Brazil and Madeira. Even troops serving in locations such as Madeira were not prepared for the Angolan climate. An overwhelming number of contemporary testimonies showed that the troops that came from the archipelago off the African coast died almost immediately after arrival. The troops that came to Angola were often “incompetent officials” or “unskilled,” vulnerable to pestilent diseases, and as one contemporary stated in 1718, the governors did not appear to choose to send anyone “that was not totally ignorant of this profession.”⁹⁹ This was most likely an exaggeration prompted by the frustration of receiving troops that could not endure the Angolan conditions, did not have a previous military career, or did not achieve the standard of service expected of them but the image that the governors upheld was clearly one of militarization.

Politics and Colonization: Captain-Majors in the Interior

The economic impact of colonizing methods such as militarization in the interior is shown through the inventories and correspondences from military officials, but the captain-majors much like the governors had a wide range of power meant for colonization. The military role of the captain-majors actually held a series of unrelated duties due to the fact that it was the highest-ranking hinterland government position. Their *raison d'être* is still largely undefined, but the consensus is that the captain-majors used their power in ways that secured commercial profitability.

It is curious to note that the meaning of the mechanism of those provisions was never truly reached, nor was the motive of mercantile activity of the hinterland authorities, despite their commercial functions having been forbidden

⁹⁸ Quilambas were African figureheads that lead their troops in the Portuguese infantry. “Quilambas que servem com as suas gentes nas guerras” November 20, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁹⁹ “officiaes incapazes”, ‘bizinhos’, ‘que não fosse totalmente ingnorante desta profissao” May 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 20.

by law on August 29, 1720; but this did not prevent the captain-majors from being attributed, for such motives, to the decadence and ruin of the province in this century.¹⁰⁰

The duties ascribed to this post covered an enormously wide range of tasks that included commerce, agriculture, religion, and military spheres. The selection process for this position was that the governor proposed a candidate to become captain-major that was in turn reviewed by the Royal authorities for a period of twenty days. The captain-major served just as the governors of the territory, for triennia. These officials served in two different categories. The first category was the captain-major of a jurisdiction¹⁰¹ in which he served as a military intermediary between African ‘vassal’ states and Portuguese settlers, and the second type was of *presídios*.

As discussed above, the *presídio* was a military structure placed in centers conducive to the confluence of commercial goods and networks in the hinterlands of Angola. Here the structures will be discussed in relation to the captain-majors. Although the *presídios* served a primarily military function, housing military personnel and intended for defense purposes, the residents by the *presídios* were most concerned with commerce. They were a “model of occupation, created by the Portuguese,” that “permitted military occupation,” and the propagation of the Christian faith, in order to protect merchants “that did not hesitate to advance into the hinterland to obtain merchandise that was indispensable the normal operation of the coastal cities at favorable prices.”¹⁰² In fact, the *feiras*¹⁰³ were situated adjacent to these structures.

The *presídios* were so far removed from the central power that they adapted to local economics and demographics.¹⁰⁴ Because the interior was still controlled by the African peoples, the *presídios* illuminate the way in which the Portuguese attempted to assume at least nominal control of certain areas in the hinterland, dominating fractional areas. The structures acted essentially as islands of Portuguese colonization in a sea of African control. The placement of these structures gave initially artificial importance to the particular zones that gained importance with treatise with African *sobas* that lead the indigenous populations of the area. The increasing importance of the areas ascribed to the *presídios*, the various direct and indirect military

¹⁰⁰ “é curioso notar que nunca se alcançou, verdadeiramente, o significado do mecanismo daqueles provimentos, nem o móbil da actividade mercantilista das autoridades sertanejas, não obstante o munus comercial lhes ter sido proibido por alvará de 29 de Agosto de 1720; mas nem por isso se deixou, por tais motivos, de atribuir aos capitães mores decadência e a ruína da província nesta centúria” Carlos Couto, *Os Capitães-Mores em Angola no Século XVIII*, Luanda: Instituto de Investigação Científica de Angola, 1972, p. 12.

¹⁰¹ Throughout numerous contemporary documents, this is referred to as a “o seu districto”

¹⁰² “modelo de ocupação, criado pelos Portugueses,” “permitir ocupação militar,” “que não hesitavam em avançar no sertão para aí obter, a preços favoráveis, as mercadorias indispensáveis ao funcionamento regular das cidades costeiras.” Henriques, 113.

¹⁰³ Commercial centers, or markets, where goods, and especially slaves were bought and sold.

¹⁰⁴ Couto, p. 25.

interactions, and the supreme importance of commerce in those areas created a “disaggregate”¹⁰⁵ effect in the composition of the African societal structures of the period.

The placement and atmosphere of the *presídios*, and perhaps more importantly the demographic chosen to occupy the position of captain-major allows for understanding the origin of the immense amount of injustices and atrocities that they committed. Although it is certain that the captain-majors abused their power, resulting from the unchecked nature of the deep hinterland, who they were is important to discuss. There was not one particular background that was given the post of captain-major. Some of the captain-majors were chosen among “filhos da terra,”¹⁰⁶ who were often times African or mulattos¹⁰⁷ because they were more susceptible to the grueling conditions posed by heat that was unbearable for some people that did not grow up with it. Many governors chose locals as captain-majors not only because it almost guaranteed that they would be able to finish the course of the position, but they also had an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and spoke the local language.¹⁰⁸ In 1697, for example, the *presídio das Pedras* had vacancies for three positions, one of which being the captain-major. In a correspondence from the king to Governor Luis Sezar de Maneses, he expresses trust in the governor’s choice to select the people that were “most capable for these services.”¹⁰⁹ Although electing Africans as captain-majors would have been a logical choice for governance of the hinterland because of their identity with the locals, this did not become particularly frequent until the second half of the eighteenth century. However, it did occur because the local residents and governors viewed choosing an African for the position as favorable to their acquisition of slaves.¹¹⁰

Many of the captain-majors arrived in Angola as a foot soldier after having committed a serious crime. Convicts in Portugal or Brazil were often sent to Angola as punishment for a period of years. Referred to as *degradados*, the institution of sending convicts to penal colonies dates to the beginning of the early modern period. However, in the seventeenth century, Angola became a preferred location to send convicts.¹¹¹ When the governors arrived in Angola accompanied by soldiers to help replenish the colonial forces, it was common for the vast majority of the soldiers to be *degradados*. For example, one hundred percent of the soldiers that Governor Aires de Saldanha de Meneses brought were convicts.¹¹² In 1685, Luis Lobo da Silva contended that the vast majority

¹⁰⁵ Henriques, p. 113.

¹⁰⁶ “Filhos da terra” were people born in the colony, often within the region in question.

¹⁰⁷ Roquinaldo Ferreira, “Ilhas Crioulas”: O Significado Plural da Mestizagem Cultural na África Atlântica,” *Revista de História* 155, 2nd - 2006, 17-41, p. 32.

¹⁰⁸ March 1, 1697 AHU, Angola, cx. 15; Couto, 60.

¹⁰⁹ “mais capazes para estes provimentos.” March 2, 1697, AHU, Códice 545.

¹¹⁰ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 38.

¹¹¹ Timothy J. Coates, *Degradados e Orfãos: Colonização Dirigida pela Coroa no Império Português, 1550-1755*, Lisboa: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1998, p. 136.

¹¹² April 25, 1675, AHU, cód 544.

of the soldiers he boasted of bringing were in fact criminals as well.¹¹³ Henrique de Figueiredo e Alarcão's 1717 arrival to Luanda brought with him a fleet of soldiers that contained merely one individual that was not a convict.¹¹⁴ This indicates the high number of persons in Angola that were forcefully sent there, and the inexperience of the military as a career for those obligated to pursue it. Although these criminals were consigned to Angola, they could roam freely throughout the territory to which they were sent. Unable to become a state official or assume a local bureaucratic position, the prevalence as arriving in the military in essence merged the two identities of soldier and convict.¹¹⁵ Fulfilling service duties to the empire originally thought of as a way to improve their personal behavior and feed the colonies with support, this was conducive to Angola's constant need of reinforcement. The *degradados* arrived in Angola with such label, and presumably desired to break free from the oppression that they suffered from arriving under this circumstance as soon as they set foot in Angola. The venture inland freed them from the constraints imposed on the coast, and incentivized them almost immediately to begin furnishing commercial ties with others. Soldiers in Angola were underpaid, and in some cases far later than expected, which undoubtedly lead them to desire to trade goods including contraband. Trading commodities and slaves with credit, and accruing personal wealth and interpersonal business relationships, eventually "such a successful trader would have become a large and favored customer of his commercial backers in Luanda, or Benguela, and perhaps even a <captain-major>...appointed by the Angolan governors to command an important district in the colony's interior."¹¹⁶ The *degradados* were uncommitted to the wellbeing of their communities, and heavily focused on maximizing their own profits, and even as captain-majors were willing to break the law if it meant capital gain.¹¹⁷ Once the captain-majors as well as officials in other ranks began a career in the interior, the prospect of leaving or even returning to Portugal became improbable. The isolation in the interior clearly had an effect on the resident soldiers, to the extent that many of them that originated elsewhere chose to leave their positions and remain in the hinterland to live amongst the African communities. The issue of renegade soldiers in Angola became so pronounced, that by 1692, the Overseas Council became concerned with the growing number of military personnel that left their post to live amongst the Africans in the interior.¹¹⁸ There was already an insufficient number of hinterland soldiers and with the vast majority forced rather than electing to go there, the preoccupations were legitimate,

¹¹³ October 8, 1685, AHU, Angola, x. 13.

¹¹⁴ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 190.

¹¹⁵ Coates, p. 74.

¹¹⁶ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 250.

¹¹⁷ Mariana Cândido, "African Freedom Suits and Portuguese Vassal Status: Legal Mechanisms for Fighting Enslavement in Benguela, Angola, 1800-1850," *Slavery and Abolition*, 32.3, 2011, pp. 447-458. P. 447.

¹¹⁸ March 28, 1692, AHU, Códice 545.

especially because the will to leave military posts to live among the Africans shows a failing colonizing force.

Marrying women from within the native population promised an even longer stay in the hinterland, in some cases indefinite. This contributes to explain the fact that many of the captain-majors focused more on their commercial relationships, and violence towards dissent than on Crown interests. Mamedy Alvarez da Guerra for example, by 1703 had married within the community at Massangano, and although he was well mannered, did not appear to be carrying out his duties or making an effort to delegate construction of new forts or other structures for the Portuguese in the district.¹¹⁹ The extreme seclusion in places with primarily African populations and birthing biracial and by virtue bicultural children, coupled with little to gain from remaining linked to the Portuguese army would have led them to focus on trade that became easier as they identified increasingly as intermediaries between the Portuguese and Africans.

After these military personnel served the colony for an extended period of time, they would have made a commercial name for themselves and become a part of the hinterland communities. These economically ambitious and connected individuals may also have harbored resentment towards the Portuguese crown after being forced to leave their homeland, or assessed that there were few benefits to being restricted by the Portuguese commercial and military policies, leading some of the captain-majors to leave their post and remain in the interior. The absence of prior military training and interest in the institution lead many of the convicts to entirely desert the profession and remain as merchants in the communities. Another demographic that many of the captain-majors would have been chosen from were *lançados*. On a general note, the *lançados* were people that fled inland from the African coast, and integrated into the African communities.¹²⁰ They were originally of European blood, whose descendants became mulattos, as the majority of them married into the African communities that they escaped to.

Upon settlement in the African communities, the *lançados* integrated themselves and became acculturated into the African way of life and language. These people opted to flee into the hinterland for a plethora of reasons, but the primary objective was to escape persecution that they were condemned to suffer on the more densely European populated coast. The motives ranged from religious oppression or royal decrees to commercial regulations. *Lançados* came to be understood as brokers that were essential in linking trade relations between the Portuguese and Africans.¹²¹ These Portuguese settlers and their descendants were less mobile than other traders, and

¹¹⁹ April 18, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹²⁰ António Carreira, *Cabo Verde: Formação e Extinção duma Comunidade Escravocrata: 1460-1878*, Lisboa: Comissão da Comunidade Europeia, Instituto Caboverdeano do Livro, 1983, p. 57.

¹²¹ J.D. Fage, "Slaves and Society in Western Africa," p. 295.

commercially adept, which would have been an ideal trait for captain-majors. The reasons that the *lançados* often fled largely led to their public image as “delinquents”¹²² because of their frequently criminal past.

After extensive time in the Angolan hinterland, the *lançados* adopted African customs such as language, religion, dress, and other cultural traits. The transferal of their values from European to African may have created a crisis of faith. António Carreira attributes this to the “degradation” of their Christian ethics.¹²³ It is unlikely that the loss of their Christian code of ethics is what led them to conduct commerce in unethical and violent ways, however it is probable that the *lançados* lost their European culture through adopting African characteristics, leading to lesser allegiance to the Portuguese crown and other institutions. As such, they became intermediaries between national and foreign merchants, and the local *sobas* in the trade of goods and slaves.¹²⁴ The loss of Portuguese identity allowed greater freedom of choice in their relationships with other nationalities and peoples, a higher income, and simply the ability to integrate easier into the communities they took residence in. The *lançados* were known to trade in unethical ways, as well as willingly trade with other European nations against the Portuguese best interest.¹²⁵ The unethical trading habits and connection to the local area is consistent with the captain-majors’ behavior, and a lucrative option for the governors in office.

Regardless of the consideration that many of the captain-majors may have been *degredados*, descendants of *lançados* or Africans, candidates for the position often served for several years in the military forces once in Angola, occasionally within the jurisdiction for which they applied to the post. Although this is ascertained through correspondence between the crown and authorities in Angola in which military service would have been strongly emphasized, candidates for the position formerly held other prestigious positions. Antonio Vas de Sylvera, for example, who was a candidate for captain-major of Ambaca in 1707, and served for thirteen years in Angola prior to this as a soldier, lieutenant, and captain at Caconda, as well as sergeant-major at Benguela.¹²⁶ Among notable qualities listed about Sylvera were that he served as an “example to others in obeying his superiors.”¹²⁷ The opponent, Manoel Florim Correa was in greater favor with the local authorities. Serving in Angola for fifteen years, he had been a soldier, a lieutenant of the infantry, lieutenant to

¹²² “delinquentes” Carreira, p. 70.

¹²³ Carreira, p. 71.

¹²⁴ Carreira, p. 69.

¹²⁵ Carreira, p. 71.

¹²⁶ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

¹²⁷ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

the mestre de campo, captain of the district of Massangano, and captain-major of the *presídio* of Cambambe, chosen by the governor.¹²⁸

In addition to Correa's previous posts, he guarded the slave ship Santiago for several days and accommodated it while they loaded human cargo. In 1692, he waged war against the Dembo Ambuila, creating a hostile altercation in which many people were killed, and resources were burned. By 1693 in continued war and conflict, it was resolved through force and slaves were offered to the Portuguese.¹²⁹ The residing council's first choice was Sylvera, whereas the Count of Alvor's choice was Correa. This shows not just a conflict of interest, but that the municipal authorities desired an obedient and "just" leader, whereas the royal authority desired one that clearly caused conflict amongst the African populous.¹³⁰ The governor had previously appointed both of the men to their positions. This does not necessarily mean that the Municipal Council did not want a war inclined individual, as the council had voted for Francisco Mogo de Melo for the position of captain-major of the *presídio* at Caconda in 1704 because he had been courageous and wounded in battle.¹³¹ What this may indicate, however, is that the royal authorities were more interested in territorial control, whereas the municipal council, aware of injustices caused by the captain-majors were more disposed to choosing someone with higher moral character although this may also indicate that they preferred a just individual that would not impinge upon their own commercial aspirations.

Because the *presídios* were so far removed from the Luanda, they were able to assume a different character that was often one of hybridity between the local population and the Portuguese residents. The living conditions were extremely taxing due to the heat, and although the *Presídios* were placed near rivers¹³² as a result, water was still in constant demand. It was difficult to arrive to the *Presídios* through the expanse of the hinterland, which only added to their isolated state. This may have been a major contributing factor regarding the demographic within which captain-majors were chosen. In fact, the people that frequented the *presídios* were often men with great experience, accustomed to taking chances, seeking adventure,¹³³ and in search of personal fortune.¹³⁴

The captain-majors having an exclusively military education if any were not prepared for agricultural duties especially because of the frequently poor conditions. The same can be said for

¹²⁸ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

¹²⁹ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

¹³⁰ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

¹³¹ September 7, 1707, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

¹³² Almost all of the *presídios* in this period were placed near the Cuanza river, and it was through this water way that the Portuguese ventured further East into the hinterland.

¹³³ "tem gente aventureyra" Angola, cx. 12.

¹³⁴ Couto, p. 57. Couto also states that the people who wandered through the *presídios* were many times vagabonds, criminals, and gypsies, etc. Couto, 134.

their experience in other realms within their duties. However, their involvement in commerce was clearly a defining factor in their selection. The governors appointed favored merchants to the post in the hinterland in order to facilitate the governors' personal business. When the relationships between the captain-majors and the African populations worsened, the governors often instructed them to retaliate with military force, which inevitably resulted in the capture and sale of additional slaves.¹³⁵ By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, after the atmosphere that was previously understood as a period of constant war and slave seizures, this tactic slowed slightly as the slaving frontier moved inland,¹³⁶ and their *modus operandi* for acquisition evolved from the use of military methods to capture slaves, to those akin to commercial slaving such as debt. In addition to the governors, many merchants from overseas even created relationships with the hinterland officials, incentivizing them to become their trade agents. This transition occurred for a number of reasons, but the paramount causes were the growing influx of firearms sold by other European powers to the Africans who could from then on better defend themselves, especially new legislation that restricted the officials from their most desirable commercial relationships.

A missive from March of 1703, in relating the death toll of military personnel, protests the warring tendencies of the captain-majors. The author concedes that commerce in the hinterland became very weak, and that the markets were unsuccessful.¹³⁷ This trend appears to fluctuate over time, and there were probably many contributing factors, but he indicates the most salient reason to be the Captain-majors. The governors' commerce enacted through such 'commissaries,' allowed for their resources to be traded through violence toward the *sobas*, giving their goods priority in the marketplace. The goods traded by the captain-majors to the *sobas* were often older and lesser quality goods, forced upon them in exchange for slaves.¹³⁸ Recognizing that this was not in the *sobas*' interests, it was clear that commerce could not easily proceed without consent from the captain-majors. If the Africans trading with these men did not comply with their orders, the captain-majors would "respond with war."¹³⁹

A letter from a Florentine Capuchin missionary, Friar Antonio Maria working at the hospital in Massangano servicing soldiers in need of medical attention from the *presídios* along the Kwanza River laid testimony to the damage that the captain-majors were committing through war techniques. Complaining that no one with medical experience desired to serve in the hospital because of fear of the danger raised by the omnipresence of criminal activity, he blames the hardships on the captain-majors' behavior. The friar states that the goods regulated and traded by

¹³⁵ Birmingham, p. 136.

¹³⁶ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 255.

¹³⁷ June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹³⁸ June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹³⁹ "acodir com Guerra," June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

these military officials were the sources of violence towards the *sobas*, and that freedom of choice was not offered to the African leaders in accepting the trade goods in exchange for slaves. This warring violence not only caused damage to personal belongings, but was prejudicial to the relationship between the Portuguese and their relations with Africans, as the friar contends that this caused many of the Africans to flee to “enemies” of the Portuguese.¹⁴⁰

Captain-majors essentially held a monopolistic role controlling the influx and export of trade goods and slaves from their respective jurisdictions. By the eighteenth century, the captain-majors used contacts they had gained in the trading networks to secure goods and profitable slave trades. This allowed for extending the commercial diaspora throughout the hinterland, and merchants from the coast were forced to exchange goods under the captain-majors’ own terms, creating various conflicts among the different trading groups.¹⁴¹ Such power permitted these military officials to devastate entire areas with their military force, and use others in their jurisdictions to exchange or transport their goods at unfair rates. However, this misconduct did not go unnoticed, and the Municipal Council took strides to limit the captain-majors’ authority.

On April 22, 1702, a letter from the Municipal Council to the traditional authorities relayed the gravity of the abuses committed by the captain-majors at their stations in the hinterland. The Municipal Council began by stating that they received notice in reference to the disregard and damage caused by them for years, and the Governors should have been more obedient for the peoples’ sake, giving only special authorization to those that enter the hinterlands.

The <captain-majors> have faded their diligence and negotiation of that fortune, having introduced damaging abuse with some insignias, and names of captain-majors, that aside from having usurped the power and dominion of Your Majesty, they have attenuated and destroyed this kingdom, and must stop using it in the <jurisdictions>; because all of the wars that have occurred are born out of such occupations because they have no more merits than the quantity of their goods or bundles.¹⁴²

The captain-majors had indulged in such severe misconduct, that they were accused not only of having abused the power given by the Crown, but that they had damaged the entirety of the colony. The letter accuses them of being the reason that many of the wars occurred because their only qualifications appear to be their commercial prowess. The letter continues on to describe their extremely violent actions, “depopulating” the hinterlands, which also hurt missionary work being done in those areas.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, Cx. 17.

¹⁴¹ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 263-265.

¹⁴² “os tem desuaneidos a sua deligencia e negociacao de tal sorte quer tem introduzido hum abuzo tao prejudicial com huns bastoens, e nomes de Capitaes mores, que alem de terem uzurpado a V. Magestade, o seu poder e dominio, tem atenuado e destruido este reino e hao de acabar de dar com elle por terra; porque todas quantas guerras tem havido sao nascidas das taes occupacoens porque como estas nao tem mais merecimentos que a quantidades de fazendas ou banzos” April 22, 1702, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁴³ April 22, 1702, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

The situation was so atrocious that the Municipal Council essentially pleaded with the Crown to strip the captain-majors of districts entirely, and require the captain-majors of *presídios* to have *residências*.¹⁴⁴ In fact, the captain-majors of the districts had previously been clerks (*escrivães*). These clerks in hopes of becoming more powerful and respected within their districts, wanted to use the insignia of the captain-majors. Soon after wielding such social power, these officials began to heinously abuse their positions, ruining relationships with local peoples, as well as with the central government.

Months later, the Municipal Council published a public announcement (*bando*) throughout the city of Luanda, as well as the *presídios* and districts in the hinterland on their own volition. The public announcement was disseminated on January 26, 1703. Speaking of damage done to the “common good” of the people of the territory, a statute from 1676 was brought up to the central authorities in order to remind them of its existence and implications.¹⁴⁵ Chapter XVIII of the *regimento* assigned to governor Aires de Saldanha de Meneses on February 12 of that year required the governor to disallow entrance of anyone into the hinterland of Angola of European, mixed, or African decent, yet Africans devoid of military insignia were allowed to enter.¹⁴⁶

The announcement condemns the “false pretexts” of the military rank that allowed the captain-majors to exploit their power for personal ends using crude levels of violence. The behavior of ignoring their orders enormously harmed the “vassal *sobas*...through the injustices committed towards them.”¹⁴⁷ Although the public announcement is primarily directed towards the captain-major, the Municipal Council states that the Governor is involved in the corruption. The Municipal Council forcefully asserts that chapter XVIII of the document was not being observed at all, and that the governors were harming the kingdom’s vassal *sobas* by allowing people into the hinterland that partook in calamitous injustices, and were often individuals unwelcome in the interior. The captain-majors that had essentially become intermediaries between the kingdom and the African population doing the governors’ business transporting goods obligated Africans to transport goods by physical force “without compensating them for their work.”¹⁴⁸ When these men arrived to the different districts, they would divide the goods that made it to the destination into bundles (*Banzos*).¹⁴⁹ These bundles were subsequently used in exchange for slaves among people in the

¹⁴⁴ End of term review of service.

¹⁴⁵ January 26, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx 17.

¹⁴⁶ January 26, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx 17.

¹⁴⁷ “sovas vassallos...pellas injustiças que lhes fazem.” January 26, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx 17.

¹⁴⁸ “sem lhes pagar seu trabalho” January 26, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁴⁹ A ‘Banzo’ was a unit of measurement of materials that was equivalent to the worth of one ‘peça de índia’, which was an ideal male slave between the ages of 15 and 30, in good health, well built, and exhibited no physical defect. See Martin, p. 78. Beatrix Heintze defines it as a collection of goods with which one bought a slave of the ‘highest quality.’ See Heintze, *fontes*, p. 115. The bundle of goods often included foreign raw materials, alcohol, cloth, and later firearms, from many parts of the world. Core items varied regionally as well, including salt, dried fish, etc. depending on where it

region, and the goods were mischaracterized as being more valuable or exotic than they were in actuality. In turn these goods were traded for Africans in the region to become enslaved.

All of the captain-majors in the region were to be sent back to Luanda and stripped of their position. This did not apply to the captain-majors of the *presídios*, but those of the jurisdictions such as in the Sobingo, the Ecolo, and the Dande were given four months since the publication of the announcement to submit. People who did not comply with the order, including anyone without an insignia was “rigorously punished” for their disobedient acts.¹⁵⁰ Three weeks later, on February 15th, the Municipal Council sent yet another letter to the Overseas Council saying that the public announcement had been published and put into action. The captain-majors had drawn numerous complaints from the Portuguese vassals because of their robberies and tyranny for their own commercial purposes.¹⁵¹

The primary reason that many of the vassal states reacted with uprising and war was because of the usurpation of their resources and violence caused by the captain-majors, and because the governors upon hearing of these uprisings, mandated retaliation efforts rather than other problem solving tactics. The retaliation was performed through war, and the captain-majors were blamed for the unrest. The Council maintained that “of all the wars that have occurred in this kingdom, the <captain-majors> are the principal origin.”¹⁵² The colony depended on war for its colonization efforts, but it was absolutely necessary that these people were prohibited from entering the hinterlands, and thus chapter eighteen must be observed.

Finally, on June eighth of the same year, the Council received a response. This response was in full accord with the Council officials. Highlighting the corruption caused by the military ranks, the central authorities stated that the various upheavals exasperated the African communities and contributed to the colony’s military and political decadence. Thus, the captain-majors of the districts should cease to exist. The old post of the clerk should replace the military post in the peripheral communities. The clerks were to hold no other titles than this, and would serve merely to “give notice to the governors about things that happened.”¹⁵³ They should henceforth be used solely to relay information about the mistreatment of the Africans, and general movements of the people throughout the areas. If this endeavor had come into fruition, it would have been a success for the

was assembled. The *banzo*, however, was also valued in *reis*. Although accurate for the original meaning of the *banzo*, as confirmed by several other authors, the use of the word *peça* for this period may be due to the fact that Martin cites a French merchant rather than Portuguese, and that the book concerns the Loango Coast, that was frequented by merchants of many nationalities. After the mid seventeenth century, the depletion of the most desirable slaves lead Portuguese merchants to designate slaves as heads (*cabeças*), likely as a commercial tactic in order to add ambiguity to the desirability of the slave exported, though *banzos* continued to be a trade unit for each slave.

¹⁵⁰ January 26, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵¹ February 15, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵² “de quantas guerras ha havido neste reyno, elles são a principal origem” February 15, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵³ “dar avizos aos governadores das couzas que acontecerem” June 8, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

merchants in the council for two reasons. After recalling the captain-majors from their positions, they could send clerks in of their choice that would more accurately and meticulously log commercial transactions (and debts owed to council members), stripping the governor of his collusion with the former officials, allowing more egalitarian trading arrangements in their favor. This would also curb the military raids harming Lisbon's commercial methods,¹⁵⁴ thus transitioning from militarism to a more capitalistic practice.

The continual phenomenon of trade commissioned by the governors was witnessed though several contemporary communiqués, maintaining that commerce dictated by the governors was so detrimental that it proved more injurious than in “any other conquest.”¹⁵⁵ In many places, this preferential commerce weakened trade in the feiras, making them only marginally profitable, in that “their commissioners, the captain-majors of the *presídios*” that disrespected the *sobas* throughout their jurisdictions were able to employ the vast amount of bundles sent by the governor to these areas.¹⁵⁶ The governors' goods were often more valuable than the goods brought by *pumbeiros* owned by private merchants,¹⁵⁷ and were able to buy a higher quantity of slaves.

The sources transmit perplexity over why this was continuing to happen, as the Municipal Council had already sent a notice to the central authorities asking for governors to be prohibited from indulging in commerce.¹⁵⁸ Although the central authorities acknowledged this by June 9th, 1703, it was not being observed. Instead of the governor's commerce “outside of contract,” if the inhabitants were able to send *pombeiros* into the territory to engage in trade, it would help the vassal states and the other traders, and promote free trade. If the system were fairer, “with this voluntary commerce, there would be no wars, and everything would improve, in particular, the royal endowment would benefit greatly.”¹⁵⁹ The governors were indirectly creating conflict and wars through commerce that was ruining the relationships between inhabitants in the territory, but this persisted for a great deal of time.

¹⁵⁴ Couto, pp. 73-75.

¹⁵⁵ “qualquer outra conquista,” June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵⁶ “os seos comissorios os Capitaes mores dos prezídios”, June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵⁷ June 28, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

¹⁵⁸ “Officiaes da camara do Reino Uro. disse a vossa carta de 15 de fevereiro deste anno em que dais conta da rezaio que tivestes para nao acompanhareis a publicação de bulla da cruzada sendo a principal de estares governando esse reino e vos tocar por esta cauza o lugar que e governador ocupava em semelhantes actos E pareçome dizervos que o governador não he obrigado a hir assistir nesta procição e vos como officiaes da camara tendes esta obrigação a que não deveis faltar, e seguiredes o que estava em estillo, e o comissario da bulla neste reino vai da mesma maneira. Como vos insinueis foi na procição o Dias João da Cunha Soares escrita em Lxa a 9 de Junho de 1703 Reiy”, AHU, Angola, códice 545.

¹⁵⁹ “com este comercio voluntario, não haveria guerras, e tudo se aumentaria, e muito em particular, a V. fazenda teria toda a ganancia,” June 9, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

A law was instituted on August 29, 1720 that prohibited the governors and all other public officials from engaging in commerce in the overseas.¹⁶⁰ This law, stating that the legal ability to engage in commerce reinstated on November 26, 1709 was an egregious mistake, and that because of the issues caused by preferential and personal commerce, the government officials were to cease all commercial activity.¹⁶¹ The decree encompasses all government officials including and above the rank of captain, and asserts that no one that falls under these stipulations may participate in commerce “for themselves or for others.”¹⁶² They can no longer be included in commercial contracts in any way on land or in regard to commercial ships destined for other parts of the kingdom.

Despite this prohibition causing a significant decrease, by 1724, the governors were still somewhat engaged in illicit commerce. Josepeda Roza Coutinho, the clerk of the royal endowment of Angola, cited many letters from the administrators of the royal contract of Angola from 1714 until that year, demonstrating blatant discontent for the injustices and unfair nature of the trade.¹⁶³ The collusion between the governors and the captain-majors reached the point where they were dividing goods between themselves and “trusted sobas” acquired from people that passed away in the hinterlands.¹⁶⁴ Because Angola’s conditions were so poor, and many people died soon after arrival, especially if they left Luanda, people could take advantage of them as well as their belongings. The officials trading such goods forced the sobas “to take the goods that they were given, obligating them to pay in the correct number of slaves.”¹⁶⁵ In fact, these military officials made the sobas believe that the goods were from the king, demanding that they be compensated with a greater quantity of slaves than the real value of the slaves could actually provide for.¹⁶⁶ The fact that this forced slave trade was being pushed by the governors and that goods were stolen from deceased merchants made it virtually impossible to imagine that there could be any other sustained forms of industry or trade relationships.¹⁶⁷ Perhaps the most succinct way of describing the situation created by such ludicrous corruption and self-serving trade was that “everyone says that having goods outside of Luanda was the same as losing them.”¹⁶⁸ The hinterland trade became so high-risk that any increase in income could be instantly lost because of the nature of the trade.

¹⁶⁰ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 323.

¹⁶¹ January 26, 1720, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶² “per si nem por outrem”, January 26, 1720, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶³ October 22, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶⁴ “sobas de confiança” October 22, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶⁵ “a tomar as fazendas que lhe dão, obrigandoce a pagallas nesta praça em numero certo de pessaz de indias.” October 22, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶⁶ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 233.

¹⁶⁷ “nem me parece haja conveniencia alguma em abrir as feitorias que eu tinha imaginado” October 22, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

¹⁶⁸ “dizem todos que fazendas fora de Luanda hê o mesmo que perdelas” October 22, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

A series of implications regarding the law condemning commerce by government officials after 1720 can be extrapolated. The intention to strip the captain-majors of their insignias at the beginning of the eighteenth century, although unsuccessful, shows an implicit reluctance that the Crown held to hold the governors responsible for their actions, while the captain-majors were easier targets. The possible elimination of the trade intermediary would have been a less intrusive way to brindle their commercial activities. The law cites attempts to permit the governors to seek supplementary incomes, but it was abused to too great an extent. While this mandate excluded the governors from trade, it raised their salaries to several times the previous amount. Clearly encouragement to be content with a higher salary so as not to seek financial resources elsewhere, it was also a way to attract more obedient gubernatorial candidates¹⁶⁹ that would enforce royal dictates in the future. With this law, the militaristic methods of slaving became less pertinent as a slave acquisition method contributing to the aforementioned shift the captain-majors dealt with from military raids to credit. The law can also be viewed as a step in the direction of 'free trade,' stripping the governors of the comparative advantage enjoyed through using captain-majors as their trade intermediaries in the Angolan hinterland. This mandate did not only affect the interior. It impeded governors from sending their own ships, or colluding with officials in other colonies. However, the degree to which the captain-majors and governors traded in the interior was evinced when they were forced to stop doing so.

Conclusion

Colonization in Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century is most applicable to the relationships between the Portuguese and Africans in the hinterland communities. At this time, Luanda and the surrounding area was the only location that was entirely under Portuguese control. The capital city was the center of political and commercial consolidation, yet even then enjoyed a plurality of identities and languages. The highest colonial authority in the territory was the governor-general, though other judicial and municipal authorities were created prior to this time. By virtue of the governor's preeminent position in the territory, the colony assumed a militaristic nature. Ranking under the governor was the captain-major who was the military leader of *presídios* and other districts in the interior of the colony.

The *presídios* were military structures that were strategically placed in locations conducive to water sources, indigenous communities, and commercial networks. This allowed for Portuguese persons to create a presence inland from the coast, most predominantly along the Kwanza River. Because the hinterland bases were not always placed in the political epicenter of the African communities, they played an effective role as a disaggregate force in the composition of the African

¹⁶⁹ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 45.

kingdoms. The African populations in the interior became increasingly accustomed to European goods and commercial relationships. The Portuguese jurisdictions became significant trade centers, which made the Africans value those locations and markets, as well as alter their commercial ideologies to accommodate the sale of slaves and other goods.

The Africans became accustomed to European goods, but they continued to dominate the hinterland. Vassal language used in Portuguese documentation in reference to them used phraseology of conquest, but it was uncharacteristic of the reality of the relationship for the majority of African communities. As the hinterland became more lucrative as a trade sector, the governors began to capitalize on trade intermediaries for personal means. The Crown elected trusted individuals to the post to work for the empire's best interest, but when the governor's arrived in Angola, many of them supplemented their salaries with commerce, using the captain-majors as their trade intermediaries. This trade collusion was prejudicial to the relationship between the Africans and the Portuguese in the interior because the captain-majors abused their authority by using gratuitous violence towards the inhabitants in their districts. The trade in the hinterland was overwhelmingly connected to the acquisition of slaves, and in order to accrue as many slaves as possible to meet the demand on the coast, the captain-majors used a policy of warring and hostility. They purchased goods and slaves at comparatively unfair prices using physically coercive methods, inevitably reselling them to the governors. This relationship was one of the most important of the period, contributing to immense amounts of problems in the colonizing effort.

The governors were chosen to work strictly within the Crown's interests, especially as these men had defended the Crown on the battlefield in previous positions. The governors always exhibited their allegiance in their correspondence with the Crown before and after arriving in Angola. However, upon arrival, they capitalized on their authority and supplemented their incomes with trade. The governors' opportunism and personal motives in the colonial commerce, although unintentionally damaging the colony, created a series of conflicts that proved cataclysmic to hinterland relations. The governors either chose or suggested captain-majors for the hinterland positions. As a result, the governors were able to elect individuals that worked in the governors' favor, serving essentially as trade agents for the governors in the interior.

The case of the Captain-major is distinctive in that they were forced to work simultaneously within a series of forces, yet their background corroborates their conduct in the hinterland. A high percentage of soldiers sent to Angola were mandated by force, especially those that had committed violent crimes. Because many of the captain-majors began as soldiers in Angola, climbing up the ranks to the hinterland position, it speaks to the moral character of the individual. The propensity to respond to conflict with extreme violence, or use violence to ensure favorable outcomes in

commercial transactions, would have been more natural to a person of this type. The governors chose ambitious individuals whom had shown great commercial promise, and the combination of violence and commercial savvy were predominant among these men. However, an additional reason that the captain-majors' deplorable actions contributed to the situation in the hinterland is an increasing trend of Africanization. The captain-majors were in the hinterland for extended periods of time, immersed in an overwhelmingly native population that drove them to adopt African customs and language. Their low salaries, isolation from the coast, and commercial connectedness, as well as marriage into the African communities may have contributed to the loss of allegiance to Portugal and to their military duties, making their primary focus personal commerce. Without the strict imperial regulations, they could trade with the other African communities and even other European powers, furnishing trade connections rather than focusing on their military duties. However, Africanization from the colonial Portuguese perspective could have been viewed as corrupt or violent simply because the officials did not act in the best interest of the Portuguese.

Authorities such as the municipal council attempted to end the abuses committed by the captain-majors, but it did not come into fruition. The council cited the violence and war tactics that they committed towards the African populous, but an additional impetus to these actions was likely to stop the monopolistic nature of the trade between the governors and captain-majors, as many council members were traders as well. The most successful regulation was the law in 1720 that prohibited colonial officials from commerce. This law attempted to curb the focus on commerce demonstrated by the military personnel and make trade more accessible to others, and it coincided with a move towards using credit rather than warring raids to capture slaves in the interior.

Concurrent with commerce in the interior was a growing need for military resources to continue the colonial military project. However, the strained relations resulting from violence impeded progress as well as financial standing. European aggression, such as from the French in 1705 showed the connectedness of the hinterland outposts amongst themselves and to the coast. The French attack depleted much of the resources from the *presídios*, and the native populations turned on the Portuguese. In order to justify the use of the *presídios*, and their reconstruction, the structures were characterized as being in terrible condition, and lacking resources. Governor Albuquerque, for example, describes the destruction of the military edifices, yet demonstrates what measures he had taken to improve the colony. This justifies the allocation of increased financial support for the militarization of the colony after showing that the poor situation of the hinterland was due not to lack of intent or malpractice, but rather to the need for capital. It also shows a movement from purely military focus to a more commercial based rhetoric. The subservient rhetoric used by the governors to the king evinces a justification of their own actions and the desire to show their

allegiance to the military cause, while they were also hampering the process through their personal commercial endeavors.

These economic trends of the Angolan interior indicate that there were conflicting personal and colonial interests. The captain-majors and the governors' commercial relationships were detrimental to the colonization in the interior. The purpose of their positions, and the reality of their conduct conflicted, and it was regressive to the interior relations. Although checks and balances were instituted to curb these issues, it is clear that individual interests were in line with the governors' exaggerations and misrepresentations sent to the central authorities that showed justification for an increase in military force and expenditure as the colonial project continued. It is curious that the hinterland officials that the governors' appointed were in large part to blame for the deplorable state of the interior as a result of commercial incentives.

Colonization of the hinterland in Angola was marked by violent acts committed by military officials. The militarization of the interior that required economic backing from the state, and commercial exclusivity marked by trade collusions between the governors and captain-majors were the major economic trends of the time. Although much of the socio-political difficulties of the period can be attributed to the captain-majors, their actions were permissible until the 1720's that caused them to use credit agreements to engage in illicit commerce rather than war. As much as the use of force and violence was detrimental to the relationship with African peoples, it was an effective method of securing goods and slaves. Their relationship to the governors would have been an attractive opportunity rather than an indication of corruption. Trade with foreigners, or using their status to improve their commercial relations is consistent with the fact that the harsh conditions that the captain-majors lived under in the hinterland made survival and safeguarding their commercial activities the top priority. The distance from the metropole, and even from Luanda, would have diminished their allegiance to the Crown, and contributed to the africanization that many of them experienced. When other political forces complained, or attempted to discontinue these commercial advantages such as the Municipal Council, a shrouded motive would certainly have been the opportunity for themselves to gain greater access to commercial relations. However, it is clear that the Angolan hinterland at the turn of the eighteenth century until the 1720's was a period of violent colonization efforts, and exclusionary commerce.

II

Commerce and the Angolan Coast

The turn of the eighteenth century on the coast of Angola was largely defined by commercial relationships. From traders connecting the Angolan hinterland to Luanda, to large-scale businessmen connecting the coast of Angola throughout the Atlantic, trade held a central focus and dependency in the livelihood of the inhabitants. Merchants in Angola performed a diversity of tasks within myriad subgroups whose agglomeration made the network possible. Several ports along the Angolan coast were instrumental to the local and imperial economy, and each subsector operated as a constituent of the Angolan colonial commercial composite regarding commercial actors, territory, products, or means of transport.

This chapter will focus on commerce on the Angolan coast throughout this period. An analysis of the commercial actors at the distinct trade levels serves to understand the system in its entirety. This also exposes important links and relations between the Angolan hinterland and the coast. The different demographics that comprised the trade networks were socially and categorically distinct groups that traded under differing conditions and circumstances. The smaller scale porters and traders exchanged goods in the interior and brought them to larger commercial centers, and eventually the coast where merchants trading in larger volume transported them to places such as Brazil. Credit was essential to the growth of the merchant capitalist market and the transfer of goods in Angola.

Credit was a means for bankers and high-volume merchants to inject large amounts of capital into the circulation of trade goods. The local currencies in Angola proved insufficient for commercial growth, and although monetary changes were made, credit ranging from small-scale IOU's to large-scale credit arrangements provided the means for commercial growth in the territory, as well as individual net worth. The potential for capital growth attracted businessmen to the colony that supported the transportation of goods, especially in relation to slaves. Slave export was protected under monopoly rights ceded by the Crown to an individual through a royal tax-farming contract. The contracts allowed the recipient to collect taxes on each slave and award licensure to business associates to become factors and purveyors, as well as hold exclusive privileges to trade within the constraints of the monopoly. The privileged position that the monopoly rights provided for the coastal traders came at an annual cost that was primarily used to sustain political and municipal functions in Angola. This requirement evinces the significant and inextricable link between the commercial and political spheres. This link is substantiated in a major conflict that occurred in Loango.

Loango was a region of Angola that was abundant in raw materials and human cargo that were essential to feeding the contracts in Luanda. Loango was included amongst the regions of Angola that included the Kongo and Benguela as well, although Portuguese colonization efforts had been less successful there. The coastal indigenous communities still set the terms for trade, and other European empires traded widely throughout the Loango Coast. Portugal did not have a military presence in Loango, and the turn of the eighteenth century experienced intensification of English trade on the region's coastal trade ports. Beginning with English merchants sending African porters into Portuguese jurisdiction, the rivalry culminated in an English fort built by the port at Cabinda. Faced with the threat of an English monopoly in Cabinda with potential to spread beyond such port, Portuguese naval forces sacked the fortification. Portuguese perception viewed the Loango Coast as theirs due to centuries of prior contact, and the commercial importance that Loango exhibited demonstrated that the loss of trade relationships in the area would be to not only commercial, but political and colonial detriment as well.

Commercial Actors in Angola

Because trade in the interior was largely under African terms of conduct, no unauthorized Europeans were allowed into the hinterland. In order to trade in the interior at the commercial centers, trade agents were an integral part of supplying the coastal demand for products unattainable at ports such as Luanda. The most common trade agent that serviced the export ports were whom contemporaries referred to as *pombeiros*, as mentioned in the first chapter. The *pombeiros* were the most common and most essential trade intermediaries in Angola that furnished the market commodities from the deep interior to the Angolan littoral. The term originated in the fifteenth century,¹⁷⁰ and is derived from the *Mpumbu* market that was located by the Stanley Pool.¹⁷¹ The word was used most widely up until the first quarter of the eighteenth century, when new appellations appeared that were ascribed to similar commercial roles. Rather than further differentiation or stratification as commercialization of the hinterland progressed, this indicated that the designation *pombeiro* was probably used as a blanket term that signified any sort of trade intermediary that frequented the markets intending to exchange raw materials for slaves.

These trade intermediaries began as an important link between the *Mpumbu* market and São Salvador, beginning their denotation as a commercial transporter of goods. Itinerant traders such as them carried small volumes of goods that were inevitably traded for slaves, coming into contact with foreigners from various European and African nations. Such contact was often necessary because the bundles that the *pombeiros* traded for slaves were often so diverse in terms of products

¹⁷⁰ Carreira, p. 65.

¹⁷¹ Henriques, p. 116.

they contained that the bundles could not be assembled without multiple commercial interactions, expanding trade networks even further. Drifting between districts, they were the ideal demographic to perform commercial transactions. They identified with the African populous, spoke the native languages, and ascribed to the African customs and cultures.

The eighteenth century drew a fundamental change in the way that the *pombeiros* were societally viewed. Strikingly emblematic of penetration into the Angolan interior, they were revered as path makers and explorers, as distances between markets grew deeper inland. Some relate the *pombeiros* to other worldwide trends of those who extended into the interior regions from other coastal areas. Likenesses made are to the American cowboy, the Brazilian *bandeirante*, French Canadian *coureurs des bois*, or the Argentine *gaucho*.¹⁷² Although the aforementioned social groups assumed an exploratory and nomadic nature, they are somewhat disanalogous to the *pombeiros*. The other examples did not always have a continued relationship with the coast, were not always native to the region, or intimately associated with commerce. Above all, the *pombeiros* were Africans, and although they were useful in forging new transport routes and methods, trade was their principle objective, and they were already a part of the African culture. The *pombeiros*' utility originated in the fact that they were already a part of the African community, and the adaptation process was irrelevant. A distinguishing characteristic of the *pombeiros* was that they did not wear European style clothing such as shoes.¹⁷³ As the African's still essentially controlled the interior, characteristics such as footwear were included amongst the characteristics disallowed inland that were viewed as European influence.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the *pombeiros* lost much of their illustriousness as pioneering hinterland traders, although they retained their original commercial function. The intrusion of foreign capital and competition, as well as expanding trade routes and the rise of slaving caravans decreased their competitive advantage. They became associated with the lowest ranks of the Angolan society, and were either commissioned to trade at commercial centers between shorter distances, or were simply slaves of Luanda merchants for whom the *pombeiros* negotiated. Although the *pombeiros* were the most common, similar traders existed as well. *Aviados* were traders that did not have their own capital either, but were distinguishable by their use of footwear, signifying a more Europeanized trader.¹⁷⁴ Etymologically speaking, the Portuguese origin is the

¹⁷² Candido, "Merchants and Business," p. 3; see Miller, *Way of Death*.

¹⁷³ Inferred from several documentary sources; see Henriques, chapter 1.

¹⁷⁴ Henriques, p. 116; In the later eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, further distinctions arose. The blanket term for these traders became *sertanejos*, for traders in the interior, and other designations such as *aviados*, *feirantes* or *funantes* (that traveled from one market to another), *ambaquistas*, and *quimbares* (free Africans that often protected commercial exchanges) surfaced.

verb ‘aviar,’ in this context meaning dispatch. The *Aviados*, or ‘dispatched men’ worked more closely with the Portuguese as traders, and were often appointed by local merchants.¹⁷⁵

A myriad of distinct tasks and positions existed in Angola that were directly connected to commerce beyond African inhabitants that merged with the Portuguese system. In addition to contracted porters and market traders, other individuals traded in larger volume and lived in coastal communities. Many of these people were slave owners that supplied Luanda with human cargo, or maintained them for personal purposes in the colony. The plurality or hybridity of identities amongst settlers that resided in Angola and the various backgrounds from which they came inhibits clear definitions of sub-cultures or groups. Many academics have opted to group these inhabitants of Angola under the general term ‘Luso-African’. The primary function of the distinction is the differentiation between Portuguese persons that spent most, or the entirety of their lives in Angola, or were of Portuguese decent that most often had one African parent, and Portuguese merchants coming directly from the metropole. Many of the Luso-Africans were Portuguese or Brazilian born traders that settled in Angola and “made a life of trade.”¹⁷⁶ They were also individuals born on the African continent that emphasized their putative descent from Portuguese merchants.¹⁷⁷ The term ‘Luso-African’ is ascribed to various groups of trading individuals, and many of them were mixed race, lived in the Angolan interior, spoke Kimbundo at home, and Portuguese as their business language.¹⁷⁸ These individuals were not only eager to become involved in the slave trade through contractual agreements or sales as well as direct slave ownership, but owned their own slaves that worked for them or on farms (*arimos*)¹⁷⁹ although not all that worked there were slaves. Some Luso-Africans that lived in Luanda owned land with this purpose in the Dande, Icolo, or Bengo regions.¹⁸⁰ The Luso-Africans were crucial to the commercial sector in Angola, and in creating a Portuguese-African identity among the Portuguese expatriates that moved there. These men that resided on the Angolan coast or regularly interacted with coastal merchants were widely connected through business relationships or family ties to other Lisbon or Brazilian merchants that traded directly or indirectly with ports such as Luanda.

The Luso-Africans were crucial links in all facets of colonial trade between the interior markets and smaller volume traders, and the coastal merchants. They were employed in innumerable

¹⁷⁵ Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants, and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674*, Boston: Brill, 2011, p. 201.

¹⁷⁶ Candido, “Merchants and Business,” p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ See Peter Mark, *Portuguese Style and Luso-African Identity: Pre-colonial Senegambia, 16th-19th Centuries*, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2003.

¹⁷⁸ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 246.

¹⁷⁹ *Arimos* were plantations for both the Africans and Portuguese, that comes from the verb *arimar* rooted from the Kimbundu word *kudima* meaning to cultivate land. Heintze, *Fontes*, 114.

¹⁸⁰ José Curto, *Álcool e escravos: o Comércio Luso-Brasileiro do Álcool em Mpinda, Luanda e Benguela durante o tráfico Atlântico de Escravos (c. 1480-1830) e o seu impacto nas sociedades da África Central Ocidental*, Lisbon: Editora Vulgata, 2002, p. 262.

positions as receptors, traders, and regulators of goods and slaves. With such a wide range of individuals, some of the most important ones were quite wealthy and powerful. The most powerful however, were the elite businessmen (*homens de negócio*) that hailed primarily from Lisbon, financing trade in the colonies. The difference between what was designated as businessmen as opposed to local merchants (*mercadores*), is that the businessmen traded in substantially larger volume. This became one of the principle lexical distinctions made by contemporaries in Angola that increased throughout the eighteenth century. However, before the second half of the eighteenth century, these two words were used somewhat interchangeably.¹⁸¹ Later, the distinctions became clearer, and other distinctive words such as *negociante* became agents of stratification. Although many of these men were based in Lisbon, the term in this period was used to designate someone of great commercial prowess. In general terms, the way of signifying the businessmen were those that rented or leased out goods or dealt with credit, especially dealing with wholesale merchandising.¹⁸² These large-scale merchants were also often in some way associated with royal contracts for export commodities throughout the empire. This allowed them to enjoy a great deal of bourgeois exclusivity and intimate links to the Crown. Many of the men considered *homens de negócio* if not Lisbon based had very strong family ties such as parents, siblings or cousins that lived in areas that were conducive to trade relationships between the various businessmen. Financial investments that the businessmen made were essential to the growth of overseas commercial networks.

The major businessmen in accordance with their exclusivity in many cases belonged to selective organizations. One of these was the Luanda chapter of the empire-wide Holy House of Mercy (*Santa Casa de Misericórdia*) that was a religious, social, and financial club for the social elite and dignitaries.¹⁸³ It was upheld to have members of high moral character, and conducted many aspects of municipal life in the city. A high percentage of the members of the organization were businessmen that acquired a great deal of social status, influence and connections as a result. Many men that worked within the same commercial companies were members and collaborated through the organization. Some of the businessmen that were members held important positions there such as Manuel Correa, who served as Purveyor of the organization in the 1680's.¹⁸⁴

If commercial actors such as the *pombeiros* were necessary to the acquisition of products at the base of commercial networks, the businessmen were equally vital in making those networks possible. The start up capital provided by the businessmen created the means for commercial

¹⁸¹ Jorge Miguel Pedreira, "Os Negociantes de Lisboa na Segunda Metade do Século XVIII: Padrões de Recrutamento e Percursos Sociais," *Análise Social*, vol. xxvii (116-117), 1992 (2.º-3.º), 407-440), p. 411.

¹⁸² Pedreira, "Os Negociantes de Lisboa" p. 411.

¹⁸³ Coates, p. 44.

¹⁸⁴ Joseph Miller, "Capitalism and Slaving: The Financial and Commercial Organization of the Angolan Slave Trade, according to the Accounts of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1684-1692)," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1984), pp. 1-56, p. 18.

players to create networks that the entire system functioned through. Capital investments provided by the businessmen allowed for them to become a part of the mercantile system through long-distance trading ventures.¹⁸⁵ Regardless of the fact that the businessmen were largely composed of wealthy people that entered the Angolan trade with a large fortune, the lucrative trade made them a great deal richer. Savings were required in order to enter the business, but it was not necessarily a prerequisite for the businessmen to have a great deal of capital. Many were able to trade in this way investing enough resources to begin, and growing their net worth upon receiving returns from debtors. As such, the businessmen would have been capable and business savvy individuals with investment capital. The penchant for business arrangements that these men had lead them to diversify in the products that they traded throughout the Atlantic. Investing in various products was a business strategy in that it diminished commercial risks incurred through trade. Avoiding the commercial risks omnipresent in the south Atlantic not only disincentivized men from investing exclusively in particular products, but also from owning slaves. Although many of the businessmen invested in slaves, and slaves were profitable in the Americas, it was not always considered a smart or secure business venture for the wealthiest merchants. The far distance that the slaves traveled opened the opportunity for a wide array of issues. In addition to pirates and other human actors, the slaves were malnourished and prone to diseases as a result. The high cost of participants in the capture, maintenance, transport, and sale of slaves, as well as many possible deaths along the way made it difficult to justify heavy dependence upon it.

Businessmen invested in goods dispatched from Luanda and sent throughout the Atlantic. Losses suffered from one product would be compensated in another. The businessmen's propensity to invest in various products was based in their conservative tendencies to avoid the risks associated with consolidation regardless of the profitability of particular products.¹⁸⁶ This contributed to the ability of these businessmen to socially ascend as they gained influence throughout the territories. The Crown's distribution of contracts ceding monopoly rights for raw materials from the colonies was not restricted to external businessmen, and many men from Luanda held them, which may have been for this reason. However, a contributor to this may have been conflicts between the Lisbon based businessmen and Luso-Africans. Awarding the Luso-African merchants such contracts was not only in their best interest, but protected the Angola-Brazilian trade relations that included business partners and other confidants that were affected. Distance from the Lisbon based commercial bankers and businessmen in addition to strengthening relationships amongst the south

¹⁸⁵ Antônio Carlos Jucá de Sampaio, "Os Homens de Negócio no Rio de Janeiro e Sua Atuação nos Quadros do Império Português (1701-1750)," in Fragoso, Bicalho, and Gouvêa, eds., *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: A Dinâmica Imperial Portuguesa (Séculos XVI-XVIII)*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001, p. 96.

¹⁸⁶ Jorge Miguel Pedreira, *Os homens de Negócio da Praça de Lisboa de Pombal ao Vintismo (1755-1822) : Diferenciação, Reprodução e Identificação de um Grupo Social*, doc. thesis, 1995, p. 117.

Atlantic merchants would have emphasized it. This also indicates a movement at the end of the seventeenth century toward a strengthening mutual relationship or identity between Brazil and Angola.¹⁸⁷ Notwithstanding, contracts were attractive to the merchant elite but the South Atlantic relationship allowed for a great deal of smugglers to evade taxes imposed on goods, as well as for traders to illegally traffic contraband between the two territories. The dynamics of royal contracts will be discussed more in-depth in a subsequent section of the chapter.

The wealthy businessmen that traded in Angola in the latter part of the seventeenth century infrequently remained long enough to integrate into the Luso-African community. Regardless of attempts to attract these men to the territory, many of them oscillated throughout other areas in the empire. This became evident when Governor Gonçalo da Costa de Alcáçova Carneiro de Meneses (1691-1694) wanted more businessmen to concentrate on Angola. Whether or not coupled with personal commercial interests, Governor Meneses contended that the “wealth that each of them possess in a business of so many interests” was integral to the good stature of the territory.¹⁸⁸ More businessmen needed to be based in the territory for commerce to grow. The governor noted that many of the businessmen that passed through Angola continued on to the Estado de Índia in the East, working within their commercial company. While the presence of these commercial giants would have brought ‘honor’ to the colony and the individuals working with them, the governor astutely recognized that there was a direct correlation between the amount of wealth brought into the colony by the businessmen, and increasing trade in Angola.¹⁸⁹

Businessmen that resided in Angola lived in the major cities such as Luanda and Benguela. Maintaining that the governor may have embellished the state of the living conditions in hopes of generating interest, in the late seventeenth century they lived on an ‘abundance’ of land.¹⁹⁰ They would most likely have lived in the upper part of Luanda throughout this period.¹⁹¹ Because Luanda was situated on a hill, the most important power structures and institutions were located in the most prominent locations. Much of the local aristocracy and most influential traders resided there as well. This was a trend since the beginning of the colonization of Angola, and held true almost until Luanda’s sesquicentennial, changing in the 1720s. This resulted from the increased importance of the port at Luanda, attributable to the increasing slave trade in Brazil due to the discovery of

¹⁸⁷ Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, “A Rede Económica do Mundo Atlântico Português,” in Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (dir.) *A Expansão Marítima Portuguesa, 1400-1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 125-129.

¹⁸⁸ January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

¹⁸⁹ January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

¹⁹⁰ January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

¹⁹¹ Fernando Batalha, *A Arquitectura em Angola*, Coimbra: V Coloquio Internacional de Estudos Luso-Brasileiros, 1966, p. 22.

enormous quantities of mineral resources, as well as the commercial accessibility because of the discontinuation of commercial collusions previously enjoyed by the government officials.¹⁹²

Slaves owned by the large-scale merchants in Angola aided with the men's agricultural produce, as well as with their household or shipping needs. Especially slaves living in communities closer than the *arimos* called *senzalas* were those that helped with the various tasks that the businessmen needed. These men at times owned a great deal of slaves, although it was yet again stated that regardless of the high profits obtained from selling slaves, it was not desired. In essence, the mortality rate not only incentivized diversification, but impeded it if too much was invested in the slaves.¹⁹³

An additional issue associated with the businessmen's worth was that it was prejudicial to the territory for them to make their fortune and then leave the colony. Also important to the colonizing effort was a growing number of Portuguese individuals taking residence there. When the businessmen left the territory, so did their families and belongings, clearly contrary to the interests of Angola and of the empire. The solution proved too idealistic for the period, but it was to promote the voyage to Angola only to those that would "wed <in Angola> in order to become residents and not leave with their fortunes."¹⁹⁴ This was suggested in accordance with encouraging secular lives for their children. People coming to Angola and marrying solely within the Portuguese community was extraordinarily rare, with very few examples other than Domingos Luis, who had seven daughters, all of whom married into wealthy families of Portuguese descent.¹⁹⁵ By having several children marry into other families in Angola, the wealth would have been distributed and filtered into the different families, consequently allowing for the wealth garnered as a function of commercializing Angola to remain in Angola and benefit the local mercantile community.

The merchant elite in Angola was in many ways an integrated community. The way that they interacted with the local areas such as Luanda was largely societally formative. The commercial sector in Angola also depended on their exports and credit. However, the businessmen could not have realized their commercial aspirations in Angola without the other participants in the greater commercial machine. Commerce in Angola was an aggregate of several sub-mechanisms working

¹⁹² Miller, *Way of Death*, Chapter 12.

¹⁹³ January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

¹⁹⁴ "cazarem nella para ficarem moradores e não sahirem com oz cabedades" January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

¹⁹⁵ Domingos Luis is given as an example of an individual that resided in Angola, creating families of Portuguese lineage, although Lopo da Fonseca Henriques was also referenced. He was a contractor of the royal tax-farming contract in Angola for several years and of a highly respected family that had family members and investments throughout the Atlantic, which puts the validity of his reference in this context into question. The fact that he resided in Angola and had children there while sustaining external investments may have been the operative factor. However, the lack of purely Portuguese families would have been a concern, especially for a governor that had only been in Angola for a year at this point in a place where the few Portuguese that arrived procreated with the African communities. Lopo da Fonseca Henriques' family will be discussed later in relation to the monopoly contracts. January 29, 1692, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

within separate functions for economic ends, but each sector was essential to the whole. The interlinked system allowed for each part to realize their purpose, and for commercial competitiveness throughout the Atlantic stemming from Angola. Depending on the location and task of the Angolan traders, different forms of currency were used that were inevitably linked to systems of credit that allowed transactions to occur and business to grow.

The Angolan Monetary and Credit System

It is clear that the intricate trade relationships between the various commercial figures in Angola were connected through the exchange of various products that were desired by the particular groups. Notwithstanding, what made the trade possible was an intricate credit system because of the volatile local currencies. The credit system in Angola served a plethora of functions. The use of credit was an essential institution not only on the Angolan coast, but also in the Angolan interior and throughout the Portuguese empire. It aided in facilitating and standardizing the sale of goods, while primarily protecting coastal merchants from fraud, theft, or damaged goods throughout the course of transaction that often endured several months or even years.

Trade agents exchanged several important products to and from Angola throughout the commercial networks. Angola imported a series of raw materials and goods such as European cloth, iron wears, beads, Brazilian alcoholic beverages and red dyewood, guns and other weapons, and gunpowder, among other goods such as those contained in the bundles traded for slaves. Export goods from Angola aside from slaves consisted primarily of ivory, wax, and salt.¹⁹⁶ These products were largely available at the markets in Angola that additionally sold items such as foodstuffs. Although Luanda was the main port through which the products were transported, other ports specialized in particulars. Some items were sold universally such as slaves and ivory, however Loango was a major port for cotton cloth and salt, whereas Benguela markets primarily had beads, foodstuffs, and wax. Many times, these products were traded for other raw materials foregoing a currency exchange, but Angolan currencies were commonly used and better gauged the products' worth.

Angolan currencies at the time were highly undependable as a way of accruing personal savings. Products such as salt were exchanged for others for example in some areas. Using perishable or expendable goods as currency made future transactions difficult, and there were also material goods whose express purpose was monetary value. Objects such as shells (*nzimbu*) found on Luanda Island used in the Kingdom of Kongo,¹⁹⁷ or beads used in locations such as Benguela

¹⁹⁶ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 206.

¹⁹⁷ Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, p. 44; Eugenia W. Herbert, "Portuguese Adaptation to Trade Patterns Guinea to Angola (1443-1640)," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Sep., 1974), pp. 411-423, p. 420.

were considered currency, especially in the initial stages of Portuguese colonization. Instituted in the seventeenth century, the *libongo* was a small straw mat used as currency in Angola.¹⁹⁸ They were tightly woven palm leaves, made to be durable, smooth and lasting.¹⁹⁹ Primarily manufactured in the north, in the Kongo and the Loango Coast, the *libongos* were stamped with an R for the king by the Municipal Council after 1649,²⁰⁰ and were the Portuguese royal currency in the mid seventeenth century. This legal tender was utilized universally, and was even used to pay Portuguese military personnel. However, the more valuable currency was the *macuta*.

The latter half of the seventeenth century experienced financial difficulties in the Portuguese empire, and the currencies were revaluated throughout the period. This occurred especially with the devaluation of the *reis* in 1688, a time when the economy was beginning to heal.²⁰¹ The *macuta* was equivalent to ten *libongos*, and was a cloth currency that existed in Angola since the onset of the Portuguese initial occupation of Luanda, used concurrently with other forms of local currencies in the beginning. The *macuta* was a long cloth fabric that served not only monetary functions, but was used in making candles for ships and for dressing slaves leaving the ports.²⁰² This proved problematic because the fact that the cloth had other uses aside from monetary value caused a scarcity of the resource. Foreign merchants trading in ports such as Mpinda and Cabinda, namely the Dutch in the 1670's, drained the cloth to such a degree that there was a noticeable shortage in Luanda.²⁰³

The *macuta* was not only causing financial problems because of its functional versatility and drain from the Portuguese empire, but the material itself was undependable. The two currencies considered were made from materials that wore easily, and when exposed to the elements or to insects they eroded rapidly. Many contemporaries complained of annually losing thousands of *reis* worth of the two forms of currency, especially *libongos*, as a result. In 1680 for example, these official forms of currency were described as being extremely "inconvenient", and a source of "great damages that the inhabitants experienced."²⁰⁴ *Macutas* in the early 1680's were worth "150 *reis* each."²⁰⁵ Problems with the valuation of the currency erupted because merchants as well as military officials on a fixed income received payment with such value. The nominal value of 150 *reis* was in

¹⁹⁸ Joachim John Monteiro, *Angola and the River Congo* vol. I, London: Macmillan and Co., 1875, P. 16.

¹⁹⁹ John Thornton, "Precolonial African Industry and the Atlantic Trade, 1500-1800," *African Economic History*, No. 19 (1990 - 1991), pp. 1-19, p. 11.

²⁰⁰ Heintze, *Fontes*, p. 119.

²⁰¹ Carl A. Hanson, "Monopoly and Contraband in the Portuguese Tobacco Trade, 1624-1702," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, vol. 19, no. 2, Winter 1982, pp. 149-168, p. 155.

²⁰² Roquinaldo Ferreira, "Dinâmica do comércio intracolônial: Geribitas, panos asiáticos e guerra no tráfico angolano de escravos (século XVIII)" in Fragoso, Bicalho, and Gouvêa, eds., *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: A Dinâmica Imperial Portuguesa (Séculos XVI-XVIII)*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001, p. 368.

²⁰³ Ferreira, "Dinâmica do Comércio," p. 368.

²⁰⁴ "inconveniência", "grandes danos que os moradores experimentavam," August 31, 1680, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁰⁵ "cento e sincoenta reis cada huma", June 9, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 13.

practice less than a third.²⁰⁶ This caused an uprising in 1682 because of the “enormous loss” that was suffered through the misrepresentation of the *macuta*’s value.²⁰⁷ Lesser quality workmanship in order to make up for losses that the *macutas* were manufactured with created unequal values of the currency. An additional problem was devaluation efforts committed by the governors largely for personal trade reasons. This made goods from the interior cheaper on the coast, but the merchants were largely affected by the “diminution of the price of the *macutas*.”²⁰⁸

The problems associated with these forms of currency were hoped to be resolved with the institution of copper coins. Promotion of the use of copper coinage began in the in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.²⁰⁹ The desire to use copper gained momentum throughout the decade, and was eventually given the namesake of the cloth currency, *macuta*. The copper coin was instated, and by 1694, the Angolan troops stipends were paid in part with copper, that lead to an uprising against the *ouvidor-geral* in the same year whom they deemed responsible for its distribution.²¹⁰ A contributing factor to discontent associated with the copper coinage was its subsequent scarcity throughout this period. By the eighteenth century, a noticeable lack of the precious metal was hampering the ability of contractors to pay those that they owed in the colony, especially in return for credit.²¹¹ However, the use of copper persisted although there was a constant undersupply. Instituting the precious metal was a theoretically positive change, but “in Angola, the issue of copper coins was the great monetary problem of the seventeenth century.”²¹² The credit system circumvented or delayed the direct use of currency, and ensured that commercial transactions came into fruition that allowed for growth in the Atlantic economy that bullion could not adequately provide for.

The use of credit in Angola was important to trade and the completion of business arrangements, but it was also essential as a safeguard for coastal merchants. It was extremely dangerous for Luanda merchants seeking trade agreements in the Angolan hinterland to entrust their goods to trade agents before receiving the exchange upon the intermediary’s return. If there were no fluvial means of access to a particular market, the journey lasted several months before the individuals returned with the desired products that would subsequently be shipped out of Luanda. If a credit system did not exist, theft would have been rampant, and there would be less incentive for

²⁰⁶ Ferreira, “Dinâmica do Comércio”, p. 369.

²⁰⁷ “grandíssima perda” November 11, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 13.

²⁰⁸ “diminuição do preço das macutas” June 9, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 13.

²⁰⁹ November 29, 1679, AHU, Angola, cx. 12; August 31, 1680, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²¹⁰ Roquinaldo Ferreira, “Dinâmica do comércio intracolonial: Geribitas, panos asiáticos e guerra no tráfico Angolano de Escravos (Século XVIII),” pp. 339-378, in Fragoso, João, Bicalho, Maria Fernanda, and Govêa, Maria de Fátima (orgs.), *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: A Dinâmica Imperial Portuguesa (Séculos XVI-XVIII)*, Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 2001, p. 370.

²¹¹ August 5, 1703, AHU, Angola, cx. 17.

²¹² “em Angola, a questão da moeda de cobre foi o grande problema monetário no século xvii,” Frédéric Mauro, *Portugal, o Brasil, e o Atlântico, vol. II*, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1997, p. 183.

return. In addition, the long journey frequently meant that products would be lost, poorly treated or cared for, or spoiled. The uncertainty and mortiferous nature of the slave trade almost guaranteed losses before reaching Luanda. The conditions under which slaves were acquired and transported was a determinant in their value when they reached the ports for sale to be shipped elsewhere in the Atlantic. Many of the slaves were injured, malnourished, or died throughout the journey. The credit system enabled coastal merchants to reject offers that did not meet the requirements stipulated in the credit agreement. It also allowed the merchants to redirect blame towards others if a problem occurred, making damaged goods or deceased slaves the liability of the porters.²¹³

Credit was necessary in order for smaller scale traders to assemble the bundles that they traded for slaves that were given a value in *reis*. Other merchants were able to finance commodity transfers through other types of credit that were inevitably financed through wealthy businessmen and bankers from Portugal. The bankers used credit as an investment strategy. They invested in goods such as ivory, but credit was a lucrative means of income. Credit indebted the Luanda merchants to the richer businessmen that in turn created a client-patron relationship between them.²¹⁴ This was a favorable business strategy for the bankers, increasingly funneling capital through credit to Luanda exacerbated the financial hold that they had over smaller scale merchants. However, this allowed ambitious merchants to continue to thrive in Angola. Credit was attributable to the merchants' ability to generate commercial routes from scratch. In fact, credit had a profound effect on trade maintained at the "core of the complex forces that fueled the transport and distribution sectors of western central Africa's eighteenth century political economy."²¹⁵ As previously suggested, although credit was universally necessary to the Angolan commercial sector, it assumed different names and characteristics that corresponded to its worth and function in society.

Credit was allocated through written agreements between the various commercial parties. These credit arrangements assumed the form of letters acknowledging debt owed from one party to another. The least widely distributed form of credit was only circulated and redeemable in the Angolan hinterland. It was sometimes found in towns that based their commercial arrangements towards the interior. These were called *folhinhas*, and many merchants were somewhat reluctant to use them because of their limited circulation. The *folhinhas* were cloth fragments that were given a monetary value.²¹⁶ An additional form of loans that was also rather insignificant in the credit hierarchy was the *livrança*. This form of credit remained mostly on the coast, specifically in

²¹³ Cândido, "merchants," p. 14.

²¹⁴ Miller, "capitalism and Slaving," p. 12

²¹⁵ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 187.

²¹⁶ Miller, "Capitalism and Slaving," p. 47.

Luanda, but was only redeemable in Angola as well. This exchange was not particularly dependable, and was not intended for long distances. *Livranças* were mostly extended in small quantities, and were dealt with on a daily basis. They essentially took on the character of early IOU's that were entirely dependent on frequent interactions with the receptors and their goodwill to reimburse them. Although the *livranças* were usually given in smaller amounts, and intended for short periods of time, their value was accumulated. Typically, at the start of a new royal tax-farming contract, the contractors would encourage the sale of large quantities of them to the Luso-Africans. The higher the quantity of *livranças* that the contractor could sell, the easier it was for him to accrue the necessary funds to support more substantial credit arrangements that could be cashed in at the end of their contract.²¹⁷ In essence, the *livranças*, although circulating locally and strengthening the local economy, were a stimulus for the larger forms of credit called *letras*.

Letras were bills of exchange that proved extremely important for the generation and sustenance of commerce in Angola, as well as the Atlantic. These credit bills were awarded in substantially larger quantities, and were used far more by the merchant elite and with coastal Luso-African merchants. They were a mechanism that functioned as a “fundamental business instrument.”²¹⁸ *Letras* allowed for substantial volumes of goods to be transported throughout the terrestrial and sea routes without significant start up costs. This would have allowed many Lisbon merchants a great deal of social and economic mobility, offsetting expenses until trade relations were realized. These credit notes were used intensively for trade, and many of the merchants maintained relationships with solicitors in the destination zones in order to “guarantee the smooth operation of their businesses.”²¹⁹ Many colonial officials' salaries were partially paid in *letras*, and they were extremely common in the territory. One of the greatest aspects of the *letras* was their inherent security, as the large return guaranteed payment. Contemporaries perceived them as more lucrative than using money, ensuring that raw materials from locations such as Brazil would be very well cared for.²²⁰ In fact, the *letras* were so trusted that many merchants were willing to front the bills of exchange up to “two years before” the return.²²¹

Credit was largely dependent on accounts in other areas of the Atlantic, especially Lisbon. The credit system was diverse, yet there were three major types of bills of exchange used for commerce in Angola. These were the *letras dos direitos*, *letras seguras*, and *letras de risco*. The

²¹⁷ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 561.

²¹⁸ “instrumento fundamental do negócio” Amélia Polónia, *Redes Informais de Comércio Ultramarino, Estudos em Homenagem a Luís António de Oliveira Ramos*, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2004, pp. 879-891, p. 885.

²¹⁹ “garantir o bom andamento das suas empresas” Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, “O Comércio das Almas e a Obtenção de Prestígio Social: Traficantes de Escravos na Bahia ao longo do Século XVIII,” *Locus Revista de História*, Juiz de Fora, v. 12, n. 2, 2006, pp. 9-27, p. 11.

²²⁰ January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²²¹ “doux annos antes,” January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

preferred form of credit in Angola was the *letras seguras*. These were less associated with the crown, and widely circulated throughout the South Atlantic. Their desirability was founded in their fail-proof ability to produce returns on goods dispatched to the Americas. Using *letras seguras* was preferred because they “<did> not run the risk of fire, sea, or corsairs, and those that fle<d> with the goods, and misconduct should not be feared.”²²² They were used as an effective method of assuring quality and control over transport, but also as product insurance in the case of disaster. Angolan merchants shipping slaves to Brazil administered the *Letras seguras*, although various other products were shipped in the same way.²²³ This allowed Angolan merchants debt restitution from merchants passing through Brazil, and furnished the American accounts of the African merchants.

Letras de risco differed from the *letras seguras* in that they did not concern merchants, but rather the ship captains.²²⁴ This is significant because there was not the same level of security involved. The captains of the trade vessels would not have had a financial backing in Brazil or Portugal. As a result, it would have been more difficult for these men to accrue the necessary funds to redeem the credit. The raw materials transported to Angola were not as lucrative as human cargo, which was the principle reason that the credit was necessary. This form of credit was quite common, and largely depended on the return of the individual that received the bill.²²⁵ This made many of the merchants extending these bills work primarily with frequently used and trusted individuals, although such concern was coupled with the issues associated with pirates and the natural elements.

The *letras dos direitos* were directly connected to the slave trade. The contractor of the royal tax-farming contract awarded them. Consequently, these *letras* that were essentially a slave export tax were closely linked to the crown. This was essential to the functionality of the slave trade and its contributors. Duties collected by the contractors were often sent in the form of *letras* and many public officials were paid in part through them. Because the bills were obtained through the contractor, they held a great deal of importance overseas. Such *letras* were not particularly common, but were sought after and secure. They were awarded with primacy towards private merchants (who were in many cases highly ranked colonial officials), and often divided into subcategories, such as old duties (*direitos velhos*) and new duties (*direitos novos*).²²⁶ These

²²² “não correm o risco de fogo, mar, e cossario e a varias que que correm vindo as fazendas, e os dezcaminhos se não podem reear” January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²²³ Miller, “Capitalism and Slaving,” p. 45.

²²⁴ Miller, “Capitalism and Slaving,” p. 46.

²²⁵ Polónia, p. 881.

²²⁶ Miller, “capitalism and slaving,” p. 44.

particular types corresponded to the old and new taxes imposed on each slave exported from Angola, paid to the contractor.

Monopoly Contracts and contractors

The function of the contracts as well as merchants that held them were fundamental to the Angolan economic system, and although there were distinctive characteristics, the use of contracts was non-unique to the colony. The use of contracts expanded throughout the Portuguese empire, and came into being at the onset of Portuguese expansion and inter-continental trade. Over time the system evolved, beginning in the late fifteenth century, in which contracts were awarded in order to collect taxes for the Crown in the overseas. This system allowed the Crown to essentially employ commercial agents to collect the royal taxes. These contracts were allocated through an auction style process in which the recipient bought the rights to the contract. This was a way for the crown to better regulate tax administration, as well as have an immediate return through the initial bid in order to compensate for financial deficits at the time.

During the Iberian Union (1580-1640) businessmen operating in the overseas colonies adopted the Spanish system of contracts called the *asiento*.²²⁷ The *asiento* was the Spanish form of contract that was used to supply the slave market from Western Africa to the Spanish American colonies.²²⁸ With the system of the *asiento*, slaves were transported on Portuguese or Spanish ships, creating a voluminous market for slaves that drove many Portuguese merchants in the period to Castile in order to secure the rights. Because Spain held no West African colonies, the *asientos* were not based in export taxes. The *asientistas* paid taxes to royal officials in the Spanish colonies, and took more direct ownership of the slaves. Throughout the union this was a lucrative way of sustaining the slave trade from Angola to diverse locations in the Americas.

After the Iberian Union ended, the Portuguese merchants returned to the contract system. When a businessman bought the rights to a contract, it conferred monopoly privileges over a product in a particular area. These contracts, by the latter part of the seventeenth century coincided with a departure from the older system of merchants as Crown agents to “a trading framework controlled by private merchants and supervised by royal officials.”²²⁹ The most important contract in Angola was the royal tax-farming contract. This allowed exclusive rights to the taxation of the slave trade through all Angolan ports. At this time, the merchant elite was able to enjoy a great deal of commercial power. Instead of being subjugated to the Crown’s power, they regulated the flux of

²²⁷ Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial* Vo. IV, Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 1971, p. 177.

²²⁸ Albert Van Dantzig, “Effects of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Some West African Societies,” in ed. J. E. Inikori, *Forced Migration: the Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies*, London: Hutchinson University, 1982, p. 189.

²²⁹ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 92.

products into particular areas, while in large part free to choose their own terms and officials. In fact, the auctioning of royal contracts was one of the principle systems of the Portuguese state's fiscal organization, that lead to the "interpenetration of the public finances with the private."²³⁰ This is essentially a style of merger that allowed for the Crown to diminish expenditures because they no longer needed to employ a great deal of officials to regulate taxation. It also encouraged contract holders to maximize profits in the colony through the system. What by today's jargon would be considered a public-private partnership allowed private merchants to become extremely wealthy seemingly at the states' expense.²³¹ Both parties benefited from the system, but the businessmen accrued immense amounts of individual capital.

The royal contracts outlined a series of stipulations considered under the agreement that allowed the men specific obligations, as well as exclusive prerogatives associated with such tasks. Contracts were negotiated to last three, six, or nine years. The contracts tended to follow a common rubric in terms of content and style. They would begin with stating the monopoly that was being rented. This would have who the individuals were that the contract was awarded to, and what the product in question was to be. The contract followed with the length of duration of the contract. Thirdly, the payment procedures were presented. The amount awarded was discussed as well as the form of payment such as styles of currency or credit, and the place or institutions involved. The chattels pledged, and the other men that were associated as business partners were also included.²³² In addition to these formalities, the obligations that the contractors were expected to fulfill followed. This included the privileges that the contractors were given along with the duties that the contractors had in relation to the local authorities, and finally the relationship between the contractor and the local royal commercial and fiscal agents.

When the contractor received the contract for Angola, the territorial boundaries encompassed what the Portuguese considered its dependencies that throughout this period were Benguela, the Kongo, and Loango. After the merchants paid the contractor the entry duties, they were free to enter the territory and send the goods to any destination without further taxation.²³³ The only two anomalies in terms of the taxed export goods from Angola were precious metals and ivory. Precious metals were considered property of the state, and ivory was subjected to an additional tax.²³⁴ The low price ceiling placed by the Crown on the commodity made it less lucrative for some traders, but was important to the royal treasury in Portugal where the overwhelming majority of

²³⁰ "interpenetração dos dinheiros públicos com os privados" Margarida Vaz do Rego, "Contratos e Contratadores Régios: Açores- Segunda Metade do Século XVIII," *Arquipélago- História*, 2a série, VIII (2004), 37-46. p. 37.

²³¹ Vaz do Rego, p. 38.

²³² Ribeiro da Silva, p. 90.

²³³ Frédéric Mauro, *Portugal, o Brasil, e o Atlântico*, vol. I, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1997, p. 213.

²³⁴ Mauro, vol. I, p. 213.

ivory was sent.²³⁵ This may also have contributed to ivory becoming an item commonly smuggled out rather than taxed. When slaves were exported from Luanda, the taxes were paid to the contractors, but they did not have to pay further taxes upon reaching the Americas. Although the duties were always paid to the contractor, in his absence or during the interim periods between the times that one businessman's contract expired and the new recipient's began, the taxes were paid directly to the royal treasury. The Crown gave incentives to hamper the continued circulation of contraband that the contractors at times allowed, knowing that the crown would not be compensated. If an individual or group was caught engaging in contraband, the Crown took two thirds of the goods, and left the rest to the contractor for having apprehended them.²³⁶ However, the contractors themselves succeeded in evading their own taxes and allowing contraband to enter for their own benefit. This was rather common and the repercussions for getting found out were less severe than the average person that attempted to do so.

Although the contractors held the monopoly, there was a series of other people that worked within the system. These were other businessmen that were allowed to work inside the monopoly system without collecting the duties. The contractors were allowed to place their own officials and factors in particular geographical areas. In addition, the contractors were permitted to award trading licenses (*avenças*) to private merchants. These licenses allowed the holders (*avençadores*) to export a specific quantity of a particular good from a predetermined area. In the case of Angola, the port of export that the license holders were allocated to was Luanda. When the *avençadores* exported the goods, local officials inspected them, and the license holders paid the royal tax to be collected by the agents of the contractor at the destination port.²³⁷ The *avençadores* held their license for a shorter period than the royal contract, and the recipients of the license were entered into a book of records in Lisbon. These men, as well as the contractors themselves hired local agents from the Luso-African community to aid in regulating exports. The *avençadores* were essentially the receptors of indirect taxes, and were the "true slave traders".²³⁸ The way that the *avenças* were structured made the holders much more intrinsically involved with the slave trade than the contractors.

In addition to the *avenças*, another type of license existed as well. This license was called a *licença*. The fundamental difference between the two types of licenses was that the *avenças* were trading licenses issued by the monopoly contractors, whereas the *licenças* were trading licenses effectively administered by the Portuguese Crown²³⁹ allowing private merchants to trade within the

²³⁵ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 541.

²³⁶ Mauro, *vol. I*, p. 213.

²³⁷ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 91.

²³⁸ Mauro, *vol. I*, p. 221.

²³⁹ Godinho, p. 178.

monopoly areas. The administration of these licenses showed that although the monopoly contracts existed, they did not close Angola off from private entrepreneurship, as long as the businessmen respected their allotted areas and specific range of goods.²⁴⁰ Businessmen purchased the *licença* from the crown that allowed access to the market, transporting their goods into the colony and paying taxes to the contractor. Although the *licenças* allowed for other traders to be a part of the monopoly, they were given to people in privileged positions, and only to those that could afford to buy the rights in the first place. Hence, regardless of the fact that licenses could be attained that admitted additional merchants into the monopoly system, they would have been associates or connected in some way to the contractor or to the crown in order for the favorable treatment to be bestowed upon them, and for them to continue to gain commercial strength in Angola.

There were several contracts awarded throughout this period, each with a timespan of six years. The organization of the contracts was intended to cover the subjects discussed above, concerning the necessary elements pertaining to the privileges and *raison d'être* of the contractor, but they were subdivided into dozens of subsections. The contract awarded in 1717 to begin on January 5, 1718 to Francisco Gomes Lisboa contained forty-seven stipulations. The contract like all others throughout this time period, ceded the rights to Angola distinguishing Benguela, the Kongo, and Loango as separate yet included provincial entities.²⁴¹ This shows that in the Portuguese colonial mindset all of these areas were nominally under Portuguese control and subject to the commercial monopoly. The annual price of the contract was forty-four thousand *cruzados* (17.6 million *reis*). The contract began by stating that the payments were to be made in goods in order to clothe and sustain the troops, including payment in flour. The contractor also paid in credit, and the fourth and final style was to be in the copper *macutas*. The coins paid were from “copper collected from the factories in Loango.”²⁴² The fact that the contract begins with matters concerning military sustenance shows the importance of the military in Angola, and how necessary the contractor was in providing for them. In fact, item twenty-eight stated that under no circumstances could the sitting governor enlist the contractor or anyone working under him in the case of a hinterland military threat in order to continue collecting taxes.²⁴³ In addition to providing for the troops' salaries, the contractor was expected to subsidize other public facilities. The contractor was required to subsidize the functionality of the hospital in Luanda, and was expected to pay eighty thousand *reis* annually to two members of the Overseas Council.²⁴⁴ Among other officials that derived their income from the contract, these were the primary beneficiaries.

²⁴⁰ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 83.

²⁴¹ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴² “cobre que se resgata nas feytorias de Loango” March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴³ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴⁴ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

The execution of the contract protected Lisboa as well as the Crown itself from potential abuses. Anyone that did not comply with the contractor's mandates could be brought to court including highly ranked government officials. This included the governor if he attempted to restrict exports for his own benefit, although this had been a problem in the colony. Religious figures as well as noblemen belonging to prestigious military orders were expected to comply with the contractor and pay the full duties assigned to the slaves that they wished to dispatch.²⁴⁵ The required taxes for each slave corresponded to the old duties and the new duties. The old duties were four thousand *reis* per slave that went to the contractor, and the new duties were worth three thousand *reis* that were to be turned into the royal treasury.²⁴⁶ The contract administered by the Overseas Council stated that a particular number of slaves were to be exported from Angola per year. Condition twenty-four made it clear that only the contractor and his representatives were allowed to be paid, and that "fifteen hundred heads <were> to be sent each year in contracted vessels."²⁴⁷

The contract continued on to say that the salt and slaves in areas such as Benguela were only to be retrieved, especially at the coastal factories, by individuals licensed by the contractor.²⁴⁸ Licensed individuals along the coast for the various products could establish factories, but a large portion of Lisboa's contract outlined the restrictions placed on merchants, the procedure for dealing with the factors and accountants that the contractor was to hire for the tax collection, and punishments for straying from the conditions. The contractor chose the *avençadores* that were to pay the taxes directly to the contractor's officials in Angola and deal with his associates in Brazil. Merchants that entered Luanda were required produce their *avença* upon arrival, thus their disembarkation was contingent on the contractor's consent. Additionally, the licensed individuals had to record all of the products leaving the port for the treasury's commercial log. If licensed traders strayed from their contractual obligations or traded without a license they were required to pay reparations in treble.²⁴⁹ To ensure good conduct in regard to the contractual agreements, the Overseas Council was adamant that if there were legal or business disagreements, the personnel involved had to go through the judicial system or they would be fined two thousand *cruzados*.²⁵⁰ The government officials could not override or become involved in commercial decisions made by the contractor as long as the contractor was working within the guidelines of the contract.

Within the restrictions on trade with raw materials and slaves, the twelfth and thirteenth stipulations explicitly treat the additional tax placed on ivory. Ivory was highly restricted, and could

²⁴⁵ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴⁶ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴⁷ "mil e quinhentas cabeças se tirarão cada anno em embarcações do contrato," March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴⁸ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁴⁹ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁵⁰ March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

only be traded by the contractor, or those designated by him. Additionally, all ivory exported from Angola was required to pass through the customs house, where it was quantified and weighed before the additional tax for ivory was applied. The import of ivory to Lisbon and the royal treasury was so controlled that “neither the governor nor other official can transport it” anywhere outside of the colony.²⁵¹ Any amount of ivory that was not sent solely by the contractor and did not follow such procedure was to be confiscated and attributed to the royal treasury.

The contract that followed Lisboa’s in 1723 rented by native Lisbon resident Vasco Lourenço Vellozo was very similar with a few modifications. The contract was substantially more expensive, worth fifty-six thousand *cruzados*.²⁵² Vellozo was expected to pay the military salaries as before, as well as some administrative officers and religious institutions, but the major difference was a new tax. This new tax of twelve hundred *reis* per slave was intended to “help pay the governor’s salary.”²⁵³ Not only does this further show the connection between the commercial sector and the military, but this is also a result of the law from 1720 prohibiting governors from commerce. The governors’ involvement in commerce had hindered the businessmen’s trade throughout the empire, and the law aided in allowing fairer trading conditions, yet the traders were ironically required to pay additional taxes in order to supplement the governor’s substantially higher salary as a result. No government officials were permitted to intervene in the commercial networks or disallow the businessmen’s trade agents from negotiating in the hinterland. There were also new restrictions on the number of slaves that could be sent to particular locations such as Rio de Janeiro²⁵⁴ as a result of the preferential treatment it received because of the gold discovery in Minas Gerais.

The royal tax-farming contract at the end of the seventeenth century was administered in 1698 to Antonio de Castro de Guimarães for the price of twenty *contos*²⁵⁵ per year for a period of six years. The contract lists associates that appear in many other contracts in the time period as the factors and was to be compensated in “four equal parts, and each one in a different style.”²⁵⁶ The first style was to be paid in *letras*. The *letras* were intended to be worth the same in Angola as in the metropole, with the intention of awarding enough to provide for the upkeep of the military officials on the coast and in the hinterland. The second type was goods to be discounted for further military sustenance. The first two types of payment were awarded in this way because the crown contended that the goods would be more valuable in Angola, especially in the interior than

²⁵¹ “Nem o Governador, nem outro ministro o poderá navegar,” March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁵² February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

²⁵³ “para ajuda dos soldos do governador” February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

²⁵⁴ February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

²⁵⁵ One *Conto* denoted the value of one Thousand *milreis*.

²⁵⁶ January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

elsewhere. In addition, the troops were to receive rations of flour, leaving the fourth installment to be paid in copper because the *macutas* and *libongos* carried different values in the hinterland and on the coast, which worked in the contractors favor, but was unfair to the troops.²⁵⁷

Although this was a standard contract, the municipal council pleaded for various amendments because of particular local trends. The copper currency was meant to have more universal acceptance, but fluctuated in availability. The other forms of payment such as goods and flour were necessary, but by the time such products reached the hinterland soldiers, many of them spoiled, decreasing in value, and the council suggested that these goods be replaced with *letras* to ensure that the infantry was compensated in the necessary value.²⁵⁸ The value of the *macutas* contributed to a further issue, which was that associates listed in the contract Manoel do Porto Barboza and Diogo Fonseca Henriques, were both still deeply indebted to the crown from past contracts, and as a result they should be dissociated from any involvement in the current monopoly contract. Issues over monetary valuation and back payments were extremely prejudicial to the current state of the colony. The issues with payment and currency, as well as compensating the military in Angola were the primary concerns, and listed in the beginning of the written contracts.

In this movement towards Crown sponsored private merchants and their associates holding the monopoly over goods in the Atlantic, their ability to award rights to others and their position allowing for them to selectively permit the influx of contraband, the contracts were rented at prices lower than their actual worth. The royal tax-farming contracts in the Atlantic rewarded not only monopoly rights for the slave trade, but also for an additional product. The additional product in Angola was ivory, which lead to a great deal of corruption in relation to the transportation of the product. Although there were issues of primary importance in the contracts that were necessary to the functionality of the colony, and various officials attempted to manipulate the commercial system for their own means, the contractors committed corruption and traded contraband as well. One particular case involved the holder of the prior Angolan royal tax-farming contract in Angola, Diogo da Fonseca Henriques.

Diogo da Fonseca Henriques came from a family linked to the Crown, and many of his other family members held prominent positions in Portuguese society. He was highly respected in Angola, and held the royal tax-farming contract for two consecutive terms, among other contracts afterwards. He, like many of the major merchant families were New-Christians that had family ties in West Africa for several decades. Henriques was a merchant that grew up in Angola, had five

²⁵⁷ January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²⁵⁸ January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

sisters,²⁵⁹ and a father who had been the holder of the royal contract for many years. Henriques' father, Lopo da Fonseca Henriques was the contractor of Angola from 1645 until 1651.²⁶⁰ Over a decade later, Lopo da Fonseca Henriques farmed out the contract again, this time with his brother Jeronimo da Teixeira Henriques who had been captain of Massangano.²⁶¹ Throughout this same period, the entrepreneurial brothers dealt not only with the slave trade, but were bondholders in Portuguese public debt and investors in the Brazil Company chartered by the Crown in 1649.²⁶² The two terms of the contract were from 1663 to 1664, and then from 1669-1676. Family ties to Angola previous to this demonstrate the depth of the family in the area. Duarte Dias Henriques held the contract from 1607 until 1614, and then proceeded to acquire the Spanish *asiento* from 1627 to 1647,²⁶³ fostering vast connections with others in Brazil and Spanish colonies as well.

Diogo da Fonseca Henriques assumed the contract rights for the first time in 1675. The contract that Diogo bought had a duration of six years. His subsequent contract was awarded in 1679, but did not take effect until 1691.²⁶⁴ His first contract terminated with a great deal of controversy that followed him throughout the 1680's. These issues centered on several accusations of breach of contract. However, the negligence and active participation that he undertook in relation to the assertions from various individuals were based in the transportation of ivory. Ivory was not the only source of corruption in relation to Fonseca Henriques' tenure as contractor in Angola, but it was a central issue concerning the misdeeds committed by him as well as conspirators in the tax evasion scheme. The power wielded by the contractors not only allowed them to conduct illicit trade, but to involve others on their payroll, or those that could benefit financially from doing business with them.

Diogo da Fonseca Henriques entered his first contract after the end of his father's. Already accused of owing back taxes from his fathers contract, the precedent was set for a great deal of scrutiny. In fact, it was expected that Diogo pay them, as he was the heir to his fathers contract.²⁶⁵ Citing the eleventh condition of Diogo's contract, officials stated that he was failing to record all of his transactions, and that commercial movements throughout the city needed to be accessible in order to monitor the validity of the records he was keeping. Additional issues by the end of Diogo's first contract that rose were that in less supervised ports such as Benguela and Loango, trade with foreigners was happening far too commonly. In Luanda the governor's ships were given precedence for embarkation before the other merchants, which was proving detrimental to the commercial

²⁵⁹ January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²⁶⁰ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 292.

²⁶¹ José Gonçalves Salvador, *Os Magnatas do Tráfico Negreiro*, Lisbon: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1981, p. 52.

²⁶² Salvador, p. 53.

²⁶³ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 292.

²⁶⁴ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 555.

²⁶⁵ December 22, 1682, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

activity in the colony.²⁶⁶ The preference for the governor's freight was leaving the port days ahead of individuals who were intended to have commercial privileges, "as occurred with *avencador* João da Silva's lighters."²⁶⁷ Additional problems with the governor were that as the contractors were to pay the infantry's salaries, the contractor wrote a petition to the Crown to stop the governor from cutting the military salary by a third. Regardless of the fact that this period was marked by an economic downturn, this would have been harmful to the local economy and to the wellbeing of the troops, especially since due to the lack of flour, its price had gone up, and the troops were paid in part with this commodity as well.²⁶⁸ This was only the first issue that the contractor had, as the Governor impeded the "free administration of <his> contract".²⁶⁹

In 1690, Diogo da Fonseca Henriques was caught in a scandal that inevitably brought him to prison. Because the value of ivory was far greater smuggled than when "sold in the public domain," the contractor in collusion with several other individuals allowed for ivory to enter Luanda from as far up as Loango. The occasion on which he was caught exposed that not only was he not adhering to the freight standards in terms of how many saves were allotted per shipment, but that he had been smuggling large quantities of ivory. In this particular shipment, "forty-one large and seventy-three small tusks" were found and confiscated, that were not logged in the customs records.²⁷⁰ The ivory had come from Loango, passing through the Dande, with soldiers and other officials as accomplices. One occasion entailed an English ship that anchored well off the coast of Luanda so as not to draw attention, and remained in the port under the pretext of maintenance needs, loading ivory at eleven at night under the veil of darkness.

The crimes that the contractor allegedly committed were in direct violation of contract conditions. Diogo failed to report some of the goods passing through Luanda, he allowed slave ships to board beyond capacity, and not only did he allow smuggling, but he colluded with foreign merchants. Ivory from Loango that Fonseca Henriques traded in large quantities was shared with some of his business associates and factors that he hired for his contract such as businessman Manoel do Porto Barboza, that failed to report over thirty thousand *reais* worth of goods.²⁷¹ A *devassa* initiated by the royal treasury inspector Antonio Pacheco de Almeida was conducted surreptitiously with the intent to implicate as many participants as possible. The questionable legality of the procedure undertaken with the *devassa*, however, did not stop Diogo from being sent to prison. Regardless of the fact that many of the stipulations of the contract were broken by virtue

²⁶⁶ June 16, 1682, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁶⁷ "como sucedeo com a fragatta do avançador João da Silva." February 19, 1688, AHU, Angola cx. 13.

²⁶⁸ June 9, 1683, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁶⁹ "livre administração do meu contracto", March 10, 1687, AHU, Angola, cx. 13.

²⁷⁰ "41 pontas de marfim, e 73 pontas de marfim miudo" March 14, 1690, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

²⁷¹ May 12, 1690, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

of the interconnectedness of the specifications, items seventeen and twenty were stated as the most directly violated, treating the slave embarkation capacity and the requirement to record transported goods respectively. The inspector gathered information such as from the captain-major of the jurisdiction of Dande, in hopes of gathering enough evidence to indict Diogo. By 1695, Diogo had been imprisoned for some time, yet was garnering support from colonial officials that testified that the *devassa* had fictitious details.²⁷² The governor himself had previously stated that the inspector could not be trusted, and that the relationship that the contractor and Pacheco de Almeida had were biased, as the two were ‘capital enemies.’²⁷³ In the same year, colonial officials began to suggest that Diogo be let free, regardless of the smuggled ivory and other crimes committed, under the auspices of health issues. He had become extremely ill, and had to be bled out several times as a result. The health concerns could not be adequately treated in the prison, and three months of house arrest were suggested for his recovery. An additional excuse for Diogo’s uncusomary release was that he was a *fidalgo*, with ties to the royal family, which they deemed terms for judicial lenience. In 1697, the contractor was freed from the cell and sent home to care for his health and take care of his personal business.²⁷⁴ After Diogo’s legal issues resolved, he continued to be a prominent member of Angolan society and deeply involved in commerce, holding future contracts in the early years of the eighteenth century, such as in 1709. Diogo’s prominent position appears to have overridden the injustices he committed. It is curious that after the ordeal, and the fact that the contract explicitly states that he was still in considerable debt to the Crown from before, they still auctioned him the rights.²⁷⁵ In addition to the crown, he still owed the Saint Xavier Hospital as well as other institutions. Regardless of Diogo’s financial indebtedness, it was clear that general consensus considered his business associates untrustworthy, and they desired “more dependable people.”²⁷⁶ Diogo’s situation shows that the contractors were able to trade on their own terms, and that although contraband was illegal the contractors had leverage in its distribution without fear of severe consequences. The source of a great deal of Diogo’s contraband was Loango because the products that he sought to illegally export originated from commercial centers along the northern coast.

The importance of Loango in the Angolan trade is often overshadowed by places such as Luanda and Benguela. Because a large portion of the slaves and valued products such as ivory were abundant in Loango, it was a valued place for merchants and contractors. It was also virtually impossible to trade in Loango without frequent interaction with other European empires. Regardless

²⁷² December 24, 1695, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²⁷³ October 29, 1689, AHU, Angola, cx. 14. The same assertion was stated again by others in 1695. December 24, 1695, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²⁷⁴ December 24, 1695, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

²⁷⁵ November 5, 1709, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

²⁷⁶ “gente de mais confiança” November 5, 1709, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.

of the fact that Diogo da Fonseca Henriques may have conducted illicit commerce or evaded taxes, his situation serves to show that the Loango Coast was important to Angolan commerce. Loango was also a location where essential commercial products overlapped. The slaves and ivory converged there, not only because both the human cargo and ivory were extracted from there, but because ivory was in many cases used amongst the goods traded for slaves in the region.²⁷⁷ The copper used as currency was also produced in that area, making the Loango coast a valuable part of the Portuguese West African coast. Diogo was an example of the preferred treatment that the businessmen in Angola received, and although the products exported from Angola left through Luanda, many of the most valuable items were most easily acquired and transported from Loango. However, the turn of the eighteenth century marked a series of conflicts between the Portuguese and other European powers that all desired commercial supremacy in the region. If the Portuguese Crown lost control, or worse, could no longer commercialize the region, a major supply of goods would be inaccessible and thus the contracts could not be filled.

Commerce on the Loango Coast and British Opposition

The Loango Coast was an expanse of the African littoral that the Portuguese colonizers gave primarily commercial focus throughout their expansionist efforts in Angola. Loango was comparatively under explored, and a number of factors lead to its underdevelopment as a premier colonial entrepôt. Firstly, concentration on Benguela and especially Luanda was already important for trade relationships, and as colonization in the interior was largely unsuccessful, financial and human resources were concentrated there. The depression in the second half of the seventeenth century made expanding up the coast past the Congo River even more difficult. Also, the Vili kingdom still controlled the region, and it was difficult to maintain a settlement in the area. Although the Portuguese began trading in Loango in 1576, roughly a century after having discovered the region, naming the beach *Praia Formosa de Santo Domingo*, there was still no slave trade established, and Luanda was more lucrative at the time. This may be attributable to the fact that the raw materials exchanged were valuable subsidies to the slave trade, and that yet another slave exportation port would have diminished Luanda's importance. A last reason for avoiding the northern coast was purely geographical. It was extremely difficult to navigate the coast, and even anchor a ship in the harbor. As noted through the Portuguese colonization efforts in the interior by means of the Kwanza River, waterways were the ideal modes of transporting cargo for export. The rivers that flowed into the Atlantic along the coast were impossible to enter. At virtually every river opening, a sandbar crossed the entirety of the entrance. The only river that was remotely traversable

²⁷⁷ March 10, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15.

was the Chiloango, whereas the long coastal sea shelf elsewhere required trading vessels to anchor as far as a mile out to sea.²⁷⁸

The trade monopoly on the coast beginning with the establishment of Angola produced a plethora of goods that were useful to Portuguese traders in Luanda and throughout the empire. Some of the most important products traded at daily markets were elephant tusks, skins, palm-cloth used for the *macuta*, elephant tail hairs, redwood, and copper.²⁷⁹ Elephant tusks were a desired commodity in the metropole, as well as copper, which was equally desired in Luanda. Because the Portuguese could ship the products to Luanda, Loango's raw materials were regular additions to the circulation of goods in the colony.

By 1600, the Portuguese monopoly gave into the Dutch, who began trading intensively in the region. The Vili leader, Manikongo, was a fervent supporter of free trade, who welcomed the presence of European newcomers. The absence of a Portuguese military presence and politico-economic pressures²⁸⁰ made it impossible for there to be any legitimate concern for retaliation. The free trade policy of the Vili Kingdom was a marked characteristic of the period, and severely checked Portuguese influence. Only after the sustained Dutch presence for a half-century did the slave market begin to appear. With the Dutch intrusion in Brazil after 1624, they became increasingly interested in creating a slave trade network. By the late 1600's, the Dutch had set up a series of factories along the coast, but they closed them in order to trade directly from their ships in the mid 1680's. This may have been in part due to the fact that the English Royal African Company arrived in 1672,²⁸¹ drawing from the slave trade as well. By the end of the 17th century, Loango was exporting in excess of 10,000 slaves annually.²⁸² The trade to the West of the Vili Kingdom created new opportunities for them as more and more villagers became involved in commerce. New trade sector hierarchies emerged that enriched the Loango natives, allowing them to become proactive about their own financial security that caused a decomposition of the formerly centralized society. The Europeans still traded on the African terms, but the seventeenth century witnessed the move from the use-based economy to the more integrated multinational export system.²⁸³ This was important to the coast's development as a commercial center, but it additionally aided in expanding the other European powers' spheres of influence at the ports and inland.

In 1702, the French first appeared on the Loango Coast after Dutch and British success in the territory. They arrived through military force, much as they did in Benguela, although it was

²⁷⁸ Martin, p. 35.

²⁷⁹ Martin, p. 35.

²⁸⁰ Birmingham, "Central Africa", p. 346.

²⁸¹ K.G. Davies, *The Royal African Company*, London: Taylor and Francis, 1957. P. 121.

²⁸² Birmingham, "Central Africa", p. 347.

²⁸³ Martin, p. 35; Richard Gray and David Birmingham. ed., *Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

unnecessary in Loango's case. French traders were able to offer higher quality goods. The products at French disposal were also potentially cheaper because they were able to draw from colonies in relatively close proximity that were also potentially more exotic, such as Mauritius and Reunion.²⁸⁴ Shortly after the French attack at Benguela, in 1706 the French contingent left the Loango Coast because of difficulties resulting from the War of Spanish Succession. However, 1712 marked their steady return to the trading zones.²⁸⁵ By this time, the four European empires were trading concurrently in Loango, contributing to the growing prominence of other ports such as Cabinda, Kakongo, Nsoyo, and Malemba.

The fact that the Loango Coast was enjoying free trade amongst the various participants meant that there was increased competition between the empires. This cheapened the price of the products exchanged. Loango thus achieved a comparative advantage over Luanda that was still monopolized by Portuguese trade. The free trade agreement between the Africans and Europeans especially in "Loango, Cabinda, and Sonyo"²⁸⁶ was noted in Luanda as due to the fact that the slaves supplying coastal markets were far closer geographically to the ports than they were in Luanda that had become depopulated in that respect. "The capture of slaves was greater because of the brevity of the journey," and the methods of slave acquisition were not as strenuous as they were in other locations throughout Angola, as with the Portuguese style, "there are always wars."²⁸⁷ It became so clear that Loango was a commercial success, that by 1717 non-Portuguese trade at the area was "named as the cause of decreased trade at Luanda."²⁸⁸ This may have been the turning point, but it was not by any means new to the Portuguese merchants at the Angolan capital city.

The Vili inhabitants involved in the trade sector that evolved into a stratified system of commercial positions began to expand their trading methods long before this. The Vili foot traders, called *mubires* by the Portuguese, began to encroach upon the territory that the Portuguese dominated. Portuguese contemporaries appear to have associated these traders exclusively with the English, but they were contracted traders much like the *pombeiros* in Portuguese Angola. The *mubires* originated from the lower Loango Coast, and travelled over tremendous amounts of territory. They collected goods such as cloth, salt, and even travelled over 150 kilometers through the Teke controlled Mindouli region in search of copper.²⁸⁹ However, the facility with trade that the *mubires* held was not the only thing that the Portuguese feared. As early as 1682, the English were

²⁸⁴ Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict*, p. 137.

²⁸⁵ Martin, p. 80.

²⁸⁶ "Loango, Cabinda e Sonho" March 18, 1690, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

²⁸⁷ "maior o resgate de escravos tanto pela brevidade da jornada" "sempre ha guerras e captivandosse" March 18, 1690, AHU, Angola, cx. 14.

²⁸⁸ Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict*, P. 137.

²⁸⁹ Birmingham, "Central Africa," p. 344.

trading with them as far down as the Portuguese district of Dande, trading with the captain-major.²⁹⁰ Not only confined to the sought-after ivory or tobacco, the *mubires* were exchanging firearms, gunpowder and ammunition even to the African populous, a practice that empowered the Africans to retaliate against the violent raids.²⁹¹

This was becoming increasingly problematic, as the *mubires* were noted not just in the Dande, but in the Congo and Sonyo, which was also considered by the Portuguese to be under their jurisdiction. Equally as alarming as the sale of firearms to natives, was the fact that they “sell their goods cheaper than <the Portuguese>.”²⁹² The continued impingement on Portuguese territory eventually culminated in a treaty with the Kingdom of Kongo in 1684 not to allow *mubires* to enter their jurisdiction. The treaty asks that only the *pombeiros* be allowed to enter the kingdom, or rather, only people associated with Portugal in order to maintain their commercial preeminence.²⁹³ São Salvador had been a primary destination for the *mubires*, and many of them had originated from within the Kongo. The issues that surfaced from *mubires* trading further south in Portuguese territory however did not entirely subside.

In the 1720's, English merchants tried to create the subsequent monopoly on Loango trade. They began at Cabinda with the intent of expanding throughout the coast. On August 24, 1721 Captain Antonio Pinheiro returned with news of being robbed of goods that he brought to exchange for slaves to be sent to Rio de Janeiro by Dutch traders.²⁹⁴ In addition to the unfortunate report, he stated that he was given news that English corsairs had begun constructing a fort within “a few leagues of the port”.²⁹⁵ The English arrived with individuals such as clerks, surgeon mates, a chaplain, and six soldiers under the pretext that it was only for their own protection.²⁹⁶ It soon became evident that it was their first attempt at the trade monopoly. Materials were brought to the area for construction, and many merchants and captains already arrived that were to live by the fort. The information originated from Africans that were also told the news second hand. English merchants had sailed past Luanda without stopping my as a way of flaunting the fact that they now had a land holding on the coast, but the gravity of the situation still awaited corroboration.

Constructing a fort in Cabinda carried serious implications. Commerce in that region was already extremely disruptive to Portuguese merchants, and creating a fort meant not only that the English intended to permanently commercialize the area, but that they intended to stay. Dutch and French merchants were equally preoccupied with the prospect of their commercial competitors

²⁹⁰ September 12, 1682, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁹¹ September 12, 1682, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁹² “darem a sua fazenda mais barata que a nossa” September 12, 1682.

²⁹³ November 24, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

²⁹⁴ June 13, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

²⁹⁵ “algumas legoaz do porto,” September 5, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

²⁹⁶ Martin, p. 81.

having a fort by the most important port in the area, but the Portuguese felt as though they had the most at stake, adamant that this was “<their> land.”²⁹⁷ Anticipation of official confirmation of the English fort at Cabinda aroused speculation regarding potential threats this could create.

Apprehension over the unknown, coupled with previous difficulties that the Portuguese had incurred due to the English trade beforehand startled those down in Luanda with the potential “terrible consequences towards the usefulness of commerce in the kingdom.”²⁹⁸ The English persistence was menacing, especially as the Portuguese imagined their favored products being sold in larger volume than they already were, due to the “liberality, scope, and economical” trade strategy that the Anglo-Saxons had already proven possible.²⁹⁹

The lack of available ships in Luanda noted by several contemporaries could not compete with the prices at Loango. By the time ships arrived, with much fewer goods than the other Europeans, the prices would have been much higher than the competitive rate. Bringing more ships was too costly for the royal treasury, but the captain-majors had been sent notice under an initiative sent by governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho to confiscate the *mubires* goods such as tobacco before they returned to the British.³⁰⁰ The forts connection was concerning as the captain-majors had clearly proven themselves undependable in respect to trade restrictions, and the *pombeiros* were revealing that their goods were not nearly as desirable as the offers from the *mubires*. The initial hope was that if the *mubires* were sufficiently blocked from commerce within Portuguese territory, it would discourage the English enough for them to leave Cabinda.³⁰¹ The prohibition effort resulted primarily in recovering valuable goods such as elephant tusks³⁰² that the *mubires* exchanged with tobacco, likely because of the monetary and social capital associated with it, although the mandate was not considerably successful.

A Portuguese delegate was sent to Cabinda with intent to discover what the English were planning to do with the fort, and to declare that the line of demarcation of the Portuguese jurisdiction indicated that they could go no further south. The Portuguese discovered through the exchange that vassals of the local King of Angoy sold a plot of land to the British, because they were “immediately satisfied with the <English> goods.”³⁰³ There is conflicting information regarding the terms under which the fort was bought, however, the King of Angoy appears to have ceded the land for commercial purposes but did not license the fort’s construction.³⁰⁴ The King

²⁹⁷ “a nossa terra” AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

²⁹⁸ “ruim consequencias para a utilidade do negocio deste Reino” September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

²⁹⁹ “Liberalidade, largueza e barateza” September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰⁰ September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰¹ September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰² April 16, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21; November 22, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰³ “satisfeitos logo com as suas fazendas”, June 13, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰⁴ September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21; June 15, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

attempted to retaliate with war against the British, but without success. The British almost immediately began trading from the fort, showing that the express purpose of the structure at Cabinda was to “take over” the harbor.³⁰⁵

By December, Capuchin missionaries working in the area confirmed the construction of the fort as well, stating that not only had the fort been erected, but that they had mounted sixteen pieces of artillery, that a year later was increased to eighteen.³⁰⁶ The fort was made with four one hundred foot long bastions that were four by twenty feet thick. Lacking a wall, it had a ditch that surrounded the structure that was ten feet deep and twenty feet wide.³⁰⁷ In addition to the fort led by British captain Hereford, houses were built for English merchants. When the King of Angoy failed to respond to a plea to restrict the English from building more houses in the bay it became clear from this point forward that the Portuguese needed to act themselves. The conflict arose from the Portuguese asserting that the Loango Coast was supposed to be under their jurisdiction, and Cabinda becoming an English monopoly spurred reactionary measures. Portuguese merchants and missionaries were the first to reach Cabinda, and they assumed that the native population was still dependent on Portuguese imports. In fact, one rationalization for promoting military action against the English at Cabinda was the relationship with the natives. Before the English could further influence the native traders, the Portuguese felt that if they attacked Cabinda, they would not incur a great deal of damage because the natives would side with them. “It <was> not possible for <the Africans> to war with <them>” because they “are greatly dependent on having commerce in <Portuguese> territory.”³⁰⁸ The natives cited that lived by commercial relationships extending increasingly further into the Portuguese jurisdiction in order to commercialize areas as far as São Salvador and Dande were the very people that the Portuguese had attempted to keep out of their lands for the previous half-century. Now realizing that force was necessary in order to expel the stubborn British, the English merchants in addition to the sale of property, attributed the legitimacy of the recent purchase to the terms of the commercial treaty signed between Portugal and Great Britain in 1713.³⁰⁹

The British soon began to restrict trade to Cabinda, and Portuguese merchants were forced to go elsewhere in order to make up for the goods that they normally exchanged there.³¹⁰ The Portuguese merchants were closed off from trade there by 1722, which cut down on the raw materials such as ivory that they had customarily brought back to Luanda, as well as slaves. After

³⁰⁵ “asenhoriarçe” September 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰⁶ June 15, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰⁷ Martin, p. 81.

³⁰⁸ “não he poçível nos possão fazer Guerra”, “tem grande dependência de terem comercio em as nossas terras”, December 12, 1721, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³⁰⁹ Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 326.

³¹⁰ April 20, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

being entirely excluded from trade, the gravity of the situation became exceedingly clear. Apprehension over competition caused by the democratization of export trade in the northern coast had led to exclusivity, turning Portuguese trading vessels away upon arrival. At this juncture, Portuguese officials in Luanda considered the appropriation of Cabinda a subject of “highest importance.”³¹¹ New implications began to emerge after experiencing the impossibility of trading at Cabinda.

The loss of Cabinda did not just force the Portuguese traders to trade at other ports. If the English ‘corsairs’ were capable of restricting trade at Cabinda, there was little doubt that they would not only attempt, but succeed in expanding their monopoly to the other major export centers along the West African littoral. Cabinda had been essential for exporting not just ivory, but products extracted from mines inland of the Northern zone as well, and because Cabinda was the major port, in order to recuperate losses merchants would have to go to multiple ports for the same amount of merchandise. Discovering new ports and forging new coastal relationships was “useless” when faced with the reality that Portuguese merchants were already extricating between three and four thousand slaves per annum.³¹² Finding new commercial zones would severely impede the ability of the Portuguese merchants to meet the demands stipulated in the contract attributed to Francisco Gomes Lisboa, contractor of the royal duties of the territory of Angola.³¹³ Losses that may be recoverable in the short term were destined to be impossible in the future; especially if the English advanced at the same pace that they had previous to this. In October of 1722, the council implored Lisbon to negotiate with the King of England, and if it led to no avail, to send a warship to surprise and evict the English settlers, as they had been equally aggressive with Portuguese merchants previously in Cabinda.³¹⁴ This could not be done from Luanda because there was already a lack of troops and other military resources that prevented them from doing so.

In the same year the French were excluded from trade as well, and British war vessels were stationed there for defense. British forces soon destroyed a French factory, and it became known that British settlers planned to extend their monopoly to Malemba. The French traders sent for help from the Crown to attack the English fort, unaware that the Portuguese had already done so. In 1723, a Portuguese military vessel arrived at Cabinda that with help from others including the Vili natives razed the fort to the ground.³¹⁵ The destruction of the English fort paralyzed their monopoly as well as their presence in Cabinda, and aided in restoring the freedom of trade that preceded it. From this point onward, although there was no clear European monopolistic hold for many years,

³¹¹ “summa importancia” October 20, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³¹² “inútil” October 20, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³¹³ October 20, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³¹⁴ October 20, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

³¹⁵ Martin, p. 82; Delgado, *vol. III*, p. 335.

the Portuguese were aware of the fact that they had a minimal presence in Loango comparatively to the coast South of the region. Despite the Portuguese contracts stating that the recipients had a monopoly on the goods extracted from the region, the lack of resources and forceful presence lead to admission that they had no authority over the area.³¹⁶

Conclusion

Commercial relationships on the Angolan coast at the turn of the eighteenth century were crucial to the functionality of the colony. Luanda was the preeminent port for the colonial import and export of raw materials and human cargo. Notwithstanding, other ports within the Portuguese colony fed the trade networks with materials that converged at Luanda, and sent elsewhere in the Atlantic. The distinct tasks within the commercial system were allocated to differing social groups but the network was only able to function as an aggregate of the parts. The *pombeiros* were intermediaries that occupied the lowest level of the trade network, connecting major trading centers in the interior with the coast. In addition to the African traders in Angola, many other individuals from myriad backgrounds and careers composed crucial roles in the exchange of import and export goods in Angola. These Luso-Africans residing in Angola traded amongst Africans as well as Europeans on a number of levels that devoted their lives to commerce, preparing goods for sale, and largely dependent on credit systems for the sustenance and growth of their commercial enterprise.

The credit system in Angola was extremely complex, creating a system of interconnectedness that encompassed all of the commercial actors. The credit system included materials or leaflets that signified that one individual or party owed another. Some forms of credit were more secure than others, especially when the quantity or quality of the goods was high, or when the transport conditions or level of trust created a high-risk environment. Some forms of credit depended on daily or weekly interactions, whereas others could take years to redeem. The risk involved in the credit arrangements largely depended on the amount of time before redemption, bringing traders deeper into debt through the constant need to generate material goods or capital in order to satisfy outstanding payments. Notwithstanding, the credit relationships in Angola were allowed to function through the influx of credit backed by businessmen either residing in Angola, or coming from places such as the metropole or Brazil. The businessmen's investments in Angola generated the capital necessary for the rest of the colony to lend resources, and for trans-Atlantic commerce to grow.

The high-volume merchants were essential to Angolan commerce, as the credit they lent out created the circulation of goods, and transversely, the means of production. The Angolan currencies were undependable, subjected to scarcity of resources, and caused many internal problems in

³¹⁶ AHU, Angola, código 554, 207.

Angola. The institution of copper was intended to solve many of the problems associated with the cloth and straw currencies, but its own scarcity and valuation conflicts were constant. Credit secured a steady flow of capital that allowed goods transported from hinterland merchants to feed demand throughout the Atlantic Ocean. The businessmen entered this system as financiers for the steady circulation of trade goods that connected the Angolan local economy to others throughout the empire. In this way, in most cases the businessmen were able to reap enormous returns from the transfer of raw materials rather than direct ownership of them, which was yet another benefit to the risk-averse business culture. Financing the slave trade was a way for the businessmen to create the means of production that cultivated products imported to Angola. The major products exported from Angola, primarily slaves, and secondarily ivory held the highest social and monetary value for sale.

Businessmen were heavily involved in the slave trade, whether they were holders of the royal tax-farming contract, or merchants that held licenses to transport the slaves from Luanda. The royal contracts were an effective way for businessmen to accrue great personal wealth, and trade under their own terms within the guidelines of the contract. Contracts were in essence a public-private partnership with the crown that not only garnered wealth for the holder, but also generated short-term benefits for the Crown in auctioning the agreement, as well as a sustained tax on the flux of goods in the colony that helped both the metropole and Angola. The yearly dues that the contractor paid for the duration of the six-year contracts, especially as a function of the slave trade, supported the colony by supporting the municipal infrastructure and paying salaries of particular institutions.

In virtually all of the contracts awarded at the turn of the eighteenth century, the first contractor obligation stipulated is subsidizing the infantry's salary in Angola. The fact that military subsidies were prioritized shows that the wellbeing of the colony was dependent on the success of the commercial sector. This also shows that although traders worked within specific functions, the Angolan trade transcended other spheres of the Angolan colonial sectors. This evinces the importance that the military had to commerce itself. At this time in Angola, the "politics and the economy <were> deeply intertwined. The first <asked> for and <gave> a lot to the second."³¹⁷ Many of the civil leaders were also merchants, and the inherently militaristic government in Angola was just as dependent on commerce for their salaries, as trade was dependent on the expansionist ideals of the military. When the governor's salary rose after 1720 because of commercial conflict of interest, the contractor was mandated to collect taxes on slaves to provide the increase in salary. Not only were military raids a method of enslavement until the 1720s, but colonial expansion was

³¹⁷ "A política e a economia estão profundamente imbricadas. A primeira pede e dá muito à segunda." Mauro, *Vol. II*, p. 183.

essential to the colony in order to expand commercial influence among the African communities, and move the Portuguese colonial control further inland as products became increasingly difficult to acquire. The monopoly contracts specified a slave export quota that required slaves sent from other ports in the colony in order to meet it. Because the contracts gave the rights to Angola, Loango, the Kongo, and Benguela, large amounts of products were shipped from those locations to Luanda before export to their final destinations. Loango supplied a great deal of slaves, as well as ivory to Luanda, which made it an integral part of the Angolan economy.

The latter part of the seventeenth century experienced a decline in Portuguese influence in Loango. The Loango coast had a series of important ports that were monopolized by the Dutch for the last three decades of the century. French and English merchants became heavily involved in trade in the region that the Portuguese considered under their jurisdiction for centuries. When British merchants attempted to forge a monopoly in Cabinda, it would have blocked the Portuguese from trade there entirely, inhibiting the Angolan contractors from meeting their demands. Land possession was also important to the time period, and an English stronghold in Cabinda signified British encroachment on Portuguese territory, as well as on the ability of other European nations to trade there. This was certainly not an irrational fear for the Portuguese merchants, because English merchants had already begun to trade within Portuguese territory through their African porters. Loango is exemplary of the Angolan African societies' hegemony over trade relationships, while becoming integrated into the European trade networks. Portuguese colonists expressed this fear with the 1684 attempt to prohibit the entry of the *mubires* into the Kongo and below, but the insidious nature of the Loango traders into Portuguese areas was impossible to regulate, especially since Portugal had no military presence there.

The Loango Coast serves to show that the peripheral region of Portuguese Angola was equally important on the commercial level to the territory in its entirety. Through conflicts and trade losses due to the porters originating on the coast, it is clear that even the most organic level of trade affected the continuity and connectivity of the entire system. This also indicates that the coastal businessmen were directly impacted through difficulties associated with foreign trade and commercial control of the area. Although Luanda was the Portuguese central port, a large portion of the most important exports originated in Loango. When the Portuguese military finally took military action at the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, it showed that the universal Portuguese commercial interest in maintaining commerce in the region, and support from military forces that would also have suffered from its loss.

III

The Angolan Slave Trade: The Atlantic Dimension

This chapter centers on the Angolan dimension of the Atlantic slave trade at the turn of the eighteenth century. It was a period of change and transformation that impacted several other facets such as the Angolan commercial and political arenas. The slave trade was a product of the colonization efforts in Angola, and the backdrop through which many of the motives discussed in the previous chapters were shaped. Three of the most important events were a law that restricted the number of slaves on each vessel for export, the discovery of gold in Brazil and the government officials' exclusion from trade in 1720. The impact that these occurrences had on the slave trade will be explored. In order to enrich the discussion, the vantage points through which slavery can be studied must first be considered. Slavery as an ideology and an institution, as well as the current state of study on slavery and African participation in the trade are crucial to a better understanding of the trade itself, and the repercussions incurred by the aforementioned significant events. Atlantic History is a field of study that is gaining prominence in the academic sphere. Recent scholarship as well as problem areas posed by the authors aids in framing the Atlantic world, and in this case the South Atlantic, through which the history of the Angolan slave trade in this period can be studied.

A fundamental aspect of the Angolan economy at the turn of the eighteenth century was the Atlantic slave trade. The external slave trade consumed the Angolan commercial sector either directly or indirectly. Whether merchants that comprised the network of trade relationships that resulted in slaves being sent throughout the Atlantic, or military, religious, or political figures entered the trade for personal economic reasons, it was an omnipresent enterprise that involved all of the major ports on the Angolan coast. In addition to the slave exports emanating from ports such as Luanda, the hinterland was essential to the acquisition and transport of human cargo. The relationship expressed in the previous chapters between the hinterland and the coast eventually extended far beyond the territorial boundaries of Angola throughout the Atlantic as the slaves embarked on their voyage of forced expatriation. The external dimension of the Angolan slave trade was fundamental to the formation of the Atlantic world, and especially in the Southern hemisphere. This period marked a crucial change in the Angolan economy, and the greater Atlantic community.

The Angolan Slave Trade and Atlantic History

The extraction of slaves from Angola began as early as the first Portuguese contact in the region. The slave trade was a preexisting institution in northern Africa and the Atlantic archipelagos as Portuguese explorers and merchants moved farther South and East.³¹⁸ When the Portuguese

³¹⁸ Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 10.

reached Angola, they immediately began slave trading. Luanda was initially considered the mainland entrepôt for slave trading after moving south of São Tomé. The first slave missions in Angola extracted slaves from coastal areas by force. This was consistent with the universal acceptance of slavery as spoils of conquest, aside from clear racial justifications.³¹⁹ After this was performed for a short time, the Portuguese were forced to move inward, while adapting to the local economic structures, and using war as a means for accruing human cargo. Using solely brute force was a failed short-term strategy because the Africans outnumbered the Europeans, and the European warring technology at the time could not easily defeat the Africans. Although African ships could not traverse the Atlantic, they were agile and efficient in protecting their coastline. The European firearms took a very long time to load, and the African weapons such as crossbows were far more efficient weaponry as a result. It was not until the late seventeenth century that improvements in firearm technology allowed Europeans to have a decided advantage in that respect.³²⁰ It was when the Portuguese had a sustained coastal and interior presence that they could use warring methods to extract slaves from the interior.

The slave trade was by no means foreign to Africans. Africans did not necessarily have a slave trade, but they certainly had a slave system. Within the slave system, the acquisition of coerced human dependents was extremely important for societal reasons such as status. The number of slaves was corollary to the height of an individual's social stratum. Even African laws concerning products were based in taxation and slaves.³²¹ In the European ideology of power and social prowess, property was the single greatest signifier. For Europeans, property was inextricably linked to the means of production: land ownership provided the ability to cultivate products for sale. Africans adhering to the institution of communal land viewed slaves as the means of production as they cultivated the shared land, producing goods. As such, the means of production held commercial value. The "capture, purchase, transport, and sale of slaves was a regular feature of African society."³²² Therefore, one can assume that when Europeans entered African markets, they were met with vast opportunities to buy slaves within the existing infrastructure. After a growing shortage of supply, the Portuguese used military and judicial methods, and later focused on debt related slavery. The European concept of slavery as a mercantile good is important to understand within the Atlantic economy, because it was dependent on the demand which fueled the need for supply, making slavery not only dependent on the demand for slaves, but on the demand for

³¹⁹ Godinho, p. 183.

³²⁰ Thornton, John, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World: 1400-1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 113.

³²¹ Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 75.

³²² Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 97.

products that required slave labor.³²³ The slaves were only as valuable as their need to cultivate goods throughout the Atlantic, which is a fundamental concept of this chapter.

Given that the African nations essentially controlled the influx of goods into the interior as well as the slave trade to the coast, Portuguese colonization efforts through economic means was essential to the influx of slaves. Using the African economic systems, the Portuguese were often challenged by African disdain for monopoly privileges, as seen in Loango. The *presídios* were essential for this reason because even though they were only symbolic of control, they guaranteed a continuity of trade throughout the colony. The maintenance of Portuguese presence in the internal trade networks made trade possible in the interior that reinforced the importance of goods of external provenance that assumed social value. Aside from the fact that the Europeans largely traded in Africa through African consent, the intrinsic value ascribed to the goods exchanged was incomparable. Second rate manufactured materials or agricultural products were far less economically valuable than slaves that could provide several times their worth in those goods through manpower.³²⁴ Commerce and especially the slave trade merged the African and Portuguese commercial systems in a way that was preferential towards the Europeans; but these commercial interactions also aided in African inclusion in the greater Atlantic network.

Academic analysis of the slave trade began as late as the 1930's,³²⁵ and remained sporadic for decades afterwards. The likely impetus that led to studying the slave trade was an intellectual change after world war One in which European imperialism was questioned. The start to the study of the slave trade did not gain momentum for decades, probably due to a number of factors, however the most salient factor that scholars attribute to this is the "conspiracy of silence" because of the guilt and emotional nature of the subject. The 1950's and 60's experienced a rise in African history that followed with the first attempts at quantifying the slave trade. Philip Curtin's work in 1969³²⁶ was a comprehensive slave trade census performed because he believed that the previous censuses were exaggerations, yet it focused primarily on secondary sources for its findings.³²⁷ This led authors to challenge the results such as David Eltis as well as others to estimate the slave export volume from particular locations or empires. From the final years of the 20th century until the present, much of the academic work has addressed the problem areas associated with the

³²³ Godinho, p. 152.

³²⁴ David Eltis, "The Relative Importance of Slaves and Commodities in the Atlantic Trade of Seventeenth-Century Africa," *Journal of African History*, 35, 1994, pp. 237-249, p. 238.

³²⁵ Jean-Michel Deveau, "European Slave Trading in the Eighteenth Century", *Diogenes*, No. 179, Vol. 45/3, Autumn, 1997, p. 49.

³²⁶ See Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

³²⁷ J. E. Inikori, ed., *Forced Migration: the Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies*, London: Hutchinson University, 1982, p. 13.

field.³²⁸ The major issues, perhaps the most difficult to resolve, are concerned with a divergence from a European or imperialist perspective, and the definition of parameters through which the study of slavery should be conducted. The parameters that many slave trade historians disagree upon are consistent and should coincide with concrete and ideological boundaries sought by Atlantic historians. Atlantic History is a growing field in historical research as a separate entity from the rest of the world. Because the slave trade from Angola had an intrinsically Atlantic dimension, the slave trade can serve to define the parameters of Atlantic History through the lens of its principle problem areas, while setting the stage for the turn of the eighteenth century as a significant period of transformation.

In order to understand the essence of Atlantic History, one must start at the beginning. In many highly credible sources, the first work in the image of Atlantic History was published in 1949 when Fernand Braudel wrote a monumental multivolume work entitled *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Époque de Philippe II*. Citing this book as the beginning, many authors credit the work with not the first real Atlantic History, but the first with conceptually new and relevant material analogous to what Atlantic History has become today. This is clearly the first history of the Mediterranean as a concept that works into the greater agenda of contemporary Atlanticists, considering the oceanic space as a singular component. Using this work as a reference point for the formation of a similar Atlantic example, a comparison can be achieved. Atlanticist Alison Games cites this work as the beginning of Atlantic history, as many historians can be considered 'Braudelian Atlanticists.' These historians include entire regions, characterizing geographic and historical components, and seek to discover vantage points that are not rooted in any one particular place.³²⁹

Braudel's work as a reference, although spatially analogous, received criticism from Atlanticist Bernard Bailyn. Bailyn conceded this spatial relationship, but asserts that Braudel's work is a disaggregative rather than aggregative history, of a Mediterranean comprised of several worlds. Instead of attempting to show the connectedness of the sea, he shows the opposite. Bailyn continues the critique stating that rather than the book being historical, it is epistemological, and is more poetic than it is intellectual. Subsequent histories situated in the Atlantic spoke of exploration and discoveries that showed how a new world was eventually discovered, but these narratives were limited in demonstrating what the world was actually like.³³⁰ Early Modern Atlantic actors also wrote with the intention of their own kingdom to be

³²⁸ Klein, *Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. xvii.

³²⁹ Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, Opportunities" *American Historical Review*, June 2006, p. 741.

³³⁰ Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 20.

the reading audience instead of showing a greater interconnectedness that can be extracted from the magnitude of cross-imperial sources today. The emphasis on particular empires creates another problem because it is not the intention of Atlantic History to be perceived as a history of colonization. An egalitarian approach to studying the Atlantic should be promoted instead.

Bailyn believes that Atlantic History did not come into being by chance or because of intellectual curiosity, but because of events that shaped the way in which people viewed the world. Until the twentieth century, much emphasis was placed on one's national identity rather than a worldly viewpoint. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the world suffered a great transformation resulting from World War One. The First World War opened people to the idea of a worldly interconnectedness. Walter Lippmann, a journalist in 1917 wrote an editorial called 'The New Republic' in which he highlighted the necessity for the western world to stay interconnected in order to continue its primacy as the world superpower. Lippmann wrote of the importance of interconnectedness within the 'Atlantic community' for the integrity of the Atlantic powers.³³¹

Although Walter Lippmann was a journalist and not a historian, this shows a cultural transformation as a result of the war that may have geared people towards thinking in a more connected way. These views disappeared into the isolationism that resulted after the war, but they returned in World War Two. In the wake of the Second World War, Lippmann himself reappeared, and began reasserting his views of a necessity for this interconnectedness in stride with another journalist Forrest Davis. He supported a post war New World Order that assumed the participation of culturally European states that all functioned under the Atlantic World's scope.³³² These examples show that it may have been cultural conditioning that moved people towards a situational conception of the world as a connected entity because of the particular circumstance of the World Wars and at the time. Western thinkers were conditioned to understand the connectedness of the world to have a western hegemony, comprised of the nations situated on the littoral of the Atlantic Ocean. Contemporaries that ascribed to this mentality began to write collective histories of the Atlantic.

Some contemporaries of this post-war time period began to write histories that built the framework for the history of the Atlantic. Ross Hoffman of Fordham University in 1945 wrote a work about the spread of Western Christianity throughout the Atlantic.³³³ This became one of the first works that followed the spread of an ideology throughout the Atlantic World. Soon

³³¹ Bailyn, p. 21.

³³² Bailyn, p. 21.

³³³ See Ross Hoffman, "Europe and the Atlantic Community," *Thought*, 20, (March, 1945) pp. 25-36.

afterwards, a British historian H. Hale Bellot expressed his belief that British schools should teach American history not as a separate entity, but rather as an extension of the British Atlantic identity.³³⁴ Jaques Godechot wrote in 1947, *L'Histoire de L'Atlantique*. This is of particular significance because, as Federica Morelli and Alejandro Gomez critique in their work “La Nueva Historia Atlantica: Un Asunto de Escalas,” the vast majority of Atlantic History works were and are being published by Anglophone authors.³³⁵ This homogeneity of the authors’ linguistic, cultural and educational background may prime the Anglophone thinkers to react to Atlantic History in a similar although not necessarily more correct or objective way. Although Anglo-American historians have produced a continued trend of macro-historical works concerning the Atlantic, Lusophone authors have begun producing an increasing number of recent works with an Atlantic scope such as *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: A dinâmica Imperial Portuguesa* that follows an analysis of the Portuguese political institutions in the South Atlantic, or Luis Felipe de Alencastro’s work on the slave trade *O Trato dos Videntes: A Formação do Atlântico Sul*.³³⁶

The first book to use the terminology ‘Atlantic System’ was Robert R. Palmer’s *The Age of Democratic Revolution* comprised of two volumes that came out in 1959 and 1964 respectively. This work discussed the revolutionary processes seen in Western Europe and America in the eighteenth century. This book sparked a great interest in the Atlantic, and further conditioned the Atlanticists to uphold the concept of a ‘Western Civilization’ in contrast to Eastern or a smaller scale distinction.³³⁷ After the publication of this book, many more authors began to write Atlantic Histories. Most wrote about the expansion of the empires of their heritage, and as time progressed and more authors wrote on the subject, an explosion of concepts and terminologies came to the literary sphere and academic parlance.

The usage of the term Atlantic System is commonplace in contemporary Atlantic Histories. The ideology behind the usage is based in the belief that national economic systems existed, which would either make Atlantic History into an aggregate of several sub-systems or empires with an Atlantic dimension, or create several separate Atlantic Histories. Aside from giving Atlantic History a European slant, the reality is that this would be extremely difficult to define because of the mobile nature of people throughout the Early Modern period. People could resolve this by where they resided or were born, or generalizing nationalities into larger

³³⁴ Bailyn, p. 23.

³³⁵ Federica Morelli, and Alejandro E., Gómez, *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos* “La Nueva História Atlantica: Un Asunto de Escalas,” *Bibliografías*, 2006, Put Online April, 2006. URL : <http://nuevomundo.revues.org/index2102.html>, p. 2.

³³⁶ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 244

³³⁷ Morelli and Gómez, p. 1.

groups such as Iberian for example. However, this would conflict with how the Atlantic actors viewed themselves.³³⁸ By giving precedence to the Atlantic systems, only the sea and the coastline can adequately be considered, whereas it is clear that raw materials or interior institutions such as trade and industry among Africans were deciding factors for the fluidity of the coastal and trans-Atlantic economy. Additionally, with high degrees of assimilation on the various continents, it becomes difficult to designate each of the various empires as purely Portuguese, Spanish, etc. The slave system itself was an institution that was born out of a common need for manpower, yet was dealt with in a plethora of ways depending on region, necessary tasks, the way that the slaves were traded locally, and obviously, because the slaves came from interior regions. The hinterland cannot be ignored in Atlantic histories, since the slave trade, mineral extraction, and local industries that made intercontinental transport possible must be considered. The captain-majors interest in trading with foreigners was driven by economic incentives, rather than what contemporaries viewed as corruption. Their oftentimes intimate association with the African communities and isolation from the metropole led them to feel less of a Portuguese affiliation, which led them to create additional networks. This is an example of what lead the newest wave of Atlanticists to try to find axis points within commercial networks that transcend national boundaries as the idea of nation-state is a designation that post-dates this period,³³⁹ linking regions or continents.

Furthering the movement towards Atlantic History as a concentration, the Commission Panamericaine d'Histoire became the first truly scientific base for the comparative study of institutions that shaped the origins of the Atlantic civilization. This commission produced "patterns of colonization and operation from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century: Mediterranean and Atlantic areas."³⁴⁰ The trend of Atlantic History continued to develop, and a wide range of literature surfaced in the 1970's only gaining momentum into the nineties, and garnering enough respect as an autonomous axis for study at the turn of the millennium. In the 1990's, a series of Academic conferences spurred interest in the Area, and many leading institutions now award degrees in the field. Conferences such as the Harvard International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World have been running annually since 1995. Other conferences have been regularly held at the University of Charleston, and a yearly summer seminar at the National University of Ireland- Galway. These are some of the most notable, however many others exist, and are gaining recognition.

³³⁸ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 164.

³³⁹ Ribeiro da Silva, p. 166.

³⁴⁰ Bailyn, p. 26.

How Atlantic History gained academic significance is extremely important because it describes the societal circumstance from which it arose, in addition to its cultural meaning. It also explains the current situation of Atlantic History having formed through the lens of primarily Anglophone authors, and focusing primarily on the North Atlantic. The roots are important to understanding this area of history, but because the last phase of the development rests in roughly a decade of a burgeoning interest in Atlantic History, a comparative conceptual analysis makes sense as a way of seeking an understanding of what Atlantic History means to the academic community.

Contemporary historians take extremely different approaches to understanding Atlantic History and its foundation or nodal point as a common reference for setting boundaries for studying it. Alison Games is an Atlanticist that considers Atlantic history to be a slice of Global history. Games asserts that Atlantic History is a way of looking at global and regional processes within a contained unit. Thus, Atlantic History is a way of looking at transformations unique to the Atlantic, and those that are derived from global processes. Games asserts that Atlantic History can be understood as colonial history rewritten without a purely colonial perspective. Atlantic History is to be understood as the space encompassed by North America, South America, Africa, and Western Europe. Not only are these four continents to be considered, but we must also restore the ocean to Atlantic History. An extension of the oceanic concept is rivers as a continuation of the Atlantic. This is seen in the first two chapters as the Kwanza river as well as rivers on ports along the Loango coast facilitated contact with an inclusion of the hinterland. A common Atlantic identity is not possible without the intercontinental interaction afforded by transatlantic voyages. The very name of the subject in question shows the inextricable importance that the Atlantic Ocean plays in creating the unified region.³⁴¹ Historian Pierre Chaunu suggested that processes of ending isolation in some areas and increased inter-societal interaction in the others (*désenclavement*) was an important element in this period.³⁴² Although this appears Eurocentric as they navigated these changes, implicit in this is the fact that Africans and Native Americans connecting was essential to the idea as well.

Alison Games Continues her spatial analysis of the Atlantic World by constituting what the Atlantic really is. The Atlantic throughout the Early Modern period to explorers was in fact to them several different seas.³⁴³ This is especially true to Native American and Africans who

³⁴¹ Games, Alison, 'Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 111, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 741-757.

³⁴² Pierre Chaunu, *L'Expansion européenne du XIII^e et XV^e siècles*, Paris: PUF, 1969, p. 54.

³⁴³ Games, p. 742.

lived in a very regional context and were not accustomed to trans-Atlantic travel. To those people, these separate seas were under different names and varied dramatically in climate. Because of such extreme differences climatically, biologically, and culturally, it was not seen as one singular space.

This makes it clear that the Atlantic Ocean just as much as the four continents that share the space are modern constructions. These modern constructions are very new concepts that are allocated to the different areas. The idea of the Americas, even just by name, is a European construct. This is also true in calling the body of water between the continents by one name to describe it: the Atlantic.³⁴⁴ This is problematic to the study of Atlantic History because it takes what today's historians call these spaces, and these names are superimposed on anachronistic place names. The fundamental problem that this poses is the fact that the analyses proposed by historians in order to produce the most accurate findings must consider the subject of study from a point of departure as close to the contemporary's reality as possible. In essence, discussing historical entities from a broader scope can be detrimental to the work's focus because it may not best describe the context in question because of ideological or institutional retrojection resulting from current tendencies and practices in the academic community on what was considered the reality of the past.

Avoiding retrojection or dangerously broad extrapolations is a crucial component to Atlantic History. This is a concern for contemporary Africanists that seek to show the importance of African societies in Angola. This gives agency to the African communities that have all too often been merged into larger groups that did not view themselves as being a singular entity. Although historians have mentioned the kingdoms in early historical works, they were not given a central focus. For decades however, authors have focused on the African kingdoms such as Gladwyn Murray Childs in her Article discussing various Angolan kingdoms however, the source was António de Oliveira de Cadornega's three volume work *A História Geral das Guerras Angolanas* completed in 1681. Even though this is a primary source that spoke of many of the African kingdoms, they were not given a central focus, nor were they discussed in extensive detail separately.³⁴⁵ In addition, the intrinsically Portuguese perspective is what historians try to avoid as they search for that of the African.

Since the 1970's, authors have been contributing enormously to eliminating the Northern bias of Atlantic history. Giving Africa a more central focus in the Atlantic shows the contributions that Africa made to the South Atlantic connections between Africa and Brazil.

³⁴⁴ Games, p. 741-757.

³⁴⁵ Gladwyn Murray Childs, "The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960), pp. 271-279.

Instead of focusing on demographic data, they emphasize the “economic and human impacts of the slave trade.”³⁴⁶ Economic relationships and dependencies are what make Atlantic History accessible not only to the Atlantic, but also to the coast and hinterland. The extreme interconnectedness of the economic system incorporates the regional African or product specializations in the hinterland into the coastal and Atlantic relationship. The regional economies also were an incentive for individuals of different backgrounds to interact that eventually created creole communities³⁴⁷ or identities such as the Luso-Africans or *lançados*. As such, the economic processes are important to the study of the South Atlantic and the incorporation of the interior.

A contributor to the study of the economic system on a smaller scale is of singular African kingdoms and anomalies in their political, social or commercial structure, as well as industries or products. Authors recognize that there is still much work to be done in order to achieve this, and in most cases primary sources are scarce. When a particular kingdom has been meticulously researched, its own connections to other institutions or nations such as the Portuguese, or throughout the Atlantic can be ascertained. Some of the most notable examples are John Thornton’s work on the Kingdom of Kongo,³⁴⁸ Jan Vansina and Joseph Miller, icons of Angolan history who researched many of the African Kingdoms such as Kasange while tying them into the Broader Angolan and Atlantic scope, and Beatrix Heintze who wrote extensively on Portuguese and African vassal relationships and political structures while also focusing on African peoples such as the Kisama³⁴⁹ or the Jaga. These authors as well as others studied African kingdoms with a particular focus while making important connections to the ‘bigger picture.’ Discovering differences and intricacies allows historians to designate

³⁴⁶ Ana Lucia Araujo, ed., *Paths of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Interactions, Identities, and Images*, New York: Cambria Press, 2011, p. 3.

³⁴⁷ Araujo, p. 6.

³⁴⁸ Many current authors attempt to make these connections, but perhaps the best example is John Thornton’s research on the Kingdom of Kongo. Throughout the entirety of his career, he has studied the Kingdom of Kongo, from roughly 1977 until his most recent publication in 2009. He wrote several works beginning with his Doctoral dissertation that he expanded upon and published later. A widely published author, Thornton began with histories of the Kongo, focusing first on the Kongo civil wars, and then published the article “Demography and History in the Kingdom of Kongo,” *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1977), pp. 507-530. Following this publication among others, he continued analyzing political, military and cultural traits of the Kongo considering a wide range of sources especially from Capuchin missionaries that wrote extensively about the kingdom. Continuing the outward scope, he wrote the article “Early Kongo-Portuguese Relations: A New Interpretation,” *History in Africa*, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 183-204, in which he challenges earlier perceptions of the Kongo as subversive to the Portuguese. In this, and in his following book *The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641-1718*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983., he shows that many of the compositional changes that occurred in the Kingdom were born out of internal conflicts and societal changes, ceding only that external trade such as in slaves became important. A decade later, Thornton published “Early Kongo-Portuguese Relations: A New Interpretation,” *History in Africa*, Vol. 8, 1981, pp. 183-204., and his book *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680*, New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1992., that show Congolese and African cultural influences in the Atlantic respectively. Through extensively studying one African kingdom, the various differences between the kingdoms become more apparent, and it gives more specific and more accurate African narratives that can be followed throughout external interactions.

³⁴⁹ Beatrix Heintze, “Historical Notes on the Kisama of Angola,” *Journal of African History*, 13.3, 1972, pp. 407–18.

anomalies within societies and identify trends. Bridging connections between several different regions and concepts through multiple perspectives is important to Atlantic History, but this becomes challenging when the original context is lost.³⁵⁰

Fastidious research focused on sub-cultures and singular societies creates a more knowledgeable and accurate starting point for broader histories following African institutions and cultures on a wider scale. It enriches future works that can adequately distinguish between cultures and credit particular peoples or regions with more focus while treating a larger spectrum. A plethora of monumentally important works exist that show African influence throughout the Atlantic. In addition to John Thornton, some of the most notable works were produced by James Sweet, who followed African Culture, Heritage, and religion from Africa to Brazil, or José Curto who wrote on Brazilian alcohol in Angola, as well as cultural changes in Africa and Brazil.³⁵¹ Additionally contributive authors are Paul E. Lovejoy, Robin Law, and Walter Rodney.³⁵² Although these are important studies in order to bring the Atlantic together, isolations must be made in order to better understand the extent of contributions throughout the area.

In order for Atlantic History to function as an area of study, a common language must be attained. The Atlantic World is full of innumerable languages from a wide range of people and cultures, with drastically differing worldviews. This is important to emphasize in order to show the great diversity through which the Atlantic World is perceived. Regardless of linguistic differences, the Atlantic World must find a common language of analysis. This area of history strives to break from preconceptions formed by the European expansionists. If this is to be achieved, a mutually appropriate system of describing the Atlantic World must be found. One example is that many Europeans referred to the Americas as the 'New world'. Not only is this insensitive to the Native Americans because the Americas were by no means new to them, but their realities did not incorporate the distinctions imposed by the Europeans such as national or continental boundaries. Many of the Native American peoples cultural boundaries transcended the impositions imposed by the notion of continents. The same holds true for Africa. The European imposed territorial borders were not consistent with the preexisting

³⁵⁰ Games, p. 741-757.

³⁵¹ This is in reference to James H. Sweet *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship, and religion in the African-Portuguese World (1440-1771)*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003; Among José Curto's several publications on Angolan culture and commerce, he coedited with Paul E. Lovejoy *Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil During the Era of Slavery*, New York: Humanity Books, 2004., that includes prominent authors on the topic such as Alberto da Costa e Silva, Joseph Miller, and Robin Law.

³⁵² See Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1974; Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 1983, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Robin Law, *The Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550-1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

cultural boundaries. Through sustained intercontinental interactions, several similarities began to arise within the Atlantic World, which makes it easier to make connections between the landmasses. This created a new world along with new cultural identities. However, this can be simultaneously dangerous. In Angola's case, words such as 'Luso-African' are a modern construct that several historians use in order to group people into a common identity. This is important in order to give voice to that demographic, and it simplifies historical analysis. However, through this, sub-groups are forgotten or are not given the deserved voice as a separate entity. As Atlantic History further develops, historians must procure a more efficient and more mutually acceptable language of analysis of the Atlantic World.

Peter Coclanis is an Atlantic History dissenter highlighting further problems who wrote an article in 2002, and then four years later, wrote another article about Atlantic History with updated insights. Coclanis conceded at the onset of his 2006 article "Atlantic World or Atlantic/World?" that his views have been revised in terms of his understanding and support of Atlantic History. He exhibits a somewhat pessimistic view of Atlantic History, stating that Atlantic History has transformed the discipline of history "for better and for worse."³⁵³ This field of history artificially limits the field of vision, blinding one to processes, developments, and conditions of central importance to understanding the Atlantic Ocean.³⁵⁴ This is Coclanis' actualized view of Atlantic History as opposed to his former opinion that is dramatically more critical.³⁵⁵ His former view is in essence similar to that of Games, when she asserted that the language used to characterize the Atlantic World is largely Eurocentric. Many of the works published within the four years between Coclanis' two articles have focused on the African engagement in Atlantic History. Many authors have also been more aware of Eurocentric preconceptions, and his first article's publication stood at the peak of a great deal of new publications breaking away from anachronistic European understandings of the Atlantic World.

Coclanis' critique of Atlantic History may have shaped the way that Atlantic History has progressed, but his contribution sheds light on why he is not a supporter of Atlantic History. He asserts that a purely Atlantic History is conceptually impossible because outside

³⁵³ Peter A. Coclanis, 'Atlantic World, or Atlantic/ World?' *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 2006), p. 725.

³⁵⁴ Coclanis, p. 725.

³⁵⁵ Coclanis, p. 726. Coclanis cites his own work written previously with this central critique of Atlantic history: "it is constricting interpretively and somewhat misspecified analytically, a halfway historiographical covenant as it were, nothing more, nothing less. By fixing our historical gaze so firmly toward the west, the approach may, anachronistically, give too much weight to the Atlantic Rim, separate North West Europe too sharply both from other parts of Europe and from Eurasia as a whole, accord too much primacy to America in explaining Europe's transoceanic trade patterns, and economically speaking, misrepresent through overstatement the place of Europe in the order of things."

influences cannot be forgotten that contributed immensely to the formation of the Atlantic World. Asiatic influences on western culture were dramatic, and in many ways made exploration of the Atlantic possible. In Angola, Asian textiles became essential goods for buying slaves because of their exotic allure, and eventually began to replace the African palm cloth made primarily in Loango.³⁵⁶ The historian goes even further to say that at the height of the Atlantic World, there were close connections between the East and West. Many institutions and concepts were simultaneously transferred in the West and in the East³⁵⁷. The question becomes where a distinction can be made between the two spheres. Apart from concurrent processes, it is integral to understanding Atlantic History to remember the Asiatic advances. Chinese, Indian, and Islamic knowledge such as mathematics, science, engineering, and technology were used by Europeans as they formed their Atlantic World.³⁵⁸ The Western Europeans could not have advanced nearly as quickly if they did not have these integral advances, and Atlanticists often conveniently forget this. In fact, the Atlantic world was a world made by Europeans, Americans, and Africans created together, including the outsiders.³⁵⁹ One more aspect that Coclanis asserts about the worldliness of the Atlantic is that as the Europeans were traveling throughout the Atlantic, it was an illusion that the European powers held a special interest in the Atlantic sphere. Even though the European powers did not have the same level of success in colonizing the world outside of the Atlantic, there is no reason to believe that the Europeans held a unique interest in the Atlantic.

Coclanis concedes that Atlantic History could conceptually work if influences from elsewhere in the world were assumed. Here Coclanis Directly critiques another Atlanticist, David Armitage. In the introduction to Armitage's coedited work *The British Atlantic World: 1500-1800*, he proposes three different types of Atlantic History. The three kinds are 'circum-Atlantic' history, 'trans-Atlantic' history, and 'cis-Atlantic' history. 'Circum-Atlantic' history studies the Atlantic Ocean as a singular entity. This type looks for consistencies throughout the entirety of the Atlantic zone, whereas the 'circum-Atlantic' history is founded in a comparative approach. Instead of viewing the Atlantic as a whole, it seeks to find points of difference and variation from which distinctions can be made throughout the four continents. The third type, 'cis-Atlantic' history, covers territories within the Atlantic context. Here, specific examples from particular places within the Atlantic are studied, which does not necessarily take other

³⁵⁶ Asian textile influence in Angolan commerce is discussed in Miller, *way of Death*, pp. 181, 182, 274, 290, 296, 536, 544, 564; Klein, *Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 107, 274; Inikori, *forced Migration*, p. 234.

³⁵⁷ Coclanis, p. 726.

³⁵⁸ Coclanis, p. 726.

³⁵⁹ Coclanis, p. 729.

places within the region into account.³⁶⁰ Unsatisfied with these three types of Atlantic History, Coclanis proposes a fourth. This fourth type is called ‘conjuncto-Atlantic’ history. This style of Atlantic History coincides with Coclanis’ agenda of incorporating the East. In instituting this fourth type, it could link up Atlantic History with “other questions and other historiographies to offer a broader, richer, amplified view of Atlantic dynamics.”³⁶¹

The most recent major work, as well as one of the most comprehensive, is a collection of essays called *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*. This book edited by Jack Greene and Phillip Morgan does a superlative job of reviewing many of the most important contributions to Atlantic History. The introduction to the book gives a definition for Atlantic History, as well as proposes five problems that arise, and six ways of approaching the study of it. The authors give a definition for Atlantic History as the study of the Atlantic basin as the place for demographic, economic, social, cultural, and other forms of exchange, and how agents of change such as people, pathogens, and plants moved across the Atlantic permanently altered the identity of those residing within the Atlantic frame.³⁶²

The five objections presented in this work are very well thought out, and in many ways build upon aforementioned objections presented by other authors, although they are presented in a way that is far too simplistic. The first objection is that the Atlantic Ocean has no geographical enclosure, and thus has no definable unity. The Atlantic was never self-contained, so there is no justifiable reference point. The second objection is that the Atlantic has little coherence or commonality.³⁶³ As a result it is very difficult to study a common Atlantic system, region, or civilization. Other major authors of Atlantic History frequently mentioned the third objection and it states that it is Imperial History masked by a more socially acceptable name. It is a politically correct way of saying the same thing. The fourth objection is one that was least discussed by the other Atlanticists, but it is a very important point. Atlantic History intrinsically privileges the coastal indigenous peoples.³⁶⁴ Because of its name, Atlantic History can be misleading as to its objectives, and in many ways it forgets the entirety of the four continents, focusing on the littoral. This is problematic because there is a loss of a reference point, and it is unclear where the Atlantic boundary ends, and another begins. Either just the ocean should be considered, or the entirety of the four continents must fit into the framework. The last objection is that there is little manifestation of differences and

³⁶⁰ David Armitage, and, Michael Braddick ed., *The British Atlantic World: 1500-1800*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 15.

³⁶¹ Coclanis, p. 739.

³⁶² Jack P. Greene. and, Phillip D. Morgan ed., *Atlantic History, a Critical Appraisal*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 50.

³⁶³ Greene and Morgan, pp. 35-55.

³⁶⁴ Greene and Morgan, pp. 35-55.

commonalities through connecting the Atlantic areas. This last objection does not appear to be the fault of the discipline or of the researchers. Seemingly the weakest, the objection should improve with time. It is important to remember that this is a very new area of study, and it still requires a lot of research. The objection is rather unfair, because Atlantic History must first be defined, then improved upon. The number of recent works being produced also gives hope that there will be continued discoveries exposing contrasts as the area becomes more widely studied.³⁶⁵

The first of the authors' six proposals is connected to the last problem area. This is that there must be an effort to find general patterns in Atlantic History that must not exaggerate either the comparisons or the contrasts. They propose that the understanding of one element is "enhanced by knowledge of the other."³⁶⁶ The authors propose next that some elements of Atlantic history must be able to cross borders. Elements such as decisions, actions, reactions, raw materials, technology, among others took place on both sides of the ocean and beyond. The third proposal is to give thorough and sustained attention to particular aspects such as industry, and highlight regional differences. Next, the exchange of values and the circulation of ideas deserves a closer look. Following one idea or concept around the Atlantic would greatly improve the discipline. The various differences between the colonial powers and the ways in which they colonized or changed their power structures is the fifth suggestion.³⁶⁷ The differing colonization methods in the Atlantic can provide a great deal of insight into European interaction in the Atlantic. Recent works such as contrasts between the Dutch and Portuguese political and commercial structures in West Africa in Filipa Ribeiro da Silva's newest book is a superlative example of an Atlantic approach to this method of comparison.³⁶⁸ This suggestion for improving the study of Atlantic History however, is dangerous because it can by nature be perceived as imperialist. It is clear that the intricacies of the colonial powers are important to study, but it may best be done under the umbrella of Colonial or European History. The last suggestion is that chronology should be closely considered, as it is important to Atlantic History, and intrinsically in the study of history regardless.³⁶⁹ The temporal dynamic of Atlantic History is the least contentious issue in the field in terms of a general time frame, with differing events as the parameters for the start and finish of the period.

³⁶⁵ Greene and Morgan, p. 81.

³⁶⁶ Greene and Morgan, p. 156.

³⁶⁷ Greene and Morgan, p. 212.

³⁶⁸ Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants 1580-1674*, London: Brill, 2011; this is an exemplary work on the Dutch and Portuguese political and commercial infrastructures that focuses on the West Coast of Africa while concurrently maintaining an Atlantic dimension as a frame of reference for her assertions.

³⁶⁹ Greene and Morgan, p. 212

The period of Atlantic History coincides with the beginning and end of the slave trade. The slave trade resolves several other problems posed by Atlantic History, giving cohesion to the Atlantic because it involves all four continents of the Atlantic. Although the institution of slavery is non-unique to the Early Modern period and to the Atlantic basin, the way in which it functioned was unique to the period and aided in creating an Atlantic identity. In order for the Atlantic to be considered whole, it could not be considered as such until the four continents were mutually cognizant of each other. The transport of human cargo throughout the Atlantic would have done exactly that. In order to compensate for this, Atlantic History should be considered as beginning later than what Jack Green and Philip Morgan state as Columbus' voyage to the Americas in 1492³⁷⁰ because that would give the discipline an intrinsically European perspective that is what the authors are attempting to resolve. The slave trade would resolve this issue beginning in the early sixteenth century after the transmission of slaves and institutions allowed for mutual impacts that created an Atlantic identity. Rather than labor over the choice of a particular date, it could be understood as a process that began throughout this time frame, although this began soon after the discovery of the Americas. Their contention that the end of Atlantic History centers around the French Revolution in 1789 is equally problematic, because the ideologies supported by the revolution did not reach the entirety of the Atlantic until much later, much less in a unified manner. A far better end to Atlantic History is the effect of the Industrial Revolution. The profound economic, technological and social changes that resulted from the Industrial Revolution supported a movement away from the need for slavery because of the rise of machinery, and unified the earth into a wider world-system. This end can also be considered a process in that the industrial revolution spanned the 1750s to the 1850s,³⁷¹ whereas the end of slavery was outlawed by European and American nations in a successive manner along this timeframe, with illicit slaving occurring until 1850.

British accumulation of gold was fundamental to realizing the industrial revolution because it was a valuable imperishable commodity that was easily monetized, and universally sought after. The discovery of gold in Rio das Velhas that later became part of the captaincy of Minas Gerais in the hills two hundred miles from Rio de Janeiro was instrumental in revitalizing the Portuguese economy.³⁷² It was also fundamental to British accumulation of wealth. The enormous quantities of gold found in the region attracted many European nations

³⁷⁰ Philip Morgan and Jack Greene (eds.), *Atlantic History. A critical appraisal*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 3.

³⁷¹ Jan de Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 54, No. 2, Papers Presented at the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association (Jun., 1994), pp. 249-270, p. 252-255.

³⁷² A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "Technology and Society: The Impact of Gold Mining on the Institution of Slavery in Portuguese America," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 37, No. 1, *The Tasks of Economic History*, Mar., 1977, pp. 59-83, p. 59.

to Brazil, but England acquired a great portion of the gold. Where the Portuguese accumulated gold dust, the British acquired gold coins.³⁷³ Much of this was made possible through tax evasion and contraband because it was not in the interests of the local merchants to declare their gold, which contributed greatly to the gold being funneled out of the Portuguese Empire.³⁷⁴ Trade between the Portuguese and the British “was always in favor of the English,”³⁷⁵ however the discovery of gold was extremely important for the enrichment of the British Empire before the inception of the industrial age. The involvement of other European empires in the Brazilian gold rush is significant because it marked several trends such as the intensification of the slave trade,³⁷⁶ a change in its composition, and many more credit allocations, and a movement towards a more unified Atlantic. This shows the importance of gold in the Atlantic, however it was instrumental in strengthening specifically South Atlantic ties between Angola and Brazil.

The current state of scholarship on the slave trade shows the importance of plurality within the Atlantic. The slave trade was clearly an Atlantic enterprise, but contemporary historians are making breakthroughs in showing the differences between African cultures as well as European empires while maintaining the importance of the Atlantic as a whole. The new scholarship seeks a commonality of understanding in relation to the way that the slave trade is studied within the Atlantic, while acknowledging that reconciliations have to be made. Identifying the transferal of ideologies and institutions as a result of the slave trade is made possible by comparison to points of reference. Atlantic History allows one to use identify trends and aggregative forces in perceptibly fragmented areas. The following section will expose how the slave trade evolved during this period in a way that mutually affected Angola and Brazil, which in turn impacted the entirety of the Angolan territory in terms of colonization, politics, and commerce.

The Angolan Slave Trade and Brazilian Gold

Angola was immensely affected by the discovery of gold in Brazil because the rise in gold mining required many more slaves to be sent to Rio de Janeiro. Luanda and Benguela were undoubtedly considered the major supplier of slaves to Brazil as “fifty percent of all

³⁷³ Charles Boxer, “Brazilian Gold and British Traders in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Aug., 1969), pp. 454-472, p. 464.

³⁷⁴ Boxer, p. 470.

³⁷⁵ “foi sempre à favor dos Ingleses,” Frédéric Mauro, “Portugal e o Brasil: a Estrutura Política e Econômica do Império, 1570-1720,” in Leslie Bethell, *América Latina Colonial*, vol. I, São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1997, pp. 447-477, p. 459.

³⁷⁶ Approximately one hundred and ten thousand slaves were exported from Angola from 1675 to 1700, whereas the next quarter century saw an export of one hundred and eighty thousand according to David Eltis’ estimates; Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 95.

slaves that arrived to Brazil were from the two ports.”³⁷⁷ Preceding the discovery of gold, Pernambuco and the Brazilian capital, Salvador da Bahia were major commercial centers. They produced important agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco among others, and were considered for centuries prior “pillars of the Portuguese Empire”.³⁷⁸ Businessmen turned their primary focus to funding human cargo voyages to Rio de Janeiro instead of other ports because the financial return was greater there as slaves were sold for higher prices, and gold created a more immediate gain. The focus on the search for gold did not only effect the slave trade in a mere economic or commercial manner, but created several stark political and societal changes and difficulties as well.

The initial gold boom in this period was felt throughout the South Atlantic while the demand for slaves was the one economic constant. The continued discovery of gold and fluctuations in its extraction largely “determined the prosperity of the South Atlantic economy”³⁷⁹ throughout this period. Although gold was valuable, the difference between agricultural produce and the precious metal was that gold was substantially more volatile. Gold was clearly not perennial in that it could not be grown. Hence, in order to capitalize on the gold market and extraction in Brazil, it was essential to arrive hastily.³⁸⁰ Between the years 1695 and 1717, 2600 slaves arrived in Minas Gerais annually, whereas between 1717 and 1723, the perennial arrival of slaves rose to as much as 4,000.³⁸¹ The immediate high volume of slaves arriving to Rio de Janeiro caused a compositional change in the Atlantic.

Before Brazilian gold caused a series of conflicts that drew the need for vigilance over slave trade conduct in the Portuguese South Atlantic, the Crown already began to regulate the transport of human cargo. On March 18, 1684 the crown instated a law to limit the number of slaves that could be transported per ship to Angola and Brazil.³⁸² This law was instated for several reasons, and impeded the expedient shipment of slaves to Brazil due to lack of ships. Two of the most salient reasons that the Crown created the law were the violence and injustices as well as the poor conditions caused by overcrowding on the slave vessels. The introduction to the law’s stipulations explicitly cited the reasons for the motion as the maltreatment and mortality rate on the voyage, as the slaves lacked the “necessary relief for life, whose conservation is communal, and natural for all, whether free or slaves.”³⁸³ The issue

³⁷⁷ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 1.

³⁷⁸ “Pilares do Império Português,” Mauro, “Portugal e o Brasil: a Estrutura Política” p. 449.

³⁷⁹ Russell-Wood, p. 60.

³⁸⁰ Russell-Wood, p. 64.

³⁸¹ Mauricio Goulart, *Escravidão Africana no Brasil (Das origens à extinção do tráfico)*, São Paulo, 1949, pp. 149-54.

³⁸² March 18, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

³⁸³ “desafogo necessario para a vida, cuja conservação he commua, e natural para todos, ou sejam livres ou escravos”. March 18, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

of mortality was a constant concern in the slave trade. This is perceptible in the very name of the slave ships: *tumbeiros*. Joseph Miller emphasizes the fact that *tumbeiros*, or as he calls them, ‘floating tombs’ was accurate, as the “highest mortality rate began as the slaves boarded the ships.”³⁸⁴ The voyage from Angola to places such as Bahia or Rio de Janeiro lasted an average of forty and fifty days respectively.³⁸⁵ The long voyages in the lower decks of the vessels tightly packed with overcrowded space with very little rations of food and water ensured an extremely difficult trip to survive. The mortality rate on this route that came to be known as the “middle passage” was one of the most “notorious issues in the study of the Atlantic slave trade.”³⁸⁶

As has been made clear, the slave trade did not begin on the coast and as a result the entirety of the venture was very expensive. From the capture and sale of slaves in the interior and their transport to the coast, the traders incurred enormous expenditures. Aside from changing hands, the slaves had to be fed and clothed. In fact, the time the slaves were captured to the time they boarded the ships could be anywhere from six months to a year. The average wait time at the port of embarkation alone was three months.³⁸⁷ The majority of the overall costs were attributed to the Africans. The Africans that sold the slaves in a commercial setting or because of wars to the Europeans demanded increasingly valuable goods. Both European and Asian cloths and other products were pursued as the Africans became more involved in the trading networks and placed more importance on imported luxuries. Because the Africans essentially controlled the sale of slaves all the way to the port of export,³⁸⁸ they set the terms of sale and price for the slaves. Consequentially, slave mortality was a great concern for traders. Some historians differ on their estimates on how many slaves perished before reaching their trans-Atlantic destination, but it is clear that a large percentage did not make it. For example, Klein estimates that as little as four or five percent of the slaves passed away on the journey along the coast to ports such as Luanda, where about fifteen percent died on the vessels across the ocean. He states that regardless of these deaths, an “overwhelming majority” made it safely to Brazil.³⁸⁹

Inikori takes a more dramatic approach, citing J. D. Fage, and states that the economic impact of slave mortality had wider implications. The military raids in the interior not only killed potential slaves, but weakened those that became slaves that were inevitably the first to

³⁸⁴ Miller, *Way of Death*, 314.

³⁸⁵ Alencastro, “A Rede Econômica,” p. 125.

³⁸⁶ Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 130.

³⁸⁷ Klein, p. 130.

³⁸⁸ John Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 12.

³⁸⁹ Klein, p. 157.

expire. However, Fage cites similar statistics to Kein offering sixteen percent mortality,³⁹⁰ where Ernst Van Den Boogaart suggests twenty.³⁹¹ Because the military raids often occurred on the periphery of African kingdoms, especially those that were outside of the areas under vassal agreements with the Portuguese, the war-torn nature of those areas often prevented further economic integration and development that was growing in other parts of the territory. The mortality rate from this approach could have been upwards of fifty percent.³⁹² This does not include the acclimation period upon arrival in Brazil that took lives as well. The high cost, as well as the foreseeably high mortality rates incentivized ship captains to pack the slave ships with as many slaves as could fit on the vessel.³⁹³

The mortality rate on the vessels was due to the overcrowded decks. Free immigrants often used slave ships as a means of transportation. The death rate of immigrants is largely comparable to that of the slaves. However, this is attributable to the fact that a high percentage of the voyagers were children, or weaker than the desirably strong slaves chosen to cross the Atlantic.³⁹⁴ Disease was more easily transmitted amongst the slaves because of their proximity, and food and water were scarce. Ironically, the higher gains were achieved from slave voyages with controlled population than on the ships with condensed human cargo.³⁹⁵ The Portuguese were the first to strictly regulate the amount of slaves that could legally be transported overseas in order to ensure the slaves' safe arrival. The 1684 law known as the *Lei das Arqueações* mentioned above was essentially a mandate that regulated the amount of slaves per interior tonnage of the vessel transporting them. This law was a technical measure that regulated the area of space that was allotted for housing slaves. Before each departure,

"all of the embarkations <were> measured in tons that intend<ed> to be filled with slaves by the floor without respect to air, as well as the ceilings, and between bridges if they have them, as well as the decks, cabinets and cabins, the poop decks, and upper areas."³⁹⁶

Each vessel's tonnage had to be recorded in a series of records that verified that the legal capacity per ton was never surpassed. This law was strictly enforced, however Brazilian traders attempting to send more slaves ran the ships along the coast in hopes of evading the contractors and searching for others that would disregard the law. Depending on the style of the ship, and where in the ship the slaves were placed, different values were given for how many slaves could be allocated there. The actual number of slaves that could be placed on each

³⁹⁰ J. D. Fage, "African Societies and the Atlantic Slave Trade," p. 100.

³⁹¹ Ernst Van Den Boogaart, "The Trade Between Western Africa and the Atlantic World," p. 396.

³⁹² Inikori, p. 27.

³⁹³ Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 307.

³⁹⁴ Klein, *Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 135.

³⁹⁵ Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 155.

³⁹⁶ "se medirão por toneladas todas as ditas embarcações que se quizerem descarregar de negros, pelo chão, sem respeito ao ar, tanto nas cubertas, e entre-pontes, se as tiverem, como em os convezes, camaras, camarotes, tombadilhos, e mais partes superiores." March 18, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

ship per ton oscillated between 2.5 and 3.5 slaves.³⁹⁷ Because the average amount of slaves transported per voyage after this law was about four hundred and twenty, the ships depending on their size and distribution weighed between one hundred and twenty and one hundred and sixty eight tons.³⁹⁸

The food allotments that accompanied the regulations on the number of slaves were also strict. This returns to the costly nature of maintaining the slaves, and would have been resented, especially with a reduced number of profitable human cargo. The ship captains were required to feed the slaves “three times a day...infallibly.”³⁹⁹ In addition, an abundance of clean water was distributed. The added space for slaves, as well as their food provisions is an exhibition of compassion towards the slaves. The document’s wording shows a concern for violence towards the slaves crossing the Atlantic, yet it is peculiar that throughout the same period the slaves were treated with horrendous violence in all other spheres of the slave trade. Violence towards the slaves or disrespect towards this law carried life banishment to the Estado da India⁴⁰⁰ that shows the central authority’s seriousness and the severity of punishment towards transgressors. Regardless of the fact that this law appears to be a step towards better treatment of the slaves, the fact that the mortality rate of slaves reduced as a result leads to other conclusions. It was in the best interest of the slave trade merchants to ensure that a higher percentage of the slaves survived the journey. Because each slave was already a financial burden, especially when credit was involved, each loss of life meant a loss of profits once they arrived for sale in Brazil. Fewer slaves would have arrived in Brazil because of the limited number of ships available for export. However, the lower number of slaves would have made them a more profitable commodity on the other side of the Atlantic. As such, they could be sold for higher prices, and the people such as the contractors, and especially the governors could either give ships with their goods precedence over others, or mandate where the ships were to be sent. When slaves were in high demand for Brazilian gold mining, this became a defining factor.

The Brazilian gold rush had an immediate impact on the slave trade. Slaves sent from Africa were extremely desirable due to their mining capabilities, and Rio de Janeiro was the most efficient access point to Minas Gerais. The focus on Rio de Janeiro as a result of gold left other major slaving ports such as Bahia and Pernambuco without the necessary amount of slaves in order to furnish the agricultural products that were harvested there. This affected the

³⁹⁷ Herbert S. Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade From Angola in the Eighteenth Century,” p. 229.

³⁹⁸ Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade,” p. 229.

³⁹⁹ “tres vezes no dia...infallivelmente.” March 18, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

⁴⁰⁰ March 18, 1684, AHU, Angola, cx. 12.

quantity and price of goods sent to Angola, creating subsequent issues that merchants disregarded for personal financial reasons. Because many of the local authorities were invested in the slave trade, many regulations attempting to curb the proportion of slaves sent to Brazil were disregarded.

Just a few years after the slave trade began to accommodate gold mining in Brazil, the Luanda community began to notice problematic trends that they feared would exacerbate if nothing were done to stop this. On September 26, 1711, the Municipal Council pleaded with the central authorities to resolve the issue.⁴⁰¹ At this time, the slave ships were sent wherever they were needed, principally to where the merchant owners of the ships sent them. Because this was before 1720, the Council highlighted that the “governor approved <the ships> for dispatch to any of the ports that best accommodated the ship captain.”⁴⁰² This was in violation of a mandate from King of Portugal D. Pedro V in 1703 to send 1200 slaves per annum to Rio de Janeiro, and 1300 to Pernambuco and Paraiba, with the remainder sent to Bahia.⁴⁰³ Clearly the governor was not following the mandate, and the majority of slaves were going to Rio. This was prejudicial towards Bahia especially that depended on slave labor for the plantation crops such as sugar, and many of the slaves that arrived in Bahia were shipped down to Rio de Janeiro and resold for higher prices.⁴⁰⁴ Brazilian merchants had become notorious for disregarding the law of embarkation tonnage, and they attempted to retrieve slaves from ports peripheral to Luanda such as Loango. This was already causing damage towards Bahian agricultural production, and merchants contracted to trade between Pernambuco, Bahia, and Angola were not only having difficulties drawing slaves to such regions of Brazil, but they were having trouble affording them. Fewer slaves for agricultural purposes meant higher production costs. The higher production costs made it difficult for the merchants in Bahia to afford more slaves, which exacerbated the cycle. When *pumbeiros* traded at the *presídios* to supply the coast with slaves sent to Bahia, they could not compete with the goods or prices demanded that the traders to Rio could because of the demand at the port.⁴⁰⁵ The advantage to supplying slaves to Rio had become so great that in the Angolan hinterland “<a quantity of goods was> necessary that a few years before could have bought three slaves.”⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰¹ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰² “mandava o governador dar despacho para qualquer dos portos do Brazil que melhor acomodava ao mestre do navio,” September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰³ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰⁴ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰⁵ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰⁶ “he necessario fazenda com que hã poucos annos se resgatavam tres pezas,” September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19

For ports supplying agricultural manpower, the price for slaves was becoming prohibitively expensive. The short-term strategy of favoring Rio de Janeiro over the other ports was not just a means for Angolan businessmen to gain wealth. Additionally, this was not merely affecting the other Brazilian ports. The council stated that the price of flour rose astronomically.⁴⁰⁷ Flour rose to prices several degrees higher than what had been provided just years before. Flour was transported from Brazil to Angola for residents' dietary needs: Flour was a staple good for most food preparation in Angola. The higher price of flour indicated that the cost of living in the territory substantially increased. Because the Angolan troops were paid in part in flour, their already meager salaries were further devalued, and it cost the state more to issue the product.

The Municipal council reminded the central authorities that the problems emerging in the South Atlantic did not solely affect the local economies. The royal treasury depended on the taxes accrued from the output of slaves. If it became too expensive for other regions of Brazil to support slave import, the crown would loose out on those profits. The services in Angola that drew from the royal treasury were also more expensive. All of this was very problematic, yet the governor was still allowing almost double the allotted amount of slaves to go to Rio de Janeiro, sending roughly two thousand.⁴⁰⁸ While this was a dangerous trend, the Council acknowledged that this could be resolved.

A year later in 1712, correspondence with the crown evinced further issues associated with the preferential treatment towards Rio de Janeiro. The situation was not resolved, and the restrictions on the number of slaves allowed on the ships hindered the contractors from meeting their quotas.⁴⁰⁹ Roughly a quarter of the slaves intended to leave the ports to fulfill the royal tax-farming contract were unable to do so, thus inhibiting the contract's fulfillment. The ships could not be filled to their former level of capacity, which created a shortage of ships. The higher number of ships required in order to send slaves across the Atlantic created a Crown induced lack of transport means. Ports such as Bahia and Pernambuco already had a shortage of slaves, yet the fact that the contracts were not even met indicated that they were losing out on additional ones.

The Municipal council wrote again to the crown in the same year reinforcing the fact that the contracts were not being met. Paschoal Rodriquez Pontes held the tax-farming contract from 1699-1705 with the expected export of 9,000 slaves.⁴¹⁰ This contract that ended six years

⁴⁰⁷ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰⁸ September 26, 1711, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴⁰⁹ Inferred from grievances in March 29, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹⁰ May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

prior to the document only fulfilled two thirds of the agreed number of slaves by the time the six years were over.⁴¹¹ This was foreboding for the Angolan government officials because the loss of tax revenue continued to create difficulties for maintaining the municipal services and infantry. The current contract was having identical problems, and had already cited a loss of 70,000 *cruzados*.⁴¹² Because nothing was accomplished to correct the problems created by the volume of slaves sent to Rio de Janeiro, the Council suggested that a law should be instated requiring the governor to send the ships to the necessary ports rather than to where he benefited most. The laws needed to be more explicit in favor of the contractors' duties rather than the governor's wishes because the contractors "never follow their right against the governors out of respect and their power."⁴¹³ The accentuated waiting period to embark was a constant frustration as many slaves passed or weakened, and the maintenance costs grew. The letter gives several testimonials from captains that were fed up with the injustices caused by the governor, and the continually rising costs of staple goods as a result of mining interests.

In 1715, several businessmen signed a plea in "public form" to the residing governor, João Manuel de Noronha.⁴¹⁴ The businessmen reminded the governor of the resolution from the King in 1703 to send just 1200 slaves to Rio de Janeiro. This was clearly disregarded by the governor, and the businessmen further restated that the current state of the South Atlantic was immensely affected by gold. However, it was not the gold in and of itself, but rather commercial, industrial, and institutional issues as a byproduct of mining it. The businessmen in this letter blame not only the governor, but the Municipal Council as well. Because many of its members were equally involved in commerce, they were also approving departures to Rio, allowing only "two or three to Bahia and Pernambuco."⁴¹⁵ Sustaining the infantry's salary was a reoccurring theme in the discussions, and of enormous concern for the colonizing efforts, especially when not enough slaves were able to be taxed to even meet their salaries. Services such as the hospital were in danger of closing that were instrumental in servicing injured or sick soldiers.⁴¹⁶ It is important to keep in mind that not only were products such as flour, sugar, and tobacco cultivated in Brazil far more expensive because of this but the troops and municipal workers were not the only ones effected. The rising costs in Brazil equaled rising costs in Angola, making goods such as tobacco used in the bundles exchanged for slaves in the Angolan hinterland much more expensive.

⁴¹¹ May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹² May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹³ "numqua seguem seo dereitto contra os governadores pello respeito e poder destes" May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹⁴ September 25, 1715, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹⁵ "dous ou tres para a Bahia e Pernambuco" May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹⁶ May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19

The businessmen contended that for the two and a half years that Governor Noronha had been in office, some of the ships had been allowed to leave without following the 1684 law against overcrowding. Although this may have alleviated some of the wait period for the slaves in Luanda, the high prices of food lead those ships to disregard the food allocation requirements, and the slaves continued to pass away in high numbers. Of the last nine ships that left Luanda legally, three were governor Noronha's.⁴¹⁷ The governors' usurpation of the slave trade in this way was hallmark of this period. High-ranking government officials such as the governor dominated the sale of shipping space (*praças*), and many of the governors were considered the most notorious individuals in the slave trade. The sale of shipping space became increasingly monopolized by the governors, which excluded many from the trade.⁴¹⁸ The preference given to the governor's ships continued to occur until the 1720 law prohibiting them from commerce.

After the law took effect the shortage of ships continued. The governor-sponsored vessels were no longer allowed to run. Although the governor could not trade, more ships were necessary in order to compensate for the losses. This allowed for more freedom in terms of where the ships could be sent, but it severely exacerbated the already problematic shortage.⁴¹⁹ The interim governor, *Mestre de Campo* José Carvalho da Costa took it upon himself to aid in the reorganization of the Angolan slave trade after the law. He outlawed the sale of *praças*,⁴²⁰ and raised freight charges from five thousand to seven thousand *reis*.⁴²¹ Luso-African slave traders that had experienced a series of difficulties as recent crown ordinances favored Lisbon merchants fought against the increase that was also not being followed by many of the participants. The sale of shipping space was yet another way for the powerful officials to monopolize the trade, and the intention was to permanently end this.⁴²² The interim governor ordered in his public announcement that the institution of *praças* should be ended "so that the shipping space <was> divided up in the most convenient way."⁴²³ The new high price for shipping area drew many ship owners to sell space that exceeded the amount allowed by the 1684 ordinance.⁴²⁴ This led the Luso-Africans to cite the law under the auspices of slave safety, although it was surely for their own ends. They viewed this change as a failure, favoring outsiders rather than the Luso-Africans, and it did not resolve the lack of departures.

⁴¹⁷ May 20, 1712, AHU, Angola, cx. 19.

⁴¹⁸ March 21, 1716, AHU, Angola, cx. 20.

⁴¹⁹ March 14, 1722, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

⁴²⁰ May 24, 1725, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

⁴²¹ Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 332.

⁴²² May 24, 1725, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

⁴²³ "para que as praças se repartam na forma mais conveniente," May 24, 1725, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

⁴²⁴ May 24, 1725, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

Regardless of the new tax and the increased competition, sentiments from a year earlier remained as they “they still felt the diminution and delay.”⁴²⁵

The Brazilian gold made it possible for many Luanda merchants to meet the price demands because of the lucrative slave sales in Brazil. Regardless of the shipping fees, other surcharges, maintenance and upkeep, among other expenses in most cases they were still able to profit. Many Luanda merchants sold their holdings and eventually moved to places such as Brazil while the slave process were still favorable. By the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century these intrusive changes in the slave trade and the lack of governmental regulatory vigilance in other areas led many slavers to send slaves directly to Brazil from Loango and Benguela.

In addition to Loango’s multinational slave trade along the coast, Benguela emerged as an important slave export area. Benguela had always been an important slave port in Angola, however it traditionally exported slaves to Luanda before sending them throughout the Atlantic. Benguela was a city of roughly three thousand inhabitants at the time, and slavery was the major industry in the area.⁴²⁶ The reduced military presence in Benguela and its distance from Luanda allowed for the merchants to slave trade without a great deal of interference. Because many of the area’s inhabitants were merchants, and primarily former criminals without administrative vigilance, they could trade without worrying about regulations. Merchants slave traded in Benguela because they could use methods discouraged in Luanda, and they could easily avoid the slave export duties expected by the contractor.⁴²⁷ Due to opportunities afforded by the slave trade to Brazil and the lack of ships in Luanda, Benguela began exporting slaves directly to the Americas by 1716.⁴²⁸ In 1717, Governor Henrique de Figueiredo e Alarcão observed that another reason that Luanda was having difficulties producing was because of the increased slaving activities in the two peripheral ports.⁴²⁹ After Benguela began shipping human cargo directly to the Americas, the slave trade in the port intensified rapidly. Often disregarding regulations enforced in Luanda, Benguela sent vessels carrying freight over the allotted capacity. Preference towards Benguela because of more lenience in terms of standards made a marked difference in the composition of the Angolan slave trade, and the observations made by Governor Figueiredo were affirmed a decade

⁴²⁵ “ainda se sente a diminuição e demora,” June 28, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.

⁴²⁶ Candido, “Merchants and Business,” p. 1.

⁴²⁷ Mariana Cândido, “Trans-Atlantic Links: The Benguela: Bahia Connections, 1700-1850,” in Ana Lucia Araujo, ed., *Paths of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Interactions, Identities, and Images*, New York: Cambria Press, 2011; David Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict*, p. 140.

⁴²⁸ Candido, “Merchants and Business,” p. 2.

⁴²⁹ Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict*, p. 137.

later by the sitting Governor Albuquerque.⁴³⁰ Benguela's allure drew officials such as from the Municipal Council to the port for trade, even as they complained of its growing importance. At the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century for example, the public officials were investing in slave ships that were between three and four times the average size vessels sent from Brazilian and Portuguese merchants.⁴³¹ Trading in Benguela would have been especially desirable after the new tax placed on slaves in 1723 to compensate for increased colonial expenses.⁴³²

Gold found in Brazil at the turn of the eighteenth century directly effected the economic enhancement of the slave trade. "Gold was used to buy slaves, and higher demand met higher prices, and more gold, expanding the slave trade."⁴³³ The cyclical nature of the reactionary processes created by gold effected many other spheres of Angolan life, directly connected to the slave trade. Ports along the Angolan coast became independent exporters, and the slave trade became far more lucrative, especially when sending the slaves to Rio de Janeiro. Because gold was a commodity that could not expire or be used up, it retained its illustriousness and high value creating trust in the metal. As such, gold "created an explosion of credit."⁴³⁴ Regardless of whether goods were sent back to Angola from Brazil, the bankers and large-scale merchants that were not directly affected by the problems that the issue induced were able to finance more slave voyages. The immense amount of credit that was enabled through the acquisition of gold allowed for the preexisting commercial relationships to expand. As the Crown set the price of gold, even the slaves in Minas Gerais were bought through credit by miners. Buying slaves through credit often carried interest rates of up to ten percent, and took three to four years to pay off.⁴³⁵ This affected not just Portuguese, Brazilian, or Angolan financiers to profit but also smaller scale merchants and commercial actors down to the *pombeiros*. Almost immediately after gold made its first major impact in 1699 there were "an estimated ten merchants for each *peça de India*" in Luanda alone.⁴³⁶

The credit boom in Angola was important to all of the commercial actors in the colony. However, just as credit allowed people more investment opportunities, it created a large amount of debt. Enslavement by debt became a common form of doing so, eventually transitioning the form of slaving from warring raids to extreme indebtedness. The credit increase did not cause this form of enslavement, but greatly exacerbated its usage. This meant

⁴³⁰ April 17, 1727, AHU, Angola, cx. 23; December 20, 1729, AHU, Angola, 1729.

⁴³¹ December 20, 1729, AHU, Angola, 1729.

⁴³² January 23, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 21.

⁴³³ Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 305.

⁴³⁴ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 16.

⁴³⁵ Russell-Wood, p. 62.

⁴³⁶ Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 27.

that Africans indebted to others would sell themselves into slavery, or offer their family members into the industry in order to compensate for losses they could not repay. Another option was a form of indentured servitude, or “pawnship,” in which indebted Africans would sign themselves into temporary slavery until their debts were cleared.⁴³⁷ In several cases, Africans that agreed to this form of payment never returned to free status. Corrupt politics, the judicial system, or sale to Brazil before their time was up where people could not verify their timespan until freedom made it prohibitively difficult to become emancipated. Merchants such as Luso-Africans that traded among the Angolan or regional circuits that did not have the same level of direct contact with gold incurred a great deal of debt. African and Luso-African slave owners that found themselves indebted to others often ceded their slaves as a form of payment as well.

Conclusion

The turn of the eighteenth century was a transformative period in the Angolan slave trade. The slave trade was a preexisting institution in Angola, and it largely grew out of itself into the Atlantic sphere. Although it is widely held that Africans controlled the slave trade from the hinterland all the way to the port of export, the commercial markets that the Portuguese and African merchants worked through and the valorization of external goods exchanged for slaves brought the Africans into the wider commercial system. Warring methods of capturing slaves existed as well, but financial opportunities and credit produced through the acquisition of gold increased the use of indebtedness to accrue slaves and colonize the Africans through bringing them into the European economic system at a disadvantage.

The study of Atlantic History and its ideological parameters is essential to the study of the slave trade in order to show the interconnected nature of the institution. It also exposes the manner in which the issues from the previous chapters are intrinsically linked to the trade and vice-versa. It allows the hinterland as well as the coast to be brought into the Atlantic sphere through showing the plurality of perspectives that impacted the entirety of the Angolan colony, and its influence throughout the Atlantic. Finding a nodal point for historical reference such as the Portuguese empire permits one to detect the ways that it interacted with other empires or African kingdoms as well as institutions. In this way, comparisons can be made as forces affect the Portuguese empire, as well as identify how the influences had a direct impact on it. Although Atlantic History attempts to lose the European perspective as the dominant one, it allows for it to assume its own place within the Atlantic as a reference and a lens through

⁴³⁷ See Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “The Business of Slaving: Pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810,” *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2001), pp. 67-89.

which other areas are studied. This also creates a method for common language or frontiers to be used in order to study the way that concepts such as commerce, colonization or politics were connected not just within themselves, but how they were co-dependently related through a series of internal and external forces and individuals. The concrete, ideological, and institutional issues considered throughout this chapter and this dissertation are shown to intercept through economic motives, yet were greatly impacted by processes of change stimulated through events that did not initially directly affect them. The slave trade at the turn of the eighteenth century in Angola clearly experienced a series of major changes that altered the colonial Angolan composition as a result.

The 1684 law was instituted with humanitarian rhetoric that claimed to be for the well being of the slaves. The law was an attempt to reduce slave mortality throughout the trans-Atlantic voyage. In reality, this was advantageous to the slave traders whose profits were contingent upon the slaves' safe arrival to the Americas. This law was theoretically advantageous for both the perceived humanitarian purpose and the commercial one, yet it led to unforeseen problems that resulted from the discovery of gold in Brazil. The intensification of the slave trade and its concentration in Rio de Janeiro incited serious levels of corruption, and the shortage of ships created by this law were exacerbated by the governors' preferential treatment towards ships carrying his slaves, or those of his accomplices. The shortage made merchants procure slaves in other Angolan ports that were less observed by authorities, and this coincided with other ports in Angola such as Loango, or Benguela that began sending slaves directly to Brazil instead of through Luanda. After 1720, the shortage of ships was still largely due to the governor and the 1684 law, however the lack of the governors' contribution to commerce was in fact what continued to the shortage. When the residing governor eliminated the sale of *praças* in 1725 and raised the surcharge on freight, it was a further attempt to democratize the slave trade and to brindle the accentuated trade to Rio de Janeiro. However unsuccessful the enactment of this law may have been in the long run, it shows a continuation of the law enforced in 1720 moving towards a more liberally commercialized slave trade in Angola, and the influence of external factors that impacted Angola on the Atlantic stage.

Conclusion

The turn of the eighteenth century in Angola was an important period of change that impacted politics, commerce, and colonization. Although their objectives were distinct, they could not have functioned individually without the presence of all. Angola was a territory that functioned in different ways whether in the hinterland, on the coast, or its influence throughout the Atlantic Ocean. However, each of the geographical areas was intrinsically connected through the interdependence of the Portuguese political and commercial agents as well as Africans.

The Portuguese political structure in Angola was inherently militaristic. The governor was both a military position and the highest authority in the colony. The Crown entrusted the governors of Angola with a wide array of powers that were intended to maintain strong connections with the metropole and its interests. Governors throughout this period showed devotion to the imperial military interests through the transportation of in many cases hundreds of troops to replenish the losses incurred in the colony. Regardless of transporting high numbers of troops, they were largely inexperienced soldiers, or unaccustomed to the grueling Angolan conditions. Because many of the soldiers were forced to immigrate, they were uncommitted, and many left their positions. Governors additionally showed a great deal of these interests through correspondence with the crown in form of inventories that the central authorities requested, or in Governor Albuquerque's case, characterized the colony as being in a deplorable state while showing what he has done to fix it using militaristic rhetoric. The motive for characterizing the colony in this way was to incentivize further financial support that could be used to promote the colonization effort and the military enterprise in the interior whose success was exaggerated. Although increasing military force in the interior was justified because of warring with the native populations or external attacks such as Benguela that depleted hinterland resources, much of the correspondence that relayed the state of the colony mischaracterized the reality. The level of control of the interior was no more than nominal, especially anywhere outside of the districts along the Kwanza River where the interior communities were lead by captain-majors that the governors chose.

Captain-majors oversaw districts and *presídios* throughout the Angolan hinterland from Benguela up through the Kwanza River. Although their primary role was militaristic, they had

a variety of duties that they were expected to fulfill. The demographic that the governor's chose the captain-majors from indicates that they were chosen for economic reasons rather than military. Both the *lançados* or their descendants, and *degredados* were notorious for their commercial skills. Whether these groups chose to flee into the hinterland or were forced to leave their country, they would generally not have felt a strong sense of allegiance towards Portugal and its aspirations. Africans or Luso-Africans that were chosen for the position were desirable because their intrinsic identity with the Africans was beneficial to trade relationships. It was especially beneficial to the slave trade, and fortifying commercial relationships with the African communities.

Captain-majors served in remote locations that made it prohibitively difficult to communicate regularly with Luanda or even interact with Portuguese individuals. The journey to most *presídios* by land took several months, and unauthorized Europeans were not permitted inland. The extreme isolation that the captain-majors suffered would surely have caused the captain-majors to adopt African traits. This is expected, as Roquinado Ferreira states: individuals that "ventured out to the *sertões* ended up more culturally black."⁴³⁸ Aside from who the captain-majors were, if they were born outside of Angola, they certainly felt less of an identity with Portugal after long periods of being not only far from the metropole, but also from the Angolan political center. This led them to trade with foreign nations, and act in ways that most benefited themselves.

The position was highly regarded as a means to wealth. The post was filled with well-connected and ambitious individuals that pursued higher returns. In the same regard, the governors chose captain-majors that formed economic collusions. The governors traded immensely with these hinterland commercial intermediaries that exchanged their goods for slaves at favorable prices and high quantity. Acquired slaves could then be sent throughout the Atlantic on the governors' vessels. In order to meet the demand for slaves to profit from, the captain-major used military force. They waged war on African communities, especially in the peripheral regions taking slaves by force or receiving them as a reward in war. This was a difficult yet lucrative way of enslavement, but it greatly damaged relations with the African communities.

The ties forged between the governor and the captain-major created decisive trade advantages, but other colonial officials challenged them. The Municipal Council attempted to end the captain-majors' monopolistic hold on interior trade in 1703. Including various other attempts, the Council tried to eliminate captain-majors in the districts and make those at the

⁴³⁸ Ferreira, *Cross-cultural Exchange*, p. 35.

presídios go under review at the end of their term. Citing reprehensibly violent acts committed by the Captain-Majors, they protested their continued recklessness that was affecting the entire colony. However detrimental the warring tactics were to colonial relations, their trade with governors was detrimental to the Council's commerce as well. Many Council members were also merchants with trade aspirations in the interior, and the hinterland officials hindered their ability to have favorable trade conditions themselves. Replacing captain-majors with clerks would have allowed the Council to trade more freely, and have those indebted to them recorded. The move would have created freer trade, yet the Council members themselves would have benefitted. Although this did not occur, the law prohibiting high-ranking officials was enforced.

The 1720 law essentially ended the collusion between captain-majors and governors, but it had much larger implications. When the two positions could no longer form a commercial alliance, commerce became more widely democratized, and the captain-majors began to accrue slaves through credit rather than warring techniques. Unrest continued in the hinterland, but warring techniques to acquire slaves became obsolete. Depleted human resources because of previous slave apprehension and the military services expended made the method difficult to continue. Credit was extremely efficient as a means of enslavement because its use was so common. The advantage that high ranking officials such as the captain-majors had on credit made it difficult for small-scale merchants to fulfill their agreements, and they were often sold into slavery to repay losses. Whether individuals repaid with family members, or enlisted themselves, after 1720 indebtedness was by far the most common form of enslavement.

Porters called *pombeiros* were the most common traders in the Angolan interior that furnished the coast with goods. These traders were Africans that by the turn of the eighteenth century were primarily slaves, or lowest in the social strata. They covered large distances between the various commercial centers sent by enslavers and coastal merchants. In this way they connected commercial networks throughout the interior as well as between the hinterland and the coast. They traded an array of goods, and primarily bundles for slaves. The bundles were made up of a series of goods that could not all be found in the same place, and composing the bundles required deepening the commercial and credit networks. Many other forms of traders existed, but the differentiating names surfaced later in the eighteenth century.

Luso-Africans were also important to the Angolan commercial network supplying the coast with goods from the interior. The Luso-Africans often owned slaves for themselves, and to sell on the coast. Those who arrived voluntarily came for commercial purposes very

involved in trade and primarily married into the African community. They came from many different backgrounds that historians tend to group under the Luso-African umbrella term, and formed strong trade bonds with Africans and Europeans.

Angolan merchants traded expansively throughout the interior and on the coast, but bankers and merchants trading in highest volume were the financiers that enabled the expansion of commerce. The great merchants financed trade in Angola and the slave trade. They invested in diverse ways financing commercial voyages while not necessarily taking direct ownership of the slaves or products that boarded their vessels. Credit began with these merchants that profited enormously using credit types such as *letras* that secured profits and allowed them to accrue immense wealth and pump more and more credit into trade. Many of these merchants alimented commerce in Angola, but lived elsewhere in the Altantic such as Brazil and Portugal. Merchants of this type that lived in Angola frequently had family members that they traded amongst throughout the empire, acting as agents securing and selling their goods. This was the case for Diogo da Fonseca Henriques who was the royal tax-farming contract holder in Angola, yet had several family members in Brazil and Portugal with whom he traded.

Many Luso-Africans held the royal tax-farming contract at the turn of the eighteenth century until the 1720s when it became primarily merchants from the metropole. These contracts were auctioned off to merchants that were ceded monopoly rights on products in a particular location, in this case Angola. The royal tax-farming contract gave monopoly rights to the slave trade as well as ivory as an additional product. Each slave that left Angola was taxed, and the proceeds were split between the Crown and the contractor. The contractor sold licensure to his associates that either helped regulate the cumbersome tax collection, or were directly involved in the transportation of slaves. Part of the contractors' contractual duties was to support municipal and governmental facilities. The contractor paid a yearly stipend to several institutions. However, in virtually all of the cases from this time, the contract began with the payment of the Angolan troops.

The contracts stated that the holder had to subsidize the military salaries. This evinces the connection between the military government and the commercial sector. Colonization efforts in the Angolan hinterland expanded the Portuguese sphere of influence that increased trade connections. It also accrued slaves for the merchants that were taxed by the contractors upon departure. When the slaves brought from the hinterland were taxed, it paid the contractor, who in turn paid the troops' salaries. Militarization and colonization of the interior benefited the contractor, while the contractor benefited the military. While the credit increase in the

early 1700's provided more opportunities for merchants, it drew attention away from Luanda towards ports on the Loango coast and Benguela. Throughout this period, British merchants in Cabinda posed a serious threat to Portuguese commerce, politics and colonization.

In 1684 The Portuguese established an accord with the Kingdom of Kongo to prohibit English trade agents from trading there or any further south. The Vili Kingdom on the Loango Coast traded extensively with foreigners. For decades several European empires traded with the Vili while attempting to create a stronghold in the region. English merchants sent *mubires* into the interior that were essentially their *pombeiros*. The Vili benefited enormously from trade with the Europeans, and it was in their best interest to maintain free trade in the region. The Portuguese were extremely threatened by the *mubires* encroachment on Portuguese territory. The African porters covered great distances inland, and went through São Salvador down into the Dande. The Portuguese considered this their territory, and not only were the agents successfully trading with captain-majors in the interior, but the goods transported by the *mubires* were traditionally cheaper and higher quality. This was not only negative for Portuguese merchants, but also for colonization efforts as this empowered the African traders and showed the increasing presence of British exploratory interests in Africa.

The Loango Coast produced between three and four thousand slaves per annum for Portuguese traders, and losing this influx would be extremely detrimental to the colony. It also fabricated the monetary cloths used as currency, and minted much of the copper circulated in Angola. Valuable export items such as ivory came predominantly from Loango, which was important to the contractors as well. Ivory was also an item that was smuggled out as seen in Fonseca Henriques' debacle that led him to prison. The fact that the product was valuable enough in places such as Portugal for ivory to be smuggled out gives ever more importance to Loango as a region of immensely important production and extraction. In 1721, British merchants constructed a fort in Cabinda under the pretexts of facilitated trade. Doubts concerning their real intentions were realized when it became clear that the English merchants fully intended to remain in the area after purchasing a plot of land and began furnishing a trade monopoly at the port. Other Europeans and the Africans despised the monopoly, but the Portuguese were most concerned because of expansionist implications. The English merchants' actions indicated that they intended to stay and expand. The British began venturing down the coast intruding on French trading stations, spreading further down Angola. Two years after the fort was constructed, Portuguese military forces razed the structure with help from the Africans.

There was no substantial Portuguese sustained military or political presence on the Loango Coast. However, the Portuguese considered the territory to be under their jurisdiction, as seen in the royal monopoly contracts and correspondence concerning the English in Cabinda. Loango was a crucial region for Angolan commerce because of its natural resources and slaves, and their loss had serious implications for the state of the colony. The British threat to interior trade was hindering the commercial and colonization initiatives, which affected the coastal merchants. The English monopoly at Cabinda would have been disastrous to fulfillment of the monopoly contracts that fueled the Atlantic slave trade and paid for colonial resources such as the military. This is especially significant as Luanda was losing its illustriousness as the prime slave export area. Trade in Loango had a commercial advantage because the products were often higher quality and cheaper than in Luanda that had more rigorously enforced regulations. With the cargo restrictions and high demand for slaves, Angolan commerce could not afford to lose Loango.

The limitations on human cargo instated in 1684 impacted not only Angola, but the Atlantic, especially in the southern hemisphere. The merchants involved in the slave trade could no longer load as many slaves as possible into their ships, which was detrimental to business in Brazil, as well as the Angolan enslavers that were required to wait far longer for slaves to leave Luanda. The slaves sent from the hinterland by the captain-majors and interior merchants were not leaving at the same rate as before. The governors' ships were given primacy, leaving before other ships, which was also problematic for the flow of goods. Although the law proved important for seemingly humanitarian efforts while concurrently resolving the issue of slave mortality, it disallowed the supply of slaves from meeting the demand.

The discovery of gold in Minas Gerais around 1695 added another dimension to the shortage of transport means. Because the easiest access point to what became Minas Gerais was Rio de Janeiro, the vast majority of slaves were sent to the Brazilian port to goldmine. Rio de Janeiro became extremely sought after as a slave importation area because of the gold mining, but the devaluation of previously important agricultural zones such as Bahia and Pernambuco meant that they were not receiving the adequate amount of slaves to fulfill local demand. Without sufficient manpower, the region could not produce the previously enjoyed amount of crops.

Rio de Janeiro was flourishing because of the mining industry, slaves were sold at astronomically higher prices there, and the shortage of slaves in the other regions drove up the price of agriculture. Because many of the agricultural products consumed in Angola were

grown in Brazil, the prices affected the Angolan economy and standard of living. This made products such as tobacco much more expensive than that sold in Angola and used in the bundles to buy slaves. The English porters, *mubires*, were notorious for selling tobacco in the Angolan hinterland, and this would have made their tobacco cheaper than that sold by their Portuguese counterparts. The price of flour is a recurrent issue in the sources from this period, and it was a staple product of consumption. Flour was used as a supplementary form of payment for many colonial officials. The military in Angola was paid in part in flour, which placed higher burden on the contractor that supplemented the cost of the product for their salaries, and the soldiers that received the product. These financial burdens made colonial expenditures rise, which impacted colonization efforts in the interior, making the officials consistently plead for more financial resources.

These issues least affected the bankers and businessmen because they were supplying the financial means of transport and profiting enormously from gold. The gold was siphoned back towards the metropole, and benefited the most powerful businessmen rather than the small-scale merchants, which allowed them to enormously increase the amount of credit given to the merchants dealing in Angolan commerce. Injecting credit into the Angolan commercial relationships allowed for the trade relationships to grow, but gold was still the most lucrative concern. Before 1720, the governors were still some of the most involved men in the slave trade, and the lack of ships caused by preference towards Rio de Janeiro came to be attributed by governors' withdrawal from commerce. This was a continuing problem, but the intent was to allow more democratized trading methods in Angolan commerce, including merchants in the civil government such as the Municipal Council that did not view the law as applying to them. When the governor motioned to outlaw shipping space in 1725, it was an additional measure to weaken trade collusions that could continue to influence where ships were sent. Although this did not garner a great deal of success until later, it evidenced a continued effort towards curbing the special interests of the time period in order to change and regularize trade in a way that was less detrimental to Angolan society and commercial relationships.

The marriage between the government and commerce in Angola was evident in the hinterland, on the coast, and throughout the Atlantic. Not only was relationship evident in each place, but the connectivity between the three places is clear. Discussing the interlinked nature of the institutional and spatial spheres is enhanced by the study of Atlantic History. The relatively new field of Atlantic history has still not been adequately defined in terms of its ideological and methodological parameters, and many authors disagree about how to resolve them. Many contemporary authors contribute to the area of study by identifying reconciliatory

reference points for its study, and others by contributing research on micro-histories that can be reapplied to the bigger picture that expose further trends and anomalies that show influences throughout the Atlantic contributed by subgroups and previously marginalized demographics.

The Atlantic slave trade helps define Atlantic History in many ways concerning the spatial and temporal dimensions throughout the modern period between the four continents. It also aids in showing the external influences that were present in Atlantic History and the Angolan commercial networks. Authors have shown that Africans from Angola had a great impact on cultures throughout the Atlantic, and research is now being done to give voice to particular sects of African society that can distinguish between different societies' cultural and geopolitical traits that were transferred throughout the Atlantic area.

It is through these particular traits that Atlantic History can be quantified in terms of contributions from micro-histories to macro-histories. Future research will be able to define the intricacies of Atlantic history, but the current undefined state of the historical area may be a positive aspect. The lack of definition allows for a more egalitarian way of showing mutual influences, processes, systems and institutions because of the lack of a nodal point. It also permits different reference points to have distinct parameters through which they are able to view Atlantic History. This makes it more conducive to Angolan history throughout this period in order to view the convergence of several different institutions and processes that impacted one another in order to discern a common driving force using the Portuguese empire as a lense.

The common force at the turn of the eighteenth century in Angola perceived through trends affected by events between 1684 and the first quarter of the eighteenth century stemming from the law in 1720 that united politics, commerce, and colonization, along with the agents of change within those institutions was economic. Colonizing efforts from the governors upon arrival and throughout their tenure shown through inventories and correspondence always had an implicit or explicit need for financial resources because of the quality of resources and troops. The captain-majors' colonizing tactics of war changed to indebtedness because of their own financial gain attained through the changing methods. The most effective form of colonization throughout this period was economic in that the African communities became accustomed to European goods and the sale of slaves into the Atlantic system. Historians such as Joseph Miller and John Thornton concur that European goods were not a necessity for Africans within their local commercial structure. However, they began to value European goods that became sought after for social stratification. This was a contributor to the decentralization of African societies as they became more dependent on commercial

centers controlled by the Portuguese. Many Africans benefitted from the European trade as seen with the Vili traders that became wealthy through commerce on the Loango Coast. It is also evident that Africans essentially controlled interior trade. The transferral of slaves in Angola predated European contact, however the way that they viewed slaves and the exchange of goods changed as a result of European intervention. As the slave trade grew decisively after 1695, more and more forced migration depleted the population of the African communities and the goods received for slaves were not as valuable to the Europeans as the loss of manpower was to African production. Commerce at the *presídios* was a standardizing force that acculturated many of the Europeans, but it unremittingly drew the Africans into the European system.

Commercial success in Angola was mutually dependent on all levels of the economic system. It demonstrates the interconnectedness of the various colonial political figures and merchants whose involvement or seclusion from trade greatly impacted the entirety of the commercial sector. From the Africans in the interior to the coastal businessmen, many people were intimately involved in trade or directly affected by it. The Angolan hinterland was deeply connected to the coast through the confluence of commercial and waterways that in turn deeply affected commerce throughout the Atlantic. When laws such as in 1720 that excluded governors from trade occurred, it affected not only themselves but the entirety of the commercial system. The turn of the eighteenth century in Angola was clearly a period of change that impacted commerce, politics, and colonization from the hinterland throughout the Atlantic.

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
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Appendix I


The Loango Coast




This is a map of the Loango Coast trading networks. The map is courtesy of Joseph Miller in *way of Death*, p. 210, enhanced with arrows depicting the English trade agents' expansion into Portuguese jurisdiction.

Appendix II

Map of the Angolan Hinterland





Map Courtesy of Roquinaldo Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange*, p. 20, enhanced to include the *presídio* at Muxima.